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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett founded both
the Washington College of Law (“WCL”) and D.C.’s Women’s
Bar Association (“WBA”) at a time when women did not receive full and equal participation in society, a time when women
were not allowed to participate on a jury, practice law, or even
vote in elections. Over a hundred years later, a lot of progress
has been done, but our society has yet to create total equality; as
Hillary Clinton stated in her concession speech for the Democratic nomination, “[a]lthough we weren’t able to shatter that
highest, hardest glass ceiling this time, it’s got 18 million cracks
in it.”
By challenging oppressive norms and educating our
community on diversity and the law, The Modern American
continues to chip away at the glass ceiling. In recognition of
these continuing struggles, we proudly dedicate this issue to
women in the law. To celebrate the legacy of our founders and
honor our shared history, our magazine hosted a Women’s Bar
Association event on October 16th, 2008, and welcomed the
WBA’s historic archives to the law school’s Pence Law Library.

This issue also presents an array of topics such as the
death penalty and its racial undertones, the rights of transgendered individuals, the rights of parents to teach hate speech to
their children, and the rights of Native American communities,
to name a few.
We have a lot to look forward to in 2009. On April
2009, The Modern American’s Fourth Annual Symposium will
gather renowned scholars, who will address the separation of
church and state and the regulation of morality as it affects
cross-cultural relations in our community. Additionally, we will
welcome a new Executive Board. And, beginning with this issue, our publication will be printed in an environmentally
friendly manner. Finally, subscribers will now be able to access
The Modern American through V.lex, LexisNexis, and the
Westlaw database.
In closing, we hope our issue inspires you to continue
fostering the discourse on diversity and embracing everyday
change in your community.

This issue features the winning essay of a joint WBATMA writing competition, as well as an article describing the
shared history of the WBA and WCL, and interviews with notable women in the legal profession.

Sincerely,

The Executive Board
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FAIR HOUSING LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
ROOMMATE SEEKERS
By
Chris A. Kolosov*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a biracial, heterosexual, female Buddhist, new
to Los Angeles and looking for a place to live. Short of money,
she notes the following roommate-wanted ads:
1. We are three Christian females… We have weekly
bible studies and bi-weekly times of fellowship.1
2. The person applying for the room MUST be a
BLACK GAY MALE.2
3. This is a Christian home and we are looking for a
Christian female to rent a downstairs room.3
She is unwelcome in at least two of the apartments, but
each ad is presumptively illegal. Fair housing laws prohibit discrimination based on religion, race, sex and, in some jurisdictions, sexual orientation.4 The federal Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”) and many state statutes and municipal ordinances exempt “Mrs. Murphy”5 landlords, who rent out rooms or apartments in smaller buildings where they reside. These landlords
can usually discriminate when selecting tenants, so long as they
do not advertise preferences or state discriminatory reasons for
rejecting applicants.6 In most states, these exemptions apply to
roommate-seekers, but some jurisdictions are more restrictive.7
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act of
18668 prohibits racial discrimination and many forms of national
origin discrimination in housing,9 and several lower courts have
concluded that the FHA does not preclude claims under the 1866
Act.10 Thus, both Mrs. Murphy landlords and roommate seekers
could be held liable for refusing to rent to people who are protected under the 1866 Act.
Today, people seeking roommates outnumber classic
Mrs. Murphy landlords,11 but, despite the distinct compatibility
concerns involved, fair housing laws do not acknowledge this
group as a separate category. Whereas boarding house owners
may impose rules upon tenants,12 compatibility is particularly
important to roommates as their conflicts are typically resolved
through discussion and compromise. Many landlords who enjoy
the Mrs. Murphy exemptions merely rent out separate apartments in buildings where they also reside. In this article, I explore whether fair housing laws violate the intimate association,
privacy, and free speech rights of people seeking roommates to
share their kitchens, bathrooms, and other common living areas.
I examine three types of laws: prohibitions on using discriminatory criteria when selecting a roommate, prohibitions on placing
discriminatory advertisements, and prohibitions on making discriminatory statements when interviewing potential candidates.
In Part II, I describe several adjudications in the roommate context, including cases brought against Internet sites that
provide forums and matching services for roommate seekers. In
Part III, I examine laws that bar discriminatory selection and
conclude that federal intimate association and privacy rights, as
well as privacy rights granted by the California constitution, are
violated if individuals do not have a completely free choice in
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selecting a roommate. In Part IV, I analyze advertising restrictions from both an intimate associate and privacy perspective
and under the commercial speech doctrine. I determine that,
although such restrictions survive intimate association and privacy challenges, only restrictions on discriminatory ads related
to race, ethnicity or national origin survive a free speech challenge. In Part V, I explain why prohibitions on discriminatory
statements are even more problematic, violating free speech,
privacy and intimate association rights. I conclude that, while it
is wise policy to allow roommate seekers greater leeway in advertising some preferences, restrictions on ads expressing preferences related to race, national origin and ethnicity are not only
constitutional, they are likely to advance the goals of the Fair
Housing Act.

II. THE ADJUDICATION OF ROOMMATE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Agency commissioners, and state and federal judges,
have adjudicated cases brought by rebuffed roommate applicants. A brief survey of a few such cases provides context for
the constitutional rights discussion that follows.13
1. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE
SELECTION AND STATEMENTS
In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v.
Larrick,14 two Caucasian women were seeking a third roommate
“to share their unit and help pay the rent.”15 During a phone conversation, one of the women told a bi-racial applicant that her
other roommate did not want to live with a black person. The
roommate seekers were found liable16 for discriminating on the
basis of race and for making racially discriminatory statements.
None of the exceptions to California’s Fair Housing code applied to the respondents because more than one roomer or
boarder lived in the dwelling.17
In Marya v. Slakey,18 an applicant sued the owner of a
six-bedroom house after a co-tenant discriminated against her.
The tenants executed a single lease and advertised and filled
vacancies after one-on-one interviews. Decisions on which candidate to select had to be unanimous, and all tenants had to be
non-smoking, vegetarian students. One tenant declined to interview the applicant, explaining that two Indian women already
lived in the house, and he did not want to live “with three people
of the same cultural orientation.”19 The applicant alleged she
had been denied housing on the basis of her race, color, national
origin and/or sex.20 The court held that the Mrs. Murphy exemption did not apply and would not have permitted discriminatory statements in any case. The court did not conclude that the
roommates were entitled to any special protections when creating criteria for cohabitants.21
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2. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE SELECTION
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed a local ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in Sprague v. City of Madison.22 Two roommates extended
an offer to a lesbian but later withdrew it, stating that they were
not comfortable living with her. The court held that the ordinance unambiguously applied in all housing rentals and rejected
the appellants’ argument that it was unconstitutional in the
roommate context: “Appellants gave up their unqualified right to
such constitutional protections when they rented housing for
profit.”23 Subsequent to commencement of the case, Madison’s
City Council had amended the ordinance24 to exempt roommates, but the court nonetheless held the defendants liable.25
The court’s conclusion that the solicitation of co-roommates
constitutes “renting housing for profit,” and that renters who do
so forfeit their privacy and First Amendment rights, may mean
that people who lack the resources to live alone are particularly
at risk of facing infringements on their constitutional rights.
3. PROHIBITIONS ON STATEMENTS/ADVERTISEMENTS
EXPRESSING PREFERENCES

4. PERMITTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION
The commissioners in Department of Fair Employment
and Housing v. Baker36 concluded that California’s statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination did not apply to a
roommate seeker. The respondent rejected a lesbian applicant
via voicemail, stating his other roommate was a Christian Fundamentalist, and they “would not get along too well.”37 The
commissioners explained that sexual orientation discrimination
was incorporated into California fair housing law through the
Unruh Civil Rights Act,38 which applies only to “business establishments,”39 and “does not apply to those relationships that are
truly private.”40 They further stated “truly private and social
relationships” are protected by the right of intimate association,
and held that the record did not reveal whether the respondent’s
housemate relationship “was sufficiently non-continuous, nonpersonal and non-social to preclude being a constitutionally protected intimate association.”41 The facts were thus insufficient
to show that his “housing operation constituted a ‘business establishment’ rather than a constitutionally protected intimate
association.”42

In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v.
5. CASES AGAINST INTERNET FORUMS OR ROOMDeSantis, a woman renter sought a roommate to share her twoMATE SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS
bedroom apartment “to help pay the rent.” 26 An African AmeriIn Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
can male potential renter stated that the advertised room was too
small, and asked to see the other bedroom. The woman refused, Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,43 a public interest consortium alindicating it was her room. The applicant later claimed that she leged that it had diverted substantial time and resources away
told him no room was available, and that she had denied him the from its fair housing program responding to Craigslist’s publicarental due to his race. A housingtion of discriminatory classified ads.44
rights group sent one Caucasian and
Many ads appeared to have been
one African American tester to the
placed by roommate seekers.45 The
apartment. The respondent told the
court held that Craigslist was afforded
Caucasian tester that she “really
by the Communications
The Court’s decision may mean that immunity
[doesn’t] like black guys. I try to be
Decency Act (CDA),46 under which
fair and all, but they scare me.”27 She people who lack the resources to live providers of an interactive computer
was legally permitted to discriminate alone are particularly at risk of fac- service are not to be treated as the
publisher of information created by
in selecting a roommate under California’s single roomer exemption, but ing infringements on their constitu- another content provider. Because
Craigslist served only “as a conduit”
was held liable for making a discrimitional rights.
for information provided by its users,
natory statement.28
it was not liable for ads that violated
In Fair Housing Advocates
fair housing laws.47 Roommate seekAssociation v. McGlynn,29 a black
female responded to an ad seeking a
ers who place discriminatory ads may
female roommate placed by a white
nonetheless be held individually liable
male. After inquiring about her race, he told her “blacks should as the content providers. Although the court’s analysis focused
live with blacks and whites should live with whites.”30 A fair on the CDA, in affirming the decision of the district court, the
housing organization then had testers contact the respondent.31 Seventh Circuit hinted at the constitutional rights issues raised
His behavior suggested he may have been seeking not just room- by the case, stating: “[A]ny rule that forbids truthful advertising
mate, but a girlfriend.32 He asked a black tester about her occu- of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters
pation, if she smoked or drank, if she had a boyfriend and why serious problems under the First Amendment.”48
she was not living with him, and if it would bother her that he
An online roommate matching service was similarly
was a white smoker who drank.33 He invited her to the apart- sued in Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com,49 but with a
ment, but she left after he asked her if she wanted a massage and very different outcome. Subscribers to the service respond to
then asked for a kiss.34 The respondent was found liable for questionnaires by selecting answers in drop-down menus.50 The
placing a discriminatory ad and for making discriminatory state- Ninth Circuit concluded that “By requiring subscribers to proments.35
vide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and
by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate
becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of
that information.”51 The Court thus remanded the case for a
4
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determination as to whether Roommate’s publication of certain
postings violates the FHA, “or whether they are protected by the
First Amendment or other constitutional guarantees.”52

III. OUTRIGHT BANS ON DISCRIMINATION
1. FEDERAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
AND DISCRIMINATORY SELECTION
In Roberts v. Jaycees, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association
encompasses roommate relationships, explaining that “highly
personal relationships” are protected because “individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”53 Though the Supreme Court specifically identified family
relationships, the Court imagined other relationships would be
similarly protected:
Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.
Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions
to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship. As a general matter only relationships with theses sorts of qualities are
likely to reflect the considerations that have
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.54
The identification of “selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation” underscores that relationships beyond blood
ties are protected. Because people cannot choose their families,
if only familial relationships were protected, identifying
“selectivity in decisions to begin” the association as a criterion
for determining whether a relationship is protected would be
incongruous. Roommate relationships, in particular, are characterized by each of the three factors identified by the Court in
Roberts. They are small, usually including no more individuals
than there are bedrooms in a dwelling. Most people are quite
selective when deciding to live with another person—they are
choosing someone who will have access to their possessions,
pets and personal information. And roommate relationships are
highly secluded. Roommates often see each other in their pajamas or underwear, and when they are sick, exhausted, or just
sad. People often hide from the rest of the world aspects of
themselves that are unavoidably revealed in the privacy of the
home.55
Thus, denying the right to choose cohabitants based on
personal criteria profoundly violates personal liberty, and fair
housing laws that ban discrimination outright should be subjected to strict scrutiny’s least restrictive means test. Yet, as
“liberty and autonomy” mean little if individuals are powerless
to decide with whom to create intimate relationships,56 no means
of combating housing discrimination could be more restrictive.
Special - Fall 2008

Prohibiting discriminatory selection only when housing is not
shared is a reasonable alternative because the result would likely
be the same. Because a roommate seeker may consider many
factors—compatible schedules, similar tastes in music or television—she can state many reasons for rejecting an applicant,
even if consciously or unconsciously her motivation is discriminatory preference. Furthermore, the exemption of Mrs. Murphy
landlords from all but the advertising and statement prohibitions
illustrates Congress’s belief that certain privacy interests are
important enough to justify some sacrifice of the FHA’s goals.57
Eliminating roommate choice is thus unlikely to pass the leastrestrictive-means test.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas58 has nonetheless led
some to conclude that federal intimate association and privacy
rights do not protect roommates.59 Six students challenged a
zoning ordinance limiting the occupancy of single-family dwellings to traditional families or to groups of not more than two
unrelated persons. The Court determined that the ordinance did
not compromise any fundamental right to association or privacy.
However, a zoning ordinance that prohibits groups of people
from living in certain areas is quite different from a law that
affirmatively requires an individual to accept a cohabitant. The
former only affects where people in an existing relationship may
live, but the latter determines with whom an individual must
create a relationship, at least if she cannot afford to live alone or
would prefer to have a roommate.60
In Carey v. Brown,61 the Supreme Court stressed the
importance of residential privacy: “The States’ interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”62
The Court continued, “Preserving the sanctity of the home, the
one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape the
tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value.”63 Not only has the Court chosen to protect residential
privacy,64 it has recognized privacy within the home as a constitutional right.65 The range of contexts in which the right has
been recognized suggests that it includes autonomy in determining the person roommate seekers are likely to greet first in the
morning and see last at day’s end.
2. PRIVACY RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS THAT PREVENT SEEKERS
FROM ULTIMATELY SELECTING ROOMMATES
At least nine state constitutions provide privacy protections more expansive than those afforded federally.66 In City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson,67 the California Supreme Court concluded that California’s privacy right68 protects roommate relationships when it struck down a zoning ordinance prohibiting
more than five unrelated persons from living together. The Court
described the plaintiffs: 69
They chose to reside with each other when
Adamson made it known she was looking for
congenial people with whom to share her
house. Since then, they explain, they have
become a close group with social, economic
and psychological commitments to each
other . . . they have chosen to live together
mainly because of their compatibility. . . . Appellants say that they regard their group as ‘a
family’ and that they seek to share several
5

values of conventionally composed families.
A living arrangement like theirs concededly
does achieve many of the personal and practical needs served by traditional family living.70
The Court concluded that California’s right to privacy encompassed the right to live with whomever one wishes, and Santa
Barbara would have to show a compelling public interest in restricting communal living.71 The highest Courts of New Jersey
and New York have concluded that similar zoning laws violated
state constitutional privacy or due process protections.72
The three part test for invasions of privacy announced
by the California Supreme Court in Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association73 suggests that roommate relationships are
protected beyond the zoning context and that roommate seekers
should have autonomy in selecting cohabitants. If a plaintiff
establishes: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3)
conduct by [the] defendant constituting a serious invasion of
privacy,” the defendant must show that the invasion substantively furthers a countervailing interest.74 The plaintiff may rebut that defendant’s assertion by showing there are alternatives
with a lesser impact on privacy interests.75
In Tom v. City and County of San Francisco,76 an ordinance preventing tenants-in-common from excluding other coowners from their individual dwellings was struck down under
this test. After pooling resources to acquire multi-unit residential property, the co-owners signed right-of-occupancy agreements specifying who would live in which unit. The court explained the effect of the ordinance, which had been passed to
discourage the conversion of rental housing to owner-occupied
housing: “[U]nrelated persons . . . would be required to share
occupancy of their dwelling units with each other, or could not
prevent other cotenants from entering their private living
space.”77 The court held that the city had articulated no interest
that justified “an extreme privacy violation, such as rendering
homeowners unable to determine the persons with whom they
should live, or forcing them to share their homes with others
who are unwelcome.”78
Fair housing laws that prohibit discriminatory roommate selection have a greater impact on privacy. The ordinance
struck down in Tom prevented the contractual protection of privacy, and thus tenants-in-common could theoretically have been
“forced to share their homes with others who [were] unwelcome.” But, as each co-owner was provided an individual
dwelling by mutual agreement, it was unlikely anyone would
actually invade another’s dwelling. However, fair housing laws
that require a roommate seeker to accept an applicant create
more than a theoretical burden. They force her to share her
home with someone “who [is] unwelcome.”79 As virtually any
alternative means of combating housing discrimination would
have a lesser impact on privacy, such laws are unlikely to be
upheld under California’s constitution.

IV. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY
ADVERTISEMENTS
1. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND FEDERAL
INTIMATE ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
The Supreme Court set a high bar for determining when
6

the right to intimate association has been violated, and federal
appeals courts have followed suit. Only laws that “directly and
substantially”80 interfere with the relationship have been struck
down, and laws creating significant burdens have been upheld
even in the context of marriage, a relationship that is in most
cases far more intimate than the relationships created between
roommates.81 Even when roommate seekers desire a close companion and not just someone to share the rent, advertising restrictions may require them to interview candidates whom they
are unlikely to choose, but in most cases, the prohibitions do not
prevent seekers from identifying suitable roommates and thus do
not violate intimate association rights.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,82 the touchstone case for the
“direct and substantial” interference standard, the Court reviewed a statute requiring parents with child support obligations
to obtain a court’s permission prior to remarriage. It held that
the law directly and substantially interfered with the fundamental right to marry, because it prevented people who could not
prove they could pay child support from remarrying.83 However, the Court made clear that laws only implicating the right to
marry would not face similar scrutiny: “[W]e do not mean to
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to
the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny. [R]easonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with the decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may be legitimately imposed.”84 The Court found
no significant interference in Califano v. Jobst,85 concluding that
a Social Security Act provision terminating benefits for a dependent, disabled adult upon marriage to someone ineligible for
benefits did not directly and substantially interfere with the right
to marry.
The Court’s conclusions in Califano may have been
influenced by its determination that the government has greater
authority to attach conditions to recipients of its own benefits.
However, in Montgomery v. Carr,86 the Sixth Circuit directly
contrasted Zablocki and Califano without suggesting that a different standard applied in Califano because a government benefit was involved. Rather, the court explained “the directness and
the substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry
distinguish[ed]” the two cases. It continued: “[w]hatever the
form of the government action involved . . . rational basis scrutiny will apply to the rationales offered by government defendants in cases presenting a claim that a plaintiff’s associational
right to marry has been infringed, unless the burden on the right
to marry is direct and substantial.”87
Furthermore, under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the government may not require a beneficiary to surrender a constitutional right as a condition to receiving a benefit.88 The Supreme Court has been unpredictable in applying the
doctrine,89 and has almost universally rejected challenges related
to government welfare programs.90 But notably, in cases involving privacy in family relationships, the explanation as to why the
laws under review were not found impermissible has been that
the government’s condition either did not substantially deter the
exercise of the rights,91 or its action was not sufficiently direct.92
This analysis mirrors the direct and substantial interference test
discussed in Zablocki and applied in the lower courts.
Even presuming the threshold for direct and substantial
interference varies with the government’s role, nothing in the
case law suggests that requiring roommate seekers to interview
additional applicants rises to the level of an unconstitutional
burden. Although the advertising restrictions remove a tool for
THE MODERN AMERICAN

filtering out candidates whom roommate seekers are unlikely to
accept, they create no limitation on seekers’ ability to say yes or
no to any candidate and thus do not “significantly interfere” with
the right to enter into the relationship. Facial challenges succeed
only where a law is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its
applications.93 In the few cases where a roommate seeker could
establish that the prohibitions actually prevented her from forming a roommate relationship,94 she could bring an as-applied
challenge. In most cases, the restrictions pass the “direct and
substantial interference” test and thus do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND
OTHER FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS

suitable applicants. However, it is unlikely that this would be
deemed a substantial limitation because the restrictions do not
limit whom a roommate seeker may consider or where she can
place her ads. They only require her to consider a broader group
of applicants than she might otherwise prefer, and ultimately she
controls the amount of time she dedicates to her search. Moreover, she maintains a great deal of control through her ad placement decisions. This is quite different from Carey, in which the
restrictions on how contraceptives could be distributed resulted
in a significant reduction in access not just to one’s choice of
contraceptive but to any contraceptives. Therefore, the restrictions on roommate ads are not unduly burdensome to the point
of violating the constitutional right to privacy.

3. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
Roommate seekers are unlikely to show that advertising
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
restrictions violate their privacy rights under the undue burden
standard that the Supreme Court has created in other privacy
Under California’s state privacy standard, a roommate
contexts: access to abortion or contraceptives. In Planned Par- seeker is unlikely to show that advertising prohibitions are an
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held invasion of privacy. She must establish: “(1) a legally protected
that a twenty-four hour waiting period for abortions imposed a privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
‘particularly burdensome’ obstacle on women with the fewest circumstances; and (3) conduct by [the] defendant constituting a
resources, “those who must travel long distances, and those who serious invasion of privacy.”102 People have a privacy interest in
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, em- selecting a roommate, but not a reasonable expectation of priployers, or others,”95 but that “[did] not demonstrate that the vacy “in the circumstances.” Because ads are a means of public
waiting period constitute[d] an undue burden.”96 Given this communication, it is logical that the interests of those who read
high bar, even if advertising restrictions require a person to in- ads, and not just those who place them, would be considered
when regulating content.
terview ten times as many
Furthermore, the restrictions on discriminatory
candidates in order to locate a
ads do not constitute a “serious invasion of
roommate, the burden they
privacy,” because in most cases, they do not
create is unlikely to be
actually prevent a roommate seeker from locatdeemed “undue,” particularly
because decisions involving People have a privacy interest in se- ing a suitable roommate, but merely require
him to interview additional candidates.103 It is
cohabitation are less fundalecting
a
roommate,
but
not
a
reamental than decisions involvin this third step that roommate advertising
sonable expectation of privacy “in differs from advertising for romantic partners.
ing reproduction.
The Court’s decision
Although such romantic partner ads are also a
the circumstances.”
in Carey v. Population Sermeans of public communication, people are
vices, International97 does
likely to have far more particularized criteria in
a greater number of areas when seeking
suggest that its standard for
mates.104 Advertising restrictions could subreviewing infringements on
privacy may sometimes be
stantially interfere with locating a compatible
lower than the abortion cases
companion due to the combination of characterindicate. The Court struck down a New York statute permitting istics sought. Moreover, there is typically a significantly higher
only licensed pharmacists to sell contraceptives, concluding that level of anxiety and fear of rejection105 involved with
it imposed a “significant burden” on the right to use contracep- “interviewing” potential lovers than there is with interviewing
tives.98 At first blush, it seems this law simply made it less con- potential roommates. Therefore, forcing those looking for love
venient for women to obtain contraceptives and was thus not so to “interview” many more applicants does constitute a much
dissimilar from the roommate advertising prohibitions. How- more serious invasion of privacy.
ever, the Court stated that although not a total ban, the law significantly reduced public access to contraceptives by increasing
4. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
costs and reducing privacy.99 In New York’s many small towns
The Supreme Court has explained that commercial
in 1977,100 where there may only have been one pharmacy, requiring an unmarried woman to interact with a pharmacist every speech may be distinguished “by its content”106 and has categotime she wanted to buy contraceptives could result in a decision rized speech that “inform[s] the public of the availability, nature,
to forgo the purchase entirely. In his concurring opinion, Justice and prices of products and services,”107 and speech in which the
Brennan emphasized that the law burdened the right to prevent speaker’s interests are “largely economic,” as commercial.108 It
conception “by substantially limiting access to the means of has further explained that the “diverse motives, means and meseffectuating that decision.”101
sages of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely
To some extent, advertising prohibitions “limit access varying degrees,” but that advertising “may be subject to reasonto the means” of finding a roommate, because searches become able regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.”109
more time-consuming and costly if people must interview un- Roommate ads apprise the public of the availability of rental
Special - Fall 2008
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housing, and although roommate relationships may be intimate, ity of property. Thus, the city was depriving its residents of
the ads placed by roommate seekers propose transactions that commercial speech rights enjoyed by virtually all other homebenefit them financially by reducing housing costs. Indeed, in owners. In contrast, prohibitions on discriminatory housing ads
are the norm, not the exception.
the cases discussed in Part II, multiple
Furthermore, unlike “For Sale” signs that, on
roommate seekers indicated that their
motives for seeking a roommate were It is not unlikely that people their face, send no stigmatizing message,
housing ads are per se harmfinancial.110 Moreover, offering shared
with racist attitudes live in discriminatory
ful and inflict an immediate harm on those
living space is not “inextricably intermore racially homogenous they degrade. In Florida Bar v. Went For It,
twined”111 with stating a roommate
Inc.,121 the Supreme Court upheld restrictions
seeker’s discriminatory criteria regarding
neighborhoods.
those with whom she wants to create an
prohibiting lawyers from soliciting personal
intimate association: As was discussed
injury or wrongful death clients within thirty
in Part IV.1, prohibitions on discriminatory ads rarely prevent a days of an accident under the Central Hudson test.122 It found
roommate seeker from locating a cohabitant.
the attorney ads offended their recipients and tarnished the repuRoommate ads should thus be evaluated as commercial tation of attorneys, and that the government has a substantial
speech, and their regulation evaluated under the four-part test interest in restricting speech that both creates an immediate harm
articulated in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. and has a demonstrable detrimental effect on a particular group.
Public Services Commission of New York.112 First, the speech The Court distinguished its decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drugs
must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading. Sec- Products Corp., striking down a federal ban on direct-mail adond, the government must assert a substantial interest. Third, vertisements for contraceptives, on the grounds that the harm
the regulation must advance that interest, and fourth, it may not that the attorney solicitations caused could not be “eliminated by
be “more extensive than necessary.”113 This does not mean the a brief journey to the trash can.”123 Whereas contraceptive ads
absolute least restrictive means; rather, the government has a may offend some people, they did not substantially burden reburden of affirmatively establishing a “reasonable fit” between cipients who could simply dispose of them.
its interest and the speech restriction.114 If, as discussed in Part
Similar to the attorney solicitations in Florida Bar that
III, the right to choose cohabitants is constitutionally protected were likely to create “outrage and irritation”124 in their recipiunder federal intimate association or federal or state privacy ents, racially discriminatory ads are likely to have an analogous
rights, then discriminatory roommate ads describe lawful activ- immediate impact on those they degrade.125 And, just as the
ity and are not misleading. Because the first prong of Central Court found that disposing of the attorney solicitations did little
Hudson is satisfied in the roommate context, the government to combat the offense they generated, once a discriminatory ad
must show a substantial interest in barring the ads, and that the has been read, its harm is not easily undone.
restrictions advance the interest asserted without being more
Moreover, like the ads in Florida Bar, racially disextensive than necessary.
criminatory ads create a secondary harm by perpetuating racially
homogenous housing patterns. In United States v. Hunter,126 the
Fourth Circuit found a newspaper editor liable under 42 U.S.C. §
A. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED TO RACE, NA3604(c) for publishing a Mrs. Murphy’s ad for an apartment in a
TIONAL ORIGIN OR ANCESTRY
“white home.” The court explained how seeing significant numAchieving residential integration was one of Con- bers of such ads in one part of a city could deter non-whites
gress’s primary goals when the FHA was enacted in 1968.115 from seeking housing in those neighborhoods, even if other
Nearly forty years later, racially homogenous housing patterns dwellings were available in those areas on a non-discriminatory
continue to be a serious concern.116 Thus, the government con- basis.127 It further explained that prohibiting even exempt landtinues to have a substantial interest in preventing housing dis- lords from placing discriminatory ads served the FHA’s purpose
crimination based on race. Despite the fact that roommate seek- because wide circulation of statements of personal prejudice
ers may ultimately select whomever they wish as cohabitants, could magnify their negative effect.128 The wide distribution of
any racially discriminatory housing ads in public forums frus- roommate ads stating racially discriminatory preferences may
trate the integration of communities by stigmatizing minorities similarly deter applicants from applying for roommate situations
and creating animosity. Thus, as a means of combating racially in certain areas. It is not unlikely that people with racist attihomogenous housing patterns, a direct and concrete harm, ad- tudes live in more racially homogenous neighborhoods. If an
vertising prohibitions do advance the goals of the FHA and are a applicant sees multiple racially discriminatory roommate listings
means no more extensive than necessary to achieve those goals.
in a particular neighborhood, she may determine that it would be
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Linmark wiser to seek housing elsewhere, thereby perpetuating the existAssociates, Inc. v. Willingboro117 reveals an unwillingness to ing housing pattern.
Further, racially discriminatory housing ads stigmatize
uphold laws enacted to promote integrated housing when the
burden on individual rights is too great.118 The Court struck minorities, frustrating the integration of communities. In his
down a ban on “For Sale” signs, despite a city’s contention that writings on racial stigma and African Americans, economist
promoting integration justified the ordinance because fear Glenn C. Loury describes two kinds of behavior: discrimination
among white homeowners that their property values would drop in contract (in the execution of formal transactions) and disas the town’s black population increased had caused “panic sell- crimination in contact (in the personal associations and relationing.”119 The Court sharply denounced the city’s restriction on ships created in the private spheres of life).129 Both have debilithe free flow of information.120 However, its decision must be tating consequences because the rules of contract and patterns of
considered in light of the type of restriction under review. “For contact control access to resources and social mobility.130
Sale” signs are a widely-used means of advertising the availabil- “Liberty and autonomy” would become meaningless if people
8
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could not discriminate when creating personal relationships, and nate could not publish discriminatory ads related to race, color,
thus discrimination in contact must remain a prerogative.131 religion, or national origin.141 The same arguments would apply
However, differential treatment of individuals in contract— regarding the number of Mrs. Murphy landlords that a minority
including housing—can be legitimately regulated because it boarder or renter would need to meet in order to create a
significantly contributes to racial inequality and stigma.132
“match” and locate housing in a predominantly white neighborA 2000 study measuring preferences among various hood, but Congress determined that the advertising restrictions
ethnic groups in Los Angeles illustrates the effects of racial were a necessary tool in achieving its integration goals.
The last prong of the Central Hudson test is thus satisstigma on housing.133 Subjects were asked to imagine the racial
mix of a neighborhood in which they would feel most comfort- fied. Although roommate seekers cannot ultimately be forced to
able. Forty percent of Asians, thirty-two percents of Latinos, live with someone against their will, because racially discriminaand nineteen percent of whites envisioned neighborhoods with tory ads stigmatize minority groups in a manner that frustrates
no African Americans, and immigrants were more likely to ex- integrated housing goals, eliminating such ads from widely acclude African Americans.134 This suggests that new arrivals to cessed public media is a means no more extensive than necesAmerica are taught that African Americans are a group to be sary to further the government’s interest in promoting integrated
avoided.135 Because discriminatory housing ads are widely cir- neighborhoods. Thus, as long as Central Hudson remains the
culated, they are likely to contribute to this stigmatization, even controlling test for commercial speech,142 roommate ads that
in cases in which the underlying discrimination is legal. Restric- discriminate on the basis of race, ancestry or national origin may
tions on roommate ads are not simply a case of the government be prohibited.
restricting speech in order to combat the spread of beliefs with
which it disagrees. Rather, it is regulating housing-related comB. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED
mercial speech to counteract a concrete housing-related harm.
TO OTHER PROTECTED CATEGORIES
The government’s substantial interest in promoting integration
thus meets the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
It is less clear that barring other types of discriminatory
One might argue that prohibiting discriminatory ads ads, like those expressing preferences based on sexualactually contributes to racially homogenous housing patterns orientation or religious practice,143 passes the Central Hudson
because allowing people to
test. The government has a substantial intercandidly state preferences
est in assuring that all citizens have equal
may encourage minorities to while preventing confusion may be a access to housing, but because roommate
seek housing where they oth- substantial government interest, it can seekers can ultimately choose their cohabierwise might not.136 If stattants, preventing them from advertising their
ing preferences is legal, mi- likely be achieved without a total ban. preferences does not make any additional
housing available to those with whom they
nority applicants may assume
that those who do not state such preferences would welcome prefer not to live. Whereas the FHA’s legislative history is rethem.137 To the contrary, if stating preferences is prohibited and plete with discussions regarding the need to racially integrate
in a predominantly white neighborhood half the roommate seek- housing,144 its history does not suggest that lawmakers were
ers are open to minority applicants and half are not, to create a concerned with integrating housing along other than racial
“match,” a minority applicant would have to visit twice as many lines.145 Thus, prohibiting ads stating preferences unrelated to
apartments in that neighborhood.138 The applicant may not have race does not serve the independent legislative objective of inteformal knowledge of those statistics, but over time and talking to gration. These ads do risk creating psychological injury and
others, she may come to suspect it and decide to avoid the white stigma, but the Supreme Court has held that the government may
neighborhood, thereby reinforcing the existing housing pat- not restrict speech only to prevent such harms. Its decision in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,146 striking down an ordinance that
tern.139
While this model is plausible, the “ifs” are significant. made it a misdemeanor to use inflammatory symbols to knowIf the percentage of roommate seekers in the white neighbor- ingly arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
hood who welcome minority applicants is more like 80% or of race, color, creed, religion or gender,” illustrates that a more
90%, the number of homes that the applicant would need to visit tangible interest is required to overcome a First Amendment
in order to create a “match” drops considerably, and the stigma- challenge. Racially discriminatory ads are unique because they
tizing effects of discriminatory ads in widely circulated media frustrate the integration of neighborhoods.
may reinforce existing housing patterns more than prohibitions
A second reason for applying advertising restrictions to
do. While it is plausible that if discriminatory ads are allowed, Mrs. Murphy landlords, and to roommate seekers, is that these
the absence of a stated preference may be turned into a positive, ads could create a false impression that housing discrimination is
the opposite is equally plausible. Seeing some racist ads may legal.147 People may see ads placed by individuals who are
create the impression that prejudice is more widespread than it uniquely allowed to discriminate, and mistakenly believe that
actually is. Applicants might assume that many more people are any landlord may do so.148 But, while preventing confusion may
racists—particularly people who live in areas with a dispropor- be a substantial government interest, it can likely be achieved
tionate number of discriminatory ads—but do not want to admit without a total ban. Such a ban would be “more extensive than
their prejudices in print.
necessary” because a policy to educate would suffice: DisclaimWhere there are conflicting factual theories, legislatures ers explaining that housing discrimination is illegal outside the
have latitude in shaping policy. In commercial speech and other roommate context could be mandated in any ad stating a disFirst Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has often de- criminatory preference.149 Restrictions that create a total ban on
ferred to legislative judgments.140 When the FHA was enacted, discriminatory ads unrelated to race, national origin, or ancestry
Congress decided that even those who are allowed to discrimi- therefore likely fail the fourth step of Central Hudson.
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c. ADS THAT USE RELIGION AS A PROXY FOR ETHNICITY

stem from religious beliefs.158 Because religious practice can
overlap with the organization of a household, locating cohabitants who share their faith and practices may be uniquely important for devout roommate seekers. When there are few fellow
practitioners in the communities where religious individuals
live, the advertising restrictions may make it extremely difficult
for devout roommate seekers to locate suitable cohabitants.
Several provisions in existing legal doctrine may provide additional grounds for as-applied challenges in these cases.

The difficult area is when race, national origin and ancestry categories overlap with religion. In Saint Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji, Justice Brennan explained “the line between discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics [] and
discrimination based on place or nation of ... origin, [] is not a
bright one.” 150 Similarly, for members of some religious
groups, like Muslims, Jews, Sikhs and Hindus, membership in
the religious group is equated with an ethnic distinction, not
simply a distinction based on belief. And, the Civil Rights Act
a. RFRAS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER RELIGIOUS
of 1866151 created protection for Jews against racial discriminaEXERCISE CLAUSES
tion—protection that remains intact.152 Thus, religious preferLiving with an individual of another faith could seriences in roommate ads must not be used as a means to skirt the
prohibitions on discriminatory ads related to race, national ori- ously burden the religious exercise of some roommate seekers.
gin, or ancestry. The intense discrimination faced by people An Orthodox Jew who maintains a kosher kitchen may be conidentified with Islam since September 11, 2001153 could eventu- cerned that a roommate who does not share her devotion would
ally drive them into segregated enclaves. And, although some compromise her practice—perhaps by eating meat on a plate
may argue that antireligious statements are too tangential to the restricted to dairy.159 Some Hindus may believe that living with
government’s interest in promoting integration to fall within the an individual who is not a member of their caste jeopardizes
“substantial interest,” all groups who could face discrimination their reincarnation.160 Restrictions on birthday and holiday celeon the basis of race must be treated equally in this context. In brations could make cohabitation with people of other faiths a
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court serious burden for a Jehovah’s Witness.161 In towns or cities
explicitly rejected the idea that judges are equipped to draw lines with large populations of people practicing their faiths, these
as to which groups deserve protection against such discrimina- roommate seekers could probably locate roommates by placing
tion.154 Although discrimination against certain ethnic groups non-discriminatory ads in places where fellow practitioners conmay have more harmful effects in various circumstances, all are gregate.162 However, when roommate seekers are part of a small
to be afforded equal protection.
minority, the restrictions may prevent them from finding a suitHow then to discern the prohibable cohabitant and therefore pose a
ited religion-as-ethnicity ads from the
serious burden, particularly if they
permissible religion-as-belief ads? Ads
cannot afford to live alone.
that describe the religious practices that
The Supreme Court’s deciroommate seekers perform within the individuals whose national origin or sion in Employment Division, Dehome—like keeping kosher, prohibiting ethnic group is identified with a par- partment of Human Resources of
alcohol for religious reasons, studying
Oregon v. Smith163 created an obstaticular
religion
would
be
granted
the bible, or praying, would suggest that
cle for such roommate seekers to
the roommate seeker’s preference for a special rights to discriminate: a re- invoke the free exercise clause of
roommate of a particular religion is rethe First Amendment as a defense to
lated to her belief system: she is not sim- sult that would probably not survive fair housing laws. The Court conan equal protection challenge.
ply using religion as a proxy for ethniccluded that the clause does not apply
ity. Under this approach, an ad that
to statutes of general applicability
states “no Jews” or “no Muslims” or “no
that are not directed at religious
Hindus” would be prohibited. However,
practice. However, Congress rea religious roommate seeker looking for
sponded by passing the Religious
a roommate who keeps kosher or observes Ramadan155 could Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),164 exempting indistate so in her ad. Ads that state “no fundamentalists” or “no viduals from generally applicable laws that substantially burden
Atheists” would also be permissible, because they focus on reli- their exercise of religion, unless the government shows the law
gious ideology and not ethnicity. The tougher case would be ads is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governthat read “no Catholics” or “no Protestants” or “no Christians,” ment interest. Twelve states have since enacted state RFRAs.165
as these religions are not identified with a particular race or an- The Supreme Court later held that the federal RFRA could not
cestry. However, they should nonetheless be prohibited. Other- constitutionally restrict state laws,166 but RFRA’s application to
wise, individuals whose national origin or ethnic group is identi- federal laws continues,167 and state RFRAs continue to apply to
fied with a particular religion would be granted special rights to state laws. Furthermore, many states apply a compelling interest
discriminate: a result that would probably not survive an equal test similar to the Sherbert-Yoder168 test for infringements on
protection challenge.156
free exercise rights granted by their state constitutions.169
State RFRAs or state religious free exercise constitutional provisions are a possible source of protection for devout
5. ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR ADVERTISEMENTS
roommate seekers whose religious practice is substantially burTHAT STATE RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES
dened by the advertising prohibitions. Religious landlords
Homogeneity of tastes, attitudes and orientations help whose beliefs would be compromised by renting to unmarried
create a successful living arrangement,157 especially when they cohabitants have sought protection under these provisions. The
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law remains largely unsettled, but some courts have found merit
in the landlords’ claims.170 The California Supreme Court declined to uphold such a landlord’s free exercise rights in Smith v.
Fair Housing and Employment Commission (Evelyn Smith),171
but the factors outlined by the court suggest that a burdened
roommate seeker could be protected under a RFRA: 172
(1) The burden must fall on a religious
belief rather than a philosophy or a way of
life. (2) The burdened religious belief
must be sincerely held. (3) The plaintiff
must prove the burden is substantial or, in
other words, legally significant. (4) If all
the foregoing are true, the government
must demonstrate that application of the
burden to the person is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and is
the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling government interest.173
Religious roommate seekers likely meet each of the four parts of
this test: (1) The housing laws burden religious belief (2) that is
sincerely held; (3) the burden is substantial because the laws
prevent the devout seeker from locating a roommate who will
not interfere with her religious practice; and (4) as described in
Part IV.4.b, the government is unlikely to demonstrate that prohibiting ads unrelated to race is a means no more extensive than
necessary of furthering a compelling state interest. In theory,174
the least restrictive means standard creates an even higher burden on the government.175 Roommate seekers whose free exercise of religion would be burdened if they were unable to locate
a cohabitant would virtually always be describing their religious
practices (like dietary restrictions, observing the Sabbath, or
barring alcohol within their dwelling) in their advertisements.
Therefore, the preferences would describe religion in terms of
belief, and not as a stigmatizing proxy for ethnicity.176 Thus,
prohibitions on these advertisements would not survive even
intermediate scrutiny.177
Nonetheless, to raise a RFRA defense, unless a roommate seeker lives in a jurisdiction recognizing an affirmative
right to have a roommate, she would need to show that she actually could not afford to live alone – not merely that living alone
costs more. The Evelyn Smith court explained: “an incidental
burden on religious exercise is not substantial if it can be described as simply making religious exercise more expensive.”178
Given the large number of renters for whom housing costs are
categorized as “severe cost burdens,”179 some roommate seekers
are likely to make this showing. Perhaps some could find less
desirable housing that required a longer commute or was located
in a more dangerous part of town, but denying a renter safe, convenient housing may indeed be held a substantial burden on her
religious practice. Thus, RFRAs or state free exercise clauses
interpreted to follow Sherbert and Yoder may provide some religious roommate seekers with a defense to generally applicable
fair housing laws.
B.

ate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”180 Even
when a challenged action is not specifically directed to the freedom of association for free speech purposes, strict scrutiny is
applied to infringements on that right.181 To come within First
Amendment protection, a group must engage in some form of
public or private expression.182 The association’s aim need not
be disseminating a certain message or expressing its views to the
public.183 Expression within the community suffices; the association need only engage in expressive activity “that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”184
Roommate seekers attempting to create an association
for the purpose of communal prayer or bible study would likely
be afforded “traditional First Amendment”185 protection: “We
are three Christian females . . . . We have weekly bible studies
and bi-weekly times of fellowship.”186 As only a small subset of
people who respond to roommate ads would be interested in
such a relationship, prohibiting these roommate seekers from
advertising specific religious practices could substantially interfere with their ability to identify applicants.187 As discussed, the
government is unlikely to demonstrate a compelling state interest that justifies prohibitions on roommate ads stating preferences unrelated to race even under the less rigorous “no more
extensive than necessary” standard.188 The Supreme Court has
rejected the suppression of speech that impairs an association’s
expressive message on First Amendment grounds.189 By preventing the creation of the association, restrictions that prevent a
roommate seeker from identifying a co-worshipper create just as
great an injury to the right of expressive association.190

V. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS
The FHA’s prohibitions on discriminatory statements
make illegal any statement “that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination” or indicates “an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination,” if based on a
protected characteristic.191 Courts have consistently interpreted
“indicates” to mean indicates “to an ordinary reader” or “to an
ordinary listener,” regardless of the speaker’s actual intent.192
Thus, roommate seekers who make statements or ask questions
that “an ordinary listener” interprets as indicating an intention to
make a preference related to a protected characteristic could be
held liable under § 3604(c). Phrases as seemingly innocuous as
“religious landmark” or “retired,” and even the word
“integrated” are potential sources of liability.193 Inquiries about
issues like religion194 or, in jurisdictions where it is protected,
sexual orientation, are prohibited. A roommate seeker could be
found in violation of the law for describing her own religious
practices or sexual orientation, if it would seem to “an ordinary
listener” that the statements indicate a discriminatory preference.
The restrictions thus effectively create a category of taboo subjects that people who are considering living together may not
discuss without risking liability.
1. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS AND
DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS

RIGHTS TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION

In some cases, roommate seekers are looking for people
with whom they can build a religious community for purposes of
expressive association. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the First Amendment right “to associSpecial - Fall 2008

Limiting the subjects that potential cohabitants can
discuss may substantially burden roommate seekers’ ability to
create successful roommate relationships and to feel comfortable
in their homes. For example, the restrictions could adversely
affect an Orthodox Jew who observes Shabbat195 and must as11

certain that her future roommate will not interfere with her practice. So too for the devout Muslim who prays in the living room
2. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND
– the only room in the apartment with an Eastward facing winSTATEMENT PROHIBITIONS
dow – several times a day, or the Evangelical Christian who
Prohibitions on discriminatory statements unrelated to
holds weekly bible studies around the kitchen table. These individuals would want to confirm that a roommate will not inter- race, national origin or ancestry do not require new analysis.
rupt their worship by turning on a television or stereo in their Even if statements made during the interview process are concommon space while they are deep in prayer or study. Disclo- sidered commercial speech, prohibitions on such statements fail
sure of these practices also serves applicants’ interests. An ap- the Central Hudson test just as prohibitions on parallel adverplicant who wants to watch Oprah may be annoyed if her room- tisements fail because the government is unlikely to establish
mate commandeers the living room for prayer, just as an appli- that such restrictions are no more extensive then necessary to
cant who does not participate in bible study may resent lost ac- further a substantial government interest.
However, prohibitions on discriminatory statements
cess to her kitchen each week. Because it is likely that tensions
would later arise as a result of these undisclosed competing de- related to race, national origin or ancestry require a fresh look.
sires, a devout roommate seeker could be significantly burdened The government maintains its interest in integration, but stateif unable to discuss her religious practice with a potential co- ments made in private are unlikely to undermine this objective
habitant. The statement prohibitions thus directly and substan- and contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups to the
extent that widely circulated ads do. The
tially prevent her from establishing
risk remains that individuals subjected to
a workable roommate relationship,
and therefore violate her intimate a devout roommate seeker could be offensive statements may no longer consider a roommate of another race200 or
association rights.
significantly
burdened
if
unable
to
Privacy rights are similarly
may restrict their search to neighborinfringed. If an evangelical Chris- discuss her religious practice with a hoods primarily inhabited by members
tian who truly believes that homoof their own race. Nonetheless, statepotential cohabitant.
sexuality is a sin winds up with a
ments made in private will not be seen
lesbian roommate because she was
by potentially thousands of people and
unable to determine an applicant’s orientation prospectively, thus do not contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups in
greeting her roommate’s lover in the bathroom several mornings the way that widely distributed advertisements do. Because the
a week may make her acutely aware that behavior that violates connection to the government’s integration objectives is more
her belief system is occurring within her home. The result may tenuous, these prohibitions may not pass even the intermediate
be feelings of alienation in “the one retreat to which men and scrutiny applied to restrictions on commercial speech.
women [are supposed to be able to] repair to escape the tribulaFurthermore, whether these statements should even be
tions of their daily pursuits.”196 If an individual cannot exercise classified as commercial speech is less clear. Once prospective
enough control over the composition of her household to create cohabitants are identified and roommate seekers and applicants
an environment in which she feels at ease, the right to privacy are determining whether they will be compatible, their dialogue
seems little more than a platitude. Therefore, under such cir- may be considered speech afforded full First Amendment procumstances, statement prohibitions would likely violate the test tection and restrictions upon it subjected to strict scrutiny. This
outlined in Carey v. Population Services, International. Just as dialogue cannot be characterized as an advertisement, and allimiting the distribution of contraceptives to licensed pharma- though it relates to a commercial transaction—the rental of
cists “burden[ed] an individual’s right to decide to prevent con- housing for financial gain—the Supreme Court has explained
ception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access that speech does not retain its commercial character “when it is
to the means of effectuating that decision,”197 statement prohibi- inextricably intertwined with otherwise protected speech.”201
tions that prevent a roommate seeker from talking about critical Because locating suitable applicants does not require the vast
aspects of her personal life or from asking a candidate about majority of roommate seekers to include discriminatory prefermatters of great importance to her, substantially limit her ability ences when they are placing ads, such statements are not
to effectively select future roommates.
“inextricable” in the advertising context. But, there is nothing
Unlike advertising prohibitions, statement prohibitions commercial about a roommate seeker explaining that she wants
actually prevent a roommate seeker from finding a compatible a roommate who will join her in communal prayer, and she is
cohabitant. That is, a roommate seeker who is religious, has unlikely to find such a cohabitant if unable to discuss religion
strong feelings about homosexuality or politics,198 or cares about when interviewing applicants. As it cannot be extracted from
national origin or race but cannot discern an applicant’s ancestry the speech related to the commercial transaction, this speech
by looking at her, would be unable to find a suitable cohabitant. should retain its full First Amendment protections.
Therefore, the government cannot regulate the stateUnlike advertising prohibitions, which increase the size of the
applicant pool that a roommate seeker must consider, but do not ments made when roommate seekers interview applicants, at
“directly and substantially” interfere with the right to form an least those related to determining compatibility. Outside the
intimate association or unduly burden privacy, statement prohi- commercial speech realm, “content-based restrictions are susbitions may make it impossible for a roommate seeker to deter- tained only in the most extraordinary circumstances: ‘The First
mine that an applicant is someone with whom she wants to form Amendment forbids the government from regulating speech in
an intimate association—someone to whom she will reveal her ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of oth“backstage” self.199 Thus, they do “directly and substantially” ers.’”202 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,203 the Court concluded that
interfere with her right to intimate association and create an prohibiting the use of inflammatory symbols was unconstitu“undue burden” on her privacy rights.
tional despite its “belief that burning a cross in someone’s front
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yard [was] reprehensible.”204 Unless the government can show
that prohibitions on discriminatory statements made when roommate seekers are interviewing applicants serve a compelling
interest—apart from protecting applicants from exposure to reprehensible ideas205—the restrictions also violate the First
Amendment.
A determination that the government can prohibit racially discriminatory ads, but not statements between individuals, risks a counterproductive result. Roommate applicants who
respond to non-discriminatory ads could then be subjected to
offensive statements in a more inimical form, such as those spoken to them directly. However, scholars analyzing prejudice and
discrimination in cyberspace suggest that because explicit expressions of prejudice have become taboo, people are significantly less likely to explicitly deny someone a resource or service based on discriminatory criteria when interacting with another person in real time.206 Rather, they will find a non-explicit
excuse for behaving discriminatorily.207
Prejudice is more likely to be overtly expressed on the
Internet because of the anonymous and disinhibited nature of the
forum,208 where people feel free to express themselves in less
self-conscious and less socially desirable ways.209 One example
of this phenomenon is cyberbullying. As explained by a teenager whose friend committed suicide after being harassed by his
classmates on-line, “You wouldn’t do that to someone’s face,
but on-line it’s completely different. You can do whatever you
want and no one can do anything—you’re at your house they’re
at their house—it’s different.”210
Roommate seekers are more likely to be discreet when
dealing with applicants in person than when placing Internet or
classified ads. In most of the cases discussed in Part II, the
roommate seekers rarely spoke of their own prejudices to the
complainants; rather, they either claimed that another roommate
had a problem with the candidate, made the statement to a third
party, or otherwise diffused their remarks. In Larrick, the defendant told the applicant that her other roommate did not want to
live with a black person.211 In Baker, the respondent explained,
via voicemail, that it was his fundamentalist Christian roommate
with whom the lesbian applicant “would not get along.” 212 In
DeSantis, the respondent told the white tester that she was afraid
of black men. 213 In Marya v. Slakey, the roommate who rejected the applicant did not make per se insulting remarks about
Indians, instead claiming that he feared a third Indian roommate
would create an environment dominated by a single culture.214
While the statements made in each case vary in degree of offensiveness, the speakers were somewhat sheepish about making
them. They may have made more overtlyprejudiced statements
in an anonymous advertisement. Thus, prohibiting discrimina-

tory ads, even while permitting discriminatory statements, may
indeed shield applicants from the most pernicious speech.

VI. CONCLUSION
Whether it is for months or years, an individual’s
choice to allow someone to share her living space is a private
decision. The government cannot interfere with the individual’s
ultimate selection without violating her Fourteenth Amendment
rights. This is no less true when an individual takes a roommate
in order to defray housing costs. A conclusion to the contrary
would mean that those with fewer resources have lesser rights to
intimate association and privacy. Such an outcome runs counter
to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Zablocki v. Redhail215 that
people may not be deprived of their fundamental rights of association simply because they are poor.
The more information that a roommate seeker can place
in an advertisement—about herself and about what she desires in
a roommate—the less time she will spend interviewing unsuitable candidates. Descriptive ads also save applicants the time
and energy they would otherwise expend contacting people who
are unlikely to accept them. Therefore, both sides benefit when
roommate seekers are granted more leeway in advertising their
preferences. Nonetheless, there is a tipping point at which the
harm that an advertised preference causes outweighs the benefits
of targeted advertising. By stigmatizing minority groups, racially discriminatory ads perpetuate racially homogenous housing patterns and the resulting social harms. Although ultimately
a roommate seeker can rely on any characteristic in choosing a
cohabitant, saving some time is not worth the damage caused by
racially discriminatory ads. Furthermore, unlike preferences
motivated by practical or religious concerns, like keeping a kosher kitchen, because preferences related to race are often motivated by fear of the unknown, intergroup contact during an interview may cause some roommate seekers to reevaluate their
prejudices.216
Fair housing laws should thus balance these competing
interests. I urge legislatures to recognize the intimate association and privacy concerns that roommate seekers face when
choosing those with whom they will negotiate taking out the
garbage, cleaning the bathtub, and whether to set up a Christmas
tree in the living room. Because these issues are not encountered by either traditional or most Mrs. Murphy landlords, fair
housing laws should be amended to address the special considerations of roommate seekers, but the integration goals of the
FHA should not be sacrificed.
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MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: ASYLUM SEEKERS WALKING THE RELIEF TIGHTROPE
By
Craig R. Novak*

INTRODUCTION

I. OVERVIEW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In 2000, a thirty-year-old female dentist with an international relief organization prepares for surgery in a tent marked
“Hospital.” Her patient, a ten-year-old boy, has several infected
molars. The hospital is located in the southernmost part of Putumayo, Colombia near the border of Ecuador. The boy squirms
in his chair knowing that the needle in the dentist’s hand will
soon be injecting into his gums. “¡Tranquilo Niño! I have done
this many times and you need to be a brave boy!”
Just as she places the needle in the child’s mouth, she hears
the sound of the tent flap opening. Entering are two easily identifiable members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“F.A.R.C.”) - one of Colombia’s most notorious guerilla
organizations. With eyes yellowed from jaundice and glazed
with hate, they surround the dentist. “I am operating here!” she
protests. “Shut-up bitch!” one states as he pulls her surgical cap
off, yanks her hair back, and sticks his AK-47 hard into her
neck. The other man moves his filthy hands along each surgical
instrument. “You will operate on this man and his teeth.” With
that statement, the man who contaminated the instruments slaps
the child out of the chair and sits in it himself. Knowing that
any sudden move would be her death, the dentist looks inside
the mouth of the guerilla member and begins to work.
Fortunately for the dentist, she was granted asylum before
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (“PATRIOT Act”) took effect in 2001, and before the passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005. Had she sought asylum any
later, the U.S. government would have barred her from applying.
Under the PATRIOT Act and REAL ID Act, she had committed
a terrorist act by giving material support to individuals that she
knew belonged to a terrorist organization.
The REAL ID Act provides arcane and widely unknown
relief provisions that, in some limited cases, offset the harshness
of the act. Relief under the REAL ID Act is tenuous as it can be
revoked at any time, and the asylum seeker must navigate its
narrow legal path. This is the tightrope. One misstep would bar
an asylum application.
Part I of this article will give an overview and the legislative
background of the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID Act as they
apply to asylum seekers. Part II will explore examples of the
material support bar and its devastating effect on asylum applicants. Part III will describe the new forms of relief under the
REAL ID Act, offer case law defining duress in a criminal and
immigration context, and explain the totality of circumstances
test. Lastly, part IV presents a practitioner’s checklist for those
who wish to assist clients with their exemption to the material
support bar.

THE PATRIOT ACT OF 2001
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When American Airlines Flight 11 hit the first tower on
September 11, 2001, the legal landscape in the U.S. for asylum
seekers, changed forever. Pushed by the Bush administration,1
Congress, with very little debate,2 passed the PATRIOT Act.
The PATRIOT Act only expanded existing inadmissibility provisions and did not add any new provisions affecting asylum
seekers.3 Asylum seekers had already been barred from both
asylum and withholding of removal if they had participated in
terrorist activities since the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts (“IIRIRA”).4 But the
lack of new provisions did not mean the PATRIOT Act had no
impact. Expanding the existing anti-terrorism provisions via the
PATRIOT Act broadened the asylum bars not only to terrorists,
but also in many cases, to their victims.5
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the Secretary of State had designated twenty-seven Foreign Terrorist Organizations.6 After the
passage of the PATRIOT Act, the Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld used his authority granted under INA § 219 to designate an additional fifteen Foreign Terrorist Organizations, altogether referred to by the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) as Tier I. The PATRIOT Act also authorized the Secretary of State to designate a new class of terrorist organizations
under the “Terrorist Exclusion List,” otherwise known as Tier
II.7 Added together, 100 terrorist organizations have been officially identified.8
A third terrorist organization category added by the PATRIOT Act is called the “undesignated category” or Tier III.
This is the catch-all of the PATRIOT Act codified under INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), as the definition of terrorist organizations
was expanded to “a group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in terrorist activities.”9 Asylum
proponents worry most about this category because the broadly
worded provisions are open to a gamut of interpretations. For
example, student protesters throwing bricks at government
forces to intentionally cause bodily harm, could be considered to
have (1) formed a terrorist organization and (2) have committed
terrorist acts. These students would be barred from asylum regardless of their persecution claims.10
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, in order for an applicant to fall
under the inadmissibility provisions for a terrorist activity, material support had to be given with the knowledge that the support
was going to a group planning terrorist activity. Under the PATRIOT Act, the applicant, who gives material support is barred
whether or not he had any knowledge that the group was about
to commit a terrorist act.11
19

Congress believed that the PATRIOT Act granted DHS the
tools needed to filter terrorists out of the immigration process.
In late 2004 however, the Commission on 9/11 released its initial public report and pointed out that asylum was an even bigger
portal to terrorists than initially believed.12 In light of the report,
certain members of the House of RepresentativesRep.Steve
Chabot (R-OH), Rep. John Hostettler (R-IN), Rep. Daniel Lungren (R-CA), Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA), Rep Mary Bono (RCA), Rep. Peter Hoecstra (R-MI), and Rep. Randy Neugenbauer
(R-TX), felt that they had the moral authority to slam that portal
shut,13 culminating in one of the most powerful assaults on asylum in Congress’ fifty year history: the REAL ID Act of 2005.
THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005

of a terrorist organization because actual terrorists often used
humanitarian work projects to fund their “criminal” functions as
money is fungible and can go to “bullets …instead of babies.”18
The legislative debate over REAL ID shows that few of its provisions have unintended consequences.19
The material support provisions were designed to be an unforgiving filter for asylum seekers.
ELEMENTS OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS
The material support bar of the REAL ID Act breaks down
into three elements where (1) the applicant knows or should
have known (mens rea) that (2) the material support the applicant provided (3) was to a terrorist organization. Due to the
previous discussion defining terrorist organizations, only the
first and second elements of the material support bar will be
presented in detail.
MENS REA

The REAL ID Act comprised of twenty-nine amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).14 While most
famous for the yet unimplemented requirement that states make
driver’s license applicants prove their lawful immigration status,
The mens rea standard for knowing has gone through sevthe REAL ID Act also changed many asylum elements, such as
requiring that race, religion, nationality, membership in a social eral iterations as it applies to the material support provisions.
group, or political opinion, be central to the applicant’s persecu- Prior to REAL ID, individuals had to have known or should
tion claim.15 In addition, the REAL ID Act established a have known that the material support that they gave furthered
“totality of the circumstances” test, which requires that the trier the goals of the terrorist organization.20 Under REAL ID, the
of fact base credibility on the applicant’s demeanor, candor, mens rea standard is much stricter. If an individual knows or
responsiveness, and the internal consistency of the applicant’s should reasonably know that they are giving support to a terrorstatements.16 Also of note is the REAL ID’s elimination of the ist organization, then the individual meets the mens rea requirement and is barred from applying for asylum.
writ of habeas corpus from
Intent is not part of the current mens rea reremoval proceedings. Lastly,
quirement.21 It does not matter whether or not
REAL ID added relief to the
material support bar under
the individual gives material support with the
the definitions of terrorist
to aid the organization or to harm others.
If an individual knows or should intent
activities, allowing the SecreAdditionally, the individual does not have to
tary of State to waive the reasonably know that they are giving give material support willingly. Even if an
asylum bar for particular in- support to a terrorist organization, individual merely acquiesces to a guerilla oradmissibility provisions.
ganization under threat of harm, the mens rea
Congress holds the Sec- then the individual meets the mens requirement has been met because the individretary of DHS accountable rea requirement and is barred from ual gave material support knowing that it was
for these waivers, and should
aiding a terrorist organization.
applying for asylum.
he activate them, he must
The Matter of S-K shows the resolve
report to several House and
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
Senate committees within one
to enforce the mens rea standard strictly and
week of the waiver, and anliterally. In S-K, an ethnic Chin woman pronually report the number of individuals waived.17 Considering vided money and supplies to the Chin National Front, who was
its harsh nature toward asylum seekers, the idea that the REAL protecting an ethnic group from the malicious assaults of the
ID Act provides any relief at all seems quite incongruous. Un- Burmese military junta. She was found credible, but was denied
derstanding the nature of REAL ID and the tenor of its Congres- asylum because she knowingly supported a group who engaged
sional sponsors requires an examination of its legislative history. in armed resistance.22 S-K is continuing to impact the immigraOnly then will it be clear why asylum applicants seem to be un- tion community because the mens rea standard seems almost
der such an onerous burden of proof, and why its relief provi- unassailable, even for “freedom fighters,” or rebels against govsions seem almost an oversight.
ernments unrecognized by the United States.23 Attacks on the
mens rea standard have often differentiated those asylum applicants who have given material support knowingly but not willLEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT
ingly. Immigration judges and the BIA have struck down many
PROVISIONS
such attacks post-Patriot Act, denying asylum to thousands of
The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Representative individuals who were forced to provide material support to terF. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R - WI), pushed for modifying the rorist organizations.24
material support provisions to terrorists because he and other
Representatives were concerned that a person who was involved
with terrorism could become an asylum applicant. During the
Congressional floor debates, Representative John Hostettler (R IN) stated that the current law misunderstood the real workings
20
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DEFINITION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT
The INA defines material support as a “safe transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification [and] weapons.” The Third Circuit Court of Appeals believes these are
suggestions and not the entire spectrum of possibilities.25 The
BIA uses a “de minimis contributions” standard for examining
cases of material support:26 offering of food, arranging shelter
for militants,27 facilitating phone calls,28 even providing a glass
of water, are all bars to asylum.29 By the BIA’s own admission,
the statute is breath-taking in its scope.30 Consequently, in
Cheema v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit limited the BIA’s broad
definition of material support activities holding that where “not a
scrap of evidence” shows that the aid recipients had anything to
do with terrorism, the United States cannot impose the material
support bar.31

II. THE IMPACT OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT
PROVISION TO ASYLUM SEEKERS
Though there is no proof that the material support provisions had an overall impact on the asylum process, the total
number of U.S. asylum cases dropped by 41.51% in the years
2001 to 2005.32 Additionally, the number of asylum grants
dropped by 11.95% in the years 2003 to 2005.33 As of 2006, the
United States had only allowed 26,113 asylees to enter.34
But the statistics showing the impact on specific nations,
demonstrate that Congress had wielded an effective tool with the
material provisions bar.35 Colombia was hit particularly hard,
seeing a 32.14% drop in asylum grants (from 4,368 to 2,964)
since REAL ID.36 Responding to the prolonged civil war, and
the surge of refugees crossing into Ecuador, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) began trying in
2001 to resettle Colombians in the United States.37 Starting with
an initial referral group of 288 refugees in 2003, the number
dwindled to thirty-five and then to nothing, when the United
States began indefinitely deferring any Colombians who raised
material support issues.38 UNHCR believes that 70 to 80% of
these Colombian refugees would be barred under the material
support provisions.39
The material support provision has barred people of many
other nationalities, including a Sri Lankan man kidnapped by
guerillas and forced to pay them ransom from his entire life savings; a Liberian woman, whose captors killed her father, gangraped her multiple times, and forced her to wash their clothes;40
and a Nepalese man beaten by a gang of Moaist rebels, who
surrendered all of his money and fled to the United States when
he was told that the gang would come again. His case has languished in review since his 2002 application was submitted.41
The negative impact of the material support bar to asylees is
not without its critics. After interviewing dozens of Colombians
barred from asylum and living under oppressive circumstances
in Ecuador, the Georgetown Law Center for Human Rights FactFinding Investigation made recommendations to Congress that
the material support bar should be amended to allow exceptions
for involuntary provisions, mistaken compliance, and insignificant support to terrorist organizations.42 Lifting the bar for these
exceptions would allow the U.S. to regain balance between protecting the safety of its citizens and being the humanitarian nation that it so claims to be.
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THE GUIDE TO THE RELIEF PROVISIONS:
HOW TO WALK THE TIGHTROPE
Regardless of the reasons, relief has come to some asylum
applicants. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security,
used his authority granted under the relief provisions of the
REAL ID Act, to create some exemption from the material support bar in five memorandums in 2007.43 While some asylum
seekers may benefit from these exemptions, the exemptions are
still complicated and narrow.
BURDENS AND EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE
MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR
No presumption that an applicant has provided material
support to a terrorist organization exists.44 Generally, the applicant is the one who will bring up the material support issue either within his asylum affidavit or when answering a question by
the asylum officer. Additionally, the Asylum Officer may infer
that an applicant encountered a terrorist group because of the
location of the applicant’s home. Once the issue of material
support is raised, the applicant carries the burden of proving that
the organization was not a terrorist organization, that he or she
did not know it was a terrorist organization, or that he or she is
entitled to the material support relief.
Currently, there are only three categories of applicants eligible for material support relief:
(1) Applicants who provided material support to only
designated groups with no conditions;45
(2) Applicants who provided material support to Tier
III (undesignated terrorist organizations)46 on the
condition that (1) the applicants supplied the material support under duress and (2) applications are
validated by the “totality of the circumstances”
test;
(3) Applicants who provided material support to specified Tier I and Tier II Terrorist Organizations
(currently only applicable to F.A.R.C.) on the condition that (1) the applicants supplied the material
support under duress and (2) applications are validated by the “totality of the circumstances” test.47
CONDITION 1: THE DURESS EXEMPTION48
Asylum applicants prove duress when they show that they
had no or very little choice in providing material support to a
terrorist organization because they would face serious, lifethreatening circumstances, if they did not comply.
DHS field officers observe the following factors to determine whether an applicant will receive a duress exemption:
•
•
•

The extent to which the applicant reasonably could
have avoided or took steps to avoid, providing material support
The severity and type of harm inflicted or threatened
The person to whom the harm or threat of harm
was directed
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•
•
•

The perceived imminence of the harm threatened
The perceived likelihood that the threatened harm
would be inflicted
Any other relevant factor regarding the circumstances under which the applicant felt compelled to
provide the material support.49

While not involving an immigration cause of action, the case of
United States v. Contento-Pachon, provides guidance for the
workings of a duress defense. Here, the Ninth Circuit, determined whether a Colombian citizen had a duress defense for
narcotics trafficking. The court noted that proving duress requires, a) immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; b) a
well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and, c)no
reasonable opportunity to escape the threat.50
In the Third Circuit case, Arias v. Gonzales, a fish farm
manager who, with his family, was being threatened by the
F.A.R.C., offered a duress defense to a material support
charge.51 The manager stated that he made “war payments” to
the F.A.R.C., but also that he was making good money at the
farm, and “doing well there.”52 The court found that the nature
of the manager’s payments disproved any duress factors as it
seemed that the manager paid F.A.R.C. voluntarily because he
enjoyed his lifestyle.53
CONDITION 2: THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST
Once DHS determines that the applicant has met the initial
duress burden, it then applies the “totality of the circumstances”
test. Generally, a court applies this test by balancing all the inferences involved in the suspicious conduct. Similarly, DHS
advises its field officers to weigh factors such as the amount and
type of material support the applicant provided, the frequency of
material support provided, and the nature of the terrorist activities committed by the terrorist organization.54 For instance, a
comprehensive analysis of how the totality of the circumstances
operates in an immigration (denaturalization) context, occurs in
Breyer v. Ashcroft. In this case, the Third Circuit determined
that a former World War II German soldier, who was actually a
U.S. citizen, did not forsake his citizenship when becoming a
member of the SS Corps.55 The key issue was whether the soldier acted voluntarily in joining the Totenkopf Sturmbann
(Death’s Head Battalion) at Auschwitz.56 The court weighed the
positive factors of the soldier trying to get leave every weekend,
and his refusing to be tattooed with the SS mark, against the
negative factors such as his reporting for his initial SS training,
even though a politician volunteered to secure his release from
the service.57
The “totality of the circumstances” test should be of concern to the immigration law practitioner because an adverse
finding here will eliminate even a worthy applicant who can
prove duress in giving material support.

III. PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO MATERIAL
SUPPORT RELIEF
Little, if any, aid exists to help the practitioner navigate this
brave new world of material support relief. The goal of this
checklist is to assist the practitioner in walking the tightrope of
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the REAL ID waivers and to point out some of the hazards that
exist along the way. It will help the practitioner to frame the
approaches to their asylum applicant’s material support exemptions that would constitute a material support exemption for an
asylum applicant.
The basic elements of an asylum claim have not changed.
An applicant still has the burden of proof that one of the five
protected areas (race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
membership in a social group) is central to the persecution
claim, and that the applicant filed a claim within one year of
arrival. Practitioners should remember that Congress is guarded
against the asylum system. Practitioners should also heed Michael Chertoff’s warning on each of these exemptions, that he
may revoke the waiver at his discretion. In order to encourage
use of the relief exemptions, practitioners can start by presenting
DHS officers with asylum cases that directly fall under the exemption, gradually letting DHS and Congress know that those
seeking the relief are not a danger to the nation.
CHECKLIST:
INITIAL STEPS IN FRAMING YOUR STRATEGY
1. Does your client even need to consider the material support exemption?

a. Has the client given any aid to anyone who may be considered a terrorist or belongs to a terrorist group?
i. Consider whether the client has ever had any contact
with any non-government groups that are on the State
Department terrorist lists or could be considered terrorist organizations.
ii. The key point is “knowing or should have known”
that (a) the client has given any aid and that (b) aid was
given to a terrorist organization. If the client is not sure
on these issues, the attorney should continue down the
checklist.
1. Question the client about giving any aid to
anyone that they remotely consider to be dangerous as a potential refresher of his or her
memory.
a. Check both the Foreign Terrorist
Organization List and the Terrorist
Exclusion List available at the U.S.
Department of State. See if the client
is familiar with any of these names,
and if so, the circumstance under
which he or she is familiar.
2. Note that cases where the clients are not
sure that they have given material support to a
terrorist organization are fairly rare. Most
clients are quite clear with whom they were
dealing.
3. Remember that material support is de minimis:
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•
•

A cup of coffee, a glass of water, spare
coins
Food, shelter, repairs

4. The mens rea requirement is knowing or
should have known:
•

Even if client believes that his or her help
will not further the terrorists’ criminal
activities, this does not exempt him or her
from the material support bar.

iii. Listen for the DHS “buzz words” in your client’s
story.
1. DHS advised its field officers to watch for
these words in an asylum interview:58
Ie. Ransom, War Tax, Slave, Force, Threat
Extortion, Fighter, Militant, Soldier, Rebel
2. If, during your client conversations, he or
she uses any of these phrases, it should alert
the attorney to a potential material support
issue.

b. Research the location where the client claims persecution.

danger to the United States.
i. DHS examines all asylum applicant cases to see
whether they are a danger to the nation, regardless of
whether the material support issue exists. Should DHS
have any doubts regarding the client being a danger, the
client will lose his or her opportunity to apply for either
asylum or the material support relief. Some clients do
not realize that their activities, which may be only directed towards some group not associated with the
United States, will be considered participating in terrorist activities and a danger to the United States.
ii. The best approach is a comprehensive interview
with the client asking about his or her associations,
spouse’s affiliations, and any activities that could possibly flag the client.

THE MATERIAL SUPPORT RELIEF PROCESS
2. Use this stage when it is fairly certain that the client provided material support to a terrorist organization.

a. Identify the organization:
i. No Duress Exemption Required:
•

i. Many of the Tier I and Tier II terrorist organizations
have information available online. Many of the terrorist organizations have specific uniforms, and areas of
geographic operations. If your client lived outside of
these areas, it will bolster his or her case, disproving
any claims of material support if the attorney can provide the material support showing the distance between
the client and the active terrorist groups in his or her
geographic area.
ii. Removing doubt from the Asylum Officer’s or Immigration Judge’s mind requires proof contrary to the
presumption that the client, if living in certain areas,
encountered terrorist groups. Enlist the client’s help in
proving lack of encounters:
1. Factors such as:
a. Education:
i. Most educated people do not live in
rural areas, where some terrorist
groups are known to operate
b. Profession:
i. Some professions, such as economists, would rarely encounter terrorist organizations
c. Family:
i. Some cultures forbid women
from talking to strangers.

c. Explore with the client any suspicion that you believe
will raise security concerns about your client being a
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation
Army (“KNU/KNLA”)
Chin National Front/Chin National Army (“CNF/
CNA”) Chi National League for Democracy
(“CNLD”)
Kayan New Land Party (“KNLP”)
Arakan Liberation Party (“ALP”)
Tibetan Mustangs
Cuban Alzados
Karenni National Progressive Party (“KNPP”).

1. If the client gave material support to any of these
organizations, then the attorney may go directly to
step 3.
ii. Duress Exemption Will be Required:
1. TIER I/II Terrorist Organizations:
a. F.A.R.C.
i. This is the only terrorist organization allowed an exemption.
2. TIER III Undesignated Organizations:
a. Organizations that could be considered terrorists under INA §212(a)(3)(B)(iv)
(vi)(III).
iii. No Material Support Exemption Available:
1. Any organization not mentioned above:
a. As of writing, the client is barred from
applying for asylum
b. This stage may end the client’s asylum
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journey if he or she has knowingly given
material support to a non-exempted terrorist organization.

b. Full Disclosure Required:
i. Should the attorney believe that the client qualifies
for the material support exemption, DHS requires
that any submission for this relief must be accompanied by a full and complete disclosure of “the
nature and circumstances of each provision of material support.”59
ii. Attorney should assist the client in documenting the
circumstances.
c.

Begin Duress Analysis:
i. Duress involves these three factors:
1. Imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury
2. A well-grounded fear that the threat will be
carried out
3. No reasonable opportunity to escape the
threatened harm
ii. The client must give a detailed explanation as to
what occurred, involving all three factors:
1. The client’s story must be consistent, plausible and believable.
2. Details that bring the Asylum Officer or
Immigration Judge into the picture are crucial to the duress analysis:
a. Ask the basic “who, what, when, where and
why” questions.
b. Have the client give his story using the detailed facts:
i. For example: “In December 2006, my wife,
children, and I were having our standard lunch
of boiled chicken and peanuts when these
armed men stormed into our house and held
their rifle against my daughter’s head. They
said that if we didn’t give them the chickens
that we kept in our farm, they would kill my
daughter and take my sons into their group.”
ii. Here, there is a threat to a life that seems
imminent, by people who look as if they
would carry it out if the client did not comply.
Additionally, the client and his family were
detained by threat of force, and there was no
reasonable avenue of escape. This small story
meets all of the duress elements.
iii. In instances where the client gives material support
over a longer period, such as a farmer in a guerilla infested area where he is paying “war taxes” monthly, the
client will need to show why he or she did not try to
escape or remove himself or herself from the danger.
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1. For example:
a. Guerillas surrounded the area and thus, the family
could not exit
b. Natural barriers such as high water rivers during the
monsoon season existed
c. Lack of transportation

d. Begin Totality of the Circumstances Analysis:
i. .DHS has the discretion to deny the material support
relief simply because it does not find that the client’s
duress justifies the exemption.
ii. At this writing, two factors will quickly eliminate the
client as a potential asylee:
1. DHS believes that the client gave material
support voluntarily:
•

For example: the terrorists only
collected their fees by mail and
the client never encountered the
group directly.

2. DHS believes that the client, because of the
duration of support given, was receiving benefits from the relationship with the terrorist
organization instead of simply cooperating to
protect his or her life, limb, and property. In
Arias v. Gonzales, the client continued to pay
the F.A.R.C. because “the money was good”
where he was working.
iii. When the practitioner is confident that the elements
in the checklist are well documented, he or she must
then submit an I-589 Form, and specifically claim the
material support exemption, if it is warranted.

CONCLUSION
Denied by the thousands, individuals who applied for asylum after the passage of the PATRIOT Act and REAL ID Act up
to early 2007, faced a Congressional majority convinced that
this group of worthy beneficiaries was a dangerous threat to the
United States. As a nation, the United States had “strained out
the gnat, yet swallowed the camel.”60 Providentially, in the very
legislation that denies asylum to so many, a paragraph that presents some hope exists. Obtaining this relief is a precarious balancing act, and any misstep will destroy the applicant’s chance
of entry. Representation is crucial to help those who are not
terrorists but are indeed terrorized, gain access to this narrow
exemption. Only then, can asylum seekers walk the tightrope.
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THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
RIDING THE TROJAN HORSE OF THE CIVIL WAR
By
Michael Brazao*
INTRODUCTION
After the end of the Civil War, slavery was formally
abolished, and the right to vote and other civil rights for AfricanAmericans were finally enshrined into the Constitution of the
United States via the Reconstruction Amendments. However,
such a narrow reading of the history of this period belies the
nebulous boundary between “war” and peace. As Yoram Dinstein has noted, “[t]he phrase ‘war’ lends itself to manifold uses.
. . [and thus] may appear to be a flexible expression suitable for
an allusion to any serious strife, struggle or campaign.”1
This expansive notion of war is appropriate for describing African-Americans’ arduous path as they have struggled to
achieve the status of equal human beings endowed with full civil
rights. This paper will examine how public officials with Confederate sympathies in the postwar South managed to preserve,
in law and in practice, many of the badges of slavery that had
ostensibly been eradicated by the Reconstruction Amendments
and the early Civil Rights Acts; and will do so with specific reference to racial disparities imposed by the death penalty.2 Under
our modern legal system, “much has remained consistent in the
administration of injustice for black ‘defendants’… [since] the
age of slavery, when blacks had little to nothing in the way of
legal recourse.”3 Keeping in mind that capital punishment is an
exercise of power over the powerless,4 this article seeks to trace
the lineage of this inequality by examining the historical symbiosis between the application of the death penalty and the legacies of slavery and apartheid in the United States.
The analysis of this paper will proceed in three parts.
First, I will present a historical overview of the institution of
slavery that will clarify how it entrenches a social caste system
by reducing the slave to an object of property. Second, I will
closely examine the period following the American Civil War to
demonstrate how a faction of Southern public officials reestablished the domination of whites in the postbellum South by formally acknowledging civil rights for African-Americans while
simultaneously continuing to subjugate them through both legal
and quasi-legal channels. Third, I will analyze how capital punishment has played a central role in allowing America to retain
the indelible stain of racial inequality long after the emancipation of the slaves, purported to fulfill the egalitarian promise
upon which America was founded.

I. THE LAW OF SLAVERY FROM ROME TO
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
SLAVES AS PROPERTY UNDER ROMAN LAW
The institution of slavery reduces human beings to objects devoid of any protections against incursions upon their life,
liberty, and dignity. In order to understand how slaves were
owned in antebellum America, it is helpful to trace the lineage
of the legal institution of ownership back to the concept of do26

minium that emerged in the late Republican period of Ancient
Rome. Dominium “was the highest, the ultimate form of title to
property, specifically distinguished from lesser types of property
interest.”5 Under dominium, “[t]he owner was lord and master
of his property.”6
Slavery was widely practiced and deeply imbedded in
the social order of Rome, and the distinction between slaves and
free men was one of three constitutional elements of personhood
under Roman law.7 This distinction had enormous juridical consequences, as “in many ways slaves were regarded as property
rather than as human beings.”8 As with any other object of
property falling under the rubric of dominium, they were
“things”9 without rights10 that “could be acquired, owned and
disposed of.”11
The concept of dominium, with its almost unlimited
powers for the owner, was a means of keeping the everincreasing slave population under control.12 This explains the
stripping of juridical protection for slaves under dominium,13
which meant that “a master could do what he liked with his
slave, over whom he had the power of life and death.”14
THOMAS HOBBES’ INFLUENCE ON ENGLISH THOUGHT
ON SLAVERY
Roman law was preserved throughout the Middle Ages
via Justinian’s Digest15 and other ancient documents, and ultimately formed the bedrock of most civil law systems that had
developed in Continental Europe by the Sixteenth century.
While the courts of England developed their own distinct brand
of common law, Roman law was preserved by the English in
their universities: for centuries, the elite establishments of Oxford and Cambridge taught exclusively Roman law and not common law. Against this backdrop, Seventeenth century political
philosopher Thomas Hobbes published his Leviathan, “...a work
which more than any other defined the character of modern politics.”16 According to Hobbes, whose philosophical treatise was
heavily influenced by classical jurisprudence, prior to the establishment of civil society, human beings existed in a state of nature.17 In this state, all men enjoyed a common capacity for dominion over all things in the world, as well as over one another.18 Although all men were formally equal in this environment, scarcity of resources and unchecked animalistic impulses
meant that life was a perpetual war, where every man was enemy to every man.19 The resulting quality of life was necessarily “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”20 For these reasons, Hobbes argued that it was imperative for humans to form
social covenants, in which some men relinquished their natural
dominion to a higher sovereign in exchange for peace and security.21
Hobbes postulated that these social covenants for establishing sovereign power of one human over another could be
created either by acquisition (i.e., force)22 or by institution (i.e.,
consent).23 He described two ways of acquiring power by force:
(1) by generation, “when a man maketh his children”24; or (2) by
THE MODERN AMERICAN

conquest, when a man “subdueth his enemies to his will.”25 In can-Americans.41 As Chief Justice Taney of the United States
contrast to sovereign power that is forcefully acquired, Hobbes Supreme Court infamously stated in the Dred Scott decision,
theorized that sovereign authority could also be instituted when blacks were considered “so far inferior, that they had no rights
men freely consent to give a higher authority - i.e. the state - the which the white man was bound to respect.”42 This dearth of
power and responsibility to ensure peace and security.26 The rights for slaves was consistent with Hobbes’s idea that the
most obvious and direct mechanism through which a state pur- dominant class needed to reinforce the normative social order
sues this mandate is the criminal law.27 Hobbes was convinced against the specter of insubordination. In keeping with the Hobthat the quality of the sovereignty exercised by these two types besian premise that sovereign power will only be delegated to a
higher authority when the
of “commonwealths”28 was “the very same.”29
head of the household is inIn this sense, a family was akin to a “little
capable of maintaining peace,
Monarchy,”30 with the male head of the housewe would expect to see a rise
hold exercising a despotic dominion over his
the application of soverunderlings (including wives, children, and
Not only was capital punishment in
eign state power in situations
slaves) in the absence of any superseding authority. The power delegated to the resulting more prevalent in the South gener- when the status quo is most
state often included the head of the family’s ally, but it “was a powerful tool for threatened. This expectation
is supported by the observaright to impose death upon his subjects.31 Once
sovereign power was authoritatively vested in keeping the slave population in sub- tion that for most of the history of American slavery,
the state, “the sovereign of each [state] hath
mission.”
“the controlling factor in a
dominion over all that reside therein”,32 includslave’s life was not the legising the children and slaves of the men who conlation on the books but the
vened the commonwealth, since “no man can
master’s whim.
Though
obey two masters.”33
slaves were occasionally
Thus, two central themes become clear
from Hobbes’ oeuvre: power and inequality. Hobbes felt no tried in courts and tribunals, the chattel slavery system gave
qualms over limiting the liberty of some humans so that peace slaveholders almost total control over their ‘property,’ including
and prosperity could prevail for society as a whole. In his view, the manner in which slaves were punished.”43 However, as the
the sovereign power that some men exercised over others was institution of slavery continued to face mounting pressure, both
merely a mutation of man’s natural right to self-defense,34 for if from within the United States and a fledgling international
a man did not subordinate his enemy, there was nothing in the movement toward its abolition,44 we see a gradual rise in the use
state of nature to stop his enemy from killing him. In this way, of the law as a means of buttressing the American social hierar“[v]iolence, as both a… fact and metaphor, [became] integral to chy. Therefore, although evidence from early colonial times
the constitution of modern law.”35 Such violence has the direct shows some instances of equality under the law, laws dealing
effect of sustaining inequality, since “[l]aw in its determining with law-breaking slaves grew more stringent as the slave popueffect cannot be everything. Obviously, law must choose and lation increased and threats of slave insurrections rose. These
elevate some modes of existence and suppress or ignore oth- ‘Slave Codes’ were extreme laws reflecting white supremacy
and fear, and allowing slaves to be put to death for transgresers.”36
sions ranging from helping a fellow slave escaping to destroying
FROM ANTIQUITY TO AMERICA: THE ROMAN AND HOBBESIAN property.45
Further evidence of the correlation between racially
ROOTS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
discriminatory penal practices and slavery is found in the higher
William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws preponderance of capital punishment in areas where slavery was
of England, expanded on the Hobbesian undertones of legal most integral to the local economy. Thus, we see that from a
domination.37 In one passage, he wrote:
very early point in the colonial period, northern colonies, who
had never been as reliant on plantation-based agriculture as the
southern colonies, adopted much more lenient attitudes toward
[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes
capital punishment,46 while “[i]n the South, capital punishment
the imagination and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole
had a different history linked, in large part, to slavery.”47 Not
and despotic dominion which one man claims
only was capital punishment more prevalent in the South generally, but it “was a powerful tool for keeping the slave population
and exercises over the external things of the
in submission.”48 This was in part due to the perceived need to
world, in total exclusion of the right of any
38
other individual in the universe.
control them as they were not only a captive workforce, but also
made up significant portions of the populations of many southThis domination was reaffirmed as a distinctly American institu- ern states.”49
As the above examples demonstrate, “[c]apital punishtion when James Madison wrote approvingly of “that dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of ment during this time… [embodied] an ‘emphatic display of
power, a reminder of what the state could do to those who broke
the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”39
Premised upon the concept of dominion that emerged the laws.”50 The most brutal and extreme exhibitions of emin Ancient Rome, slavery flourished in America for nearly a phatic state power were almost always reserved for the subjucentury after it was abolished in England.40 Together, these gated classes, who had the most to gain from a disruption of the
closely related legal institutions perpetuated a stark disparity in social status quo and the least to lose should their efforts be
the valuation of human life between white Americans and Afri- thwarted. Therefore, in an attempt to ratchet up the deterrent
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value of criminal power against potential insurrection, “many
II. THE WAR THAT DIDN’T END
executions were ‘intensified’ through extreme methods such as
burning at the stake, dismemberment, dissection, and public
THE RESISTANCE AGAINST RECONSTRUCTION
display of bodies after death;”51 barbarous tactics that were usually, if not always, reserved for blacks.52 In fact, offences by
The surrender of the Confederate army in the Spring of
slaves against their masters for crimes of “petit treason”53 were 1865 marked the formal end of the American Civil War and
often brutally punished in a manner quite similar to those con- ushered in the Reconstruction period of American history.
victed of treason against the state.
While it is generally conceded that “[t]he Confederate generals
The disparity in the application of capital punishment surrendered honorably… the spirit of the South was hardly debetween the northern and southern regions of America continued feated. Slavery was gone, but the idea of states’ rights and
to widen in the decades leading up to the Civil War. Early autonomy survived.”66 The indomitable spirit of the Confedermovements in the 18th century to abolish or restrict the death acy was apparent immediately following its surrender to Union
penalty54 “were mostly concentrated in northern states,”55 and forces. In 1865, pending re-admission to the Union, every
formed part of a broader movement toward the “rejection of southern state passed a series of “Black Codes” that purported to
other social institutions such as slavery.”56 This trend continued reduce freed slaves to second class citizenship and give whites
well into the Nineteenth century, when “[l]aws in northern states “some of the control of blacks they had during slavery.”67 Such
were ‘all in the direction of abolition’ from the 1820s through thinly-veiled attempts at reintroducing slavery through the juthe 1850s.”57 At the same time, the abolitionist cause was much ridical back door were met with swift action after the 1866 fedmore attenuated in the South. “This owed itself partly to the eral election yielded a Congress devoted to the agenda of
institution of slavery, which was firmly in place in the South “Radical Reconstruction.”
until after the Civil War.”58 Even where modest abolitionist
Under the doctrine of Radical Reconstruction, the fedtrends were observed in the South, the death penalty retained a eral government sought to ensure the adherence of recalcitrant
distinctly racial flavor. “No southern states abolished capital southern authorities to the letter and spirit of the Reconstruction
punishment completely, but every
Amendments, which formally abolished
southern state did eliminate it for
slavery and extended voting and other civil
some crimes committed by
rights to black freedmen. In order to enwhites.”59 Moreover, “in southern In 1865, pending re-admission to the sure compliance, Congress passed the Restates, capital punishment was Union, every southern state passed a construction Acts of 1867, placing the
still used for crimes related to
South under federal military control.68 It
series
of
“Black
Codes”
that
purspreading discontent among free
was under the authority of this martial law
black people, insubordination ported to reduce freed slaves to sec- that freed slaves were registered to vote.
among slaves, and even attempted
The ensuing elections saw a handful of
rape by a black person against a ond class citizenship and give whites blacks elected to Congress, as well as sizewhite person.”60
“some of the control of blacks they able black constituencies (and in some
The disparity between
cases, majorities) elected to state public
had during slavery.”
northern and southern states is
office.69
also visible in the differing pace
As one can imagine, the federal laws
at which executions ceased to be
passed immediately after the Civil War
conducted as public spectacles.
“had effected a complete revolution in [American] constitutional
Whereas “from 1830 to 1860, every Northern state… moved its jurisprudence by transferring from the states to the United States
public hangings indoors” in response to a concern that public [responsibility over] all the fundamental rights of citizens – their
executions fostered “occasions for rioting, revelry and rib- life, their liberty, and their property.”70 Such a massive change
aldry,”61 the abolition of public executions took much longer in from the antebellum power dynamic in the South was met with
the South, with the last public execution occurring in 1936 in considerable opposition by the recently deposed southern white
Kentucky.62 Because public executions were believed to engen- establishment, who resented this complete rewriting of the
der licentiousness, “[p]erceptions of unruly crowds meant public “racial contract” upon which America had been founded.71 Such
executions were no longer perceived as legitimate exercises of resentment was exacerbated by the perceived “fervor with which
state power nor mechanisms to deliver a message of lawful retri- Reconstruction Republicans set about the legislative remodelbution.”63 This posed a much greater problem for southern au- ing” through legislative instruments “drawn in sweeping lanthorities, who relied more heavily on public executions to serve guage appropriate to the federal government’s new-found sense
as a manifestation of force and pedagogy of power in order to of power.”72
secure their inequitable social hierarchies.64 Thus, it would be
more difficult for southern authorities to accept that public exe- THE NEW DEPARTURE: THE TROJAN HORSE OF RACE RELAcutions had a futile (or worse, a detrimental) effect on public
TIONS IN AMERICA
order, since the public execution was so integral to the state’s
“display of the majestic, awesome power of sovereignty.”65
The short-term effectiveness of Radical Reconstruction
By the 1860s, it was apparent that the abyss between in ensuring the right to vote and civil rights for blacks was a
northern and southern states on the issue of slavery had become humiliating blow to the supremacy of the white southern estabso entrenched that a war was inevitable. The ultimate “victory” lishment after the Civil War. Having recently faced military
of Union forces on the battlefield, however, would prove to be a defeat through both the loss of the Civil War and the failure to
Pyrrhic victory in the struggle for equality.
resist the presence of federal troops during Radical Reconstruction, any hope for resurrecting a semblance of antebellum domi28
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nation required the adoption of a radical new strategy against
an overbearing, even suffocating, federal presence. This article suggests that, at this point in American history, southern
jurists adopted a strategy of apparent acceptance of the Reconstruction agenda that actually allowed many badges of slavery
to persist in relatively undiluted form.
Southern authorities appear to have modeled their
approach to restoring the antebellum status quo on a Roman
precedent. In the Aeneid, famed Roman poet Virgil recounts
the legendary story of how Rome was founded. One episode
from this epic has since gained almost universal recognition
in Western society: the “Trojan Horse” used by the Greeks
during their long siege upon the city of Troy. The Greek
army, whose “strength [was] broken in warfare” after many
years of futile hostilities,73 offered the colossal wooden horse
as a gift. The Trojans accepted the horse as a token of peace
and surrender, and brought it within their city’s walls.74 Later
that night, as the Trojans slept, the horse “opened wide” and
“emitted men,”75 who stole into the darkened city, “[l]et in
their fellow soldiers at the gate, [a]nd joined their combat
companies as planned.”76 This parable is instructive in understanding how the southern authorities regained the upper hand
in the ongoing war for political supremacy in the postbellum
South.
As the Greeks realized in the Aeneid, the Southern
establishment understood that they did not have sufficient
military prowess to achieve their objectives through all-out
war. Thus, a new, less belligerent approach was needed to
continue the struggle for “states’ rights.” This strategy was
first employed by a faction of southern Democrats known as
“Redeemers,” whose primary political objective was the return of political sovereignty to the southern states through
cooperation with and concession to the federal government
and the North.77 The Redeemers gradually gained control of
the party agenda through the implementation of a “New Departure” tactic, whereby the emphasis of political dialogue
was shifted away from suffrage and civil rights to economic
and other less controversial matters. The movement became
so successful that within four years, all Democrats and most
northern Republicans agreed that Confederate nationalism and
slavery were dead and further federal military interference
was unnecessary.78 By 1870, the Democratic–Conservative
leadership across the South decided it had to end its opposition to Reconstruction as well as to black suffrage in order to
survive and move on to new issues.79
Like the Trojans, whose readiness to accept the
Horse was likely prompted by a desire to end a seemingly
endless war with little prospect of victory in sight, the willingness of southern Democrats to suddenly surrender on such
a major bone of political contention was welcomed by a beleaguered Republican party yearning to turn the page on this
chapter of American political history.80 The South’s willingness to accept the new constitutional reality convinced the
Republicans to adopt a let-alone policy toward the South.81
The goal of the New Departure was ultimately achieved in the
Compromise of 1877, whereby The South agreed to accept the
hotly-disputed victory of Republican presidential candidate
Rutherford Hayes in the election one year earlier, if he agreed
to withdraw the last of the federal troops from their states.82
At that point, all sides agreed that Reconstruction was finished.83

Special - Fall 2008

Hobbes wrote, “war consists not in battle only, or the
act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.”84 With those words in
mind we understand how, in the course of Reconstruction, a
hotly contested Civil War morphed into a cold war fought
along political and juridical fronts. With the perfection of the
New Departure in 1877, it became clear that the courts were
the new battlefield.85 Future grievances between the North
and the South would be governed by the rule of law and the
requirements of due process. What remained to be seen was
the extent to which the Supreme Court and Congress would go
to eliminate the social implications of slavery and racial discrimination.86 As African-Americans would soon learn, neither would go very far.
The Supreme Court set the tone when it released a
series of decisions that gradually overturned much of the Reconstruction civil rights legislation. Beginning with the Civil
Rights Cases87 of 1883, it held that the Fourteenth Amendment only gave Congress the power to outlaw public, not private, discrimination.88 The Court reinforced this ruling with
Plessy v. Ferguson89 in 1896, announcing that state-mandated
segregation was legal as long as the law provided for
“separate but equal” facilities. As a result, “[t]he strict limitation of the postbellum amendments to state action expresse[d]
the view called ‘states’ rights’ – the very position that the
South fought for in the Civil War, which had ostensibly been
repudiated not only by the war but also by the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the civil
rights acts of 1866 and of 1875.”90
This laissez-faire line of Supreme Court jurisprudence permitted state courts to follow suit. They enforced a
wide range of postwar “Jim Crow Laws” that transformed the
South into a virtual apartheid state, where African-Americans
became second-class citizens continuing to bear many badges
of the slavery from which they had supposedly been emancipated. While varying widely in their disregard of the Reconstruction Amendments,91 what these laws had in common was
“[t]hrough these means, the neutrality of the liberal state was
formally upheld, as demanded by the social contract, without
in any significant way challenging the racial polity.”92 Indeed,
so striking was the ability of southern authorities to retain the
essence of slavery through their juridical institutions, that “[i]f
you look at the subsequent history of the United States, there
is some truth in the paradoxical statement that the Confederacy was born when Lee handed Grant his sword.”93

III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT’S ROLE IN
EXTENDING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY
LYNCHING AS A CONTINUATION OF WHITE DOMINION
The central premise for the Compromise of 1877 was
the understanding that Southern lawmakers would formally
adhere to the aims of Reconstruction. Thus, the art of the
New Departure and its Jim Crow Laws was in how they
spawned an entire movement allowing sovereignty over the
South to be wrested from the federal government and returned
to local white hands without appearing to violate the postbellum Constitution. Once this repatriation of sovereign control
was complete, the subjugation of blacks resumed with zeal
and was hindered only by a need to outwardly conform to due
29

Recent scholarship has challenged the conventional
process. One stark example of this phenomenon was the proliferation of lynching that occurred at the hands of local mobs. depiction of lynch law:
While it is generally conceded that the practice of lynching far
[M]any lynchings should be classipredates the Civil War,94 it has also been observed that prior to
fied not as irrational deeds perpetrated by
that conflict “only rarely were the punishments imposed under
mobs of private persons, acting without legal
what had come to be known as ‘Lynch’s Law’ specifically capiauthority but, rather, as ritualized enactments
tal,”95 and it was only after Reconstruction that “the term
that drew their authority from the unwritten
‘lynching’ c[a]me to acquire its contemporary connotations,…
racial contract of the white community and
the targeting of African-Americans, and, more specifically, Afrithat patterned their proceedings, to a greater or
can-American men, chiefly in the South, and the absence of the
lesser extent, on the very judicial procedures
due process of law.”96
they are characteristically said to flout.105
That the widespread lynching of blacks began its ascent
following the New Departure is no coincidence. Rather, this
trend served as a useful “means of reaffirming an endangered
This argument maintains that the
form of white… identity… [and] a lethal means of regenerating
public spectacle lynchings of Africanthe racial contract once the racial polity could no longer be seAmericans by whites in the postcured through the institution of chattel slavery.”97 “Lynchings
Reconstruction era “should be located not in
the domain of the illegal or the extralegal but,
were characterized by their celebratory and public nature, their
rather, near the heart of a more comprehensive
brutal method of killing, their disregard for any semblance of
structure of racial control, one that vested indue process for the accused, and an absence of punishment for
formal police powers in members of the white
the killers.”98 By restoring the antebellum dichotomy between
race and that encouraged vigilantism as a necracial classes99 and affirming life-or-death sovereignty of white
essary complement to its weak agencies of
males over blacks, “lynching provided a de facto extralegal resformally authorized political discipline.”106
toration of the antebellum Black Codes.”100
In order for the application of lynch law to survive the
scrutiny of the Supreme Court, it was imperative that lynching
THE DEATH PENALTY AS A “LEGAL LYNCHING”
cloak itself in the Court’s language condoning “private” disWhile it is true that no region in America has displayed
crimination. Southern law enforcement claimed that the state
did not perpetuate the violence. This fiction was enough to a historical monopoly over capital punishment, it is also true that
shield lynching from the scrutiny of the federal courts, since “[d]eath penalty practice in America is highly regionalized.”107
they had no jurisdiction to intervene on the mere grounds that The plain fact of the matter is that “[m]ost modern executions
state police and prosecutors were failing to solve crimes. For occur in the South,”108 where “the death penalty is as firmly enthese reasons, “conventional definitions of lynching [typically] trenched as grits for breakfast.”109 This pronounced regional
…draw a sharp line of demarcation between violence inflicted in disparity means that it is impossible to speak of an American
the name of the law and that which stands
pattern or single national profile
outside or in violation of the law.”101
regarding capital punishment.110
Nonetheless, a brief peek under the hood
This regionalization shares a close
of this ruse reveals the reality of state parhistorical affinity with the instituticipation in these supposedly “private”
tion of slavery, and its disproporacts. “[A]s the very phrase ‘lynch law’
The plain fact of the matter is that tionate application against blacks
implies… the mutually exclusive opposithe modern era is a vestige of
executions occur in in
tion between the legal and the illegal fails “[m]ost modern
the
dominion historically enjoyed
108
where “the death pen- by the white elite establishment
to appreciate how unstable and often irrele- the South,”
vant was the liberal formulation of the dis- alty is as firmly entrenched as grits over blacks.
tinction between the official and unofficial,
A historical examination of capifor breakfast.”
public and private, in the conduct of lynchtal punishment in America reveals
ing.”102 The complicity of southern public
its provocative correlation with
lynching.111
officials in lynchings was entrenched by
The incidence of
the refusal of southern senators in the
racially-motivated lynchings,
United States Congress to endorse an antiwhich rose to prominence after
lynching bill that would allow federal law enforcement officials Reconstruction, declined steadily from a peak in the 1890s and
to investigate and prosecute lynchings when local authorities disappeared (or at least went into hiding)112 by the 1940sfailed to intervene.103 Although no less than seven presidents 1950s.113 Despite this apparent success at eradicating racial viohad requested such a law from Congress, and the House of Rep- lence, however, a judicial analogue had been created in its place.
resentatives had passed an anti-lynching bill four times, “the “With these ‘legal lynchings,’ whites deferred to the courts but
Senate’s powerful southern senators used the filibuster to ensure remained ready to return to mob justice if the results were not
that the bill never got a vote.”104 Once again, we see the modus favorable to them.”114 In this way, institutionalized racial viooperandi of the New Departure at work; southern lawmakers lence against African-Americans was able to persist to a great
could invoke the democratic principle of legislative due process degree.115 For example, over half (54%) of citizens executed
to perpetuate a racist legacy passed down from the antebellum between 1930 and 1967 were African-American,116 despite
era.
never comprising more than 11% of the American population
during that time,117 and three out of five executions during that
30
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time took place in the southern states,118 where 90% of those
executed for rape, 100% of those executed for burglary, and
83% executed for armed robbery, were black.119 Throughout
that period, blacks never consisted of more than 25% of the
population of the South.120
This statistical trend is faithful to the Redeemers’ strategy of weaving antebellum attitudes into the fabric of democratic institutions. Because legislatures and courts were enacting
and applying facially neutral laws, the law provided a gloss of
“stability and regularity”121 that was absent in the context of
mob lynchings. The genius of these legal lynchings was in how
they co-opted the Constitution itself -specifically, the division of
powers doctrine, as the pursuit of criminal prosecutions has historically been understood as a matter of local concern- to shelter
a racist institution.122 Under the pretense of due process,123 a
legal apparatus was created that would “use force against its
citizens without itself appearing like a criminal.”124 Much like
the Greeks who attacked the city of Troy under cover of nightfall, these complicit agents worked “in a state of relative invisibility,”125 fostered by an “epistemology of ignorance”126 that
deflected accusations of bias by pointing an exculpatory finger
toward the incontrovertibly race-neutral language of the blackletter law.127 As an end result, “[m]ore graphic forms of racial
violence, such as spectacle lynching, became less imperative
once white dominance was assured by less transparent but more
calculable means,”128 and with the passage of time the Confederacy’s most enduring weapon in perpetuating the subordination
of blacks as “subpersons”129 has proven not to be the musket or
the noose, but the gavel.130
The ability of the state to impose the death penalty
completes this paradigm. “Along with the right to make war, the
death penalty is the ultimate measure of sovereignty and the
ultimate test of political power.”131 Thus, “[w]ith the end of
slavery… [t]he belief that capital punishment was necessary to

restrain a primitive black population became an article of faith
among white southerners lasting well into the twentieth century.”132 Because the death penalty treats “members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded,”133 it is the ultimate manifestation of the ability of the
state “to do anything it pleases with life,”134 a direct Hobbesian
descendant “of the personal power of kings.”135

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this analysis is not to illustrate that the
American system of capital punishment system is tainted by
race. Rather, by tracing the link between the current practice of
capital punishment and the classical doctrine of dominion, it
attempts to expose how the imposition of state-sanctioned death
in contemporary America is marred by the indelible stain of
slavery. Having been stealthily carried into modern jurisprudence via the Trojan Horse of the New Departure, the Hobbesian
paradigm of a master wielding life-or-death dominion over his
chattel remains a live concept in the American criminal justice
system today, particularly in the South. Through its racially
selective administration, the modern application of the death
penalty represents one of the most enduring fronts in the struggle for legal equality, a vestige of a Civil War that purportedly
ended nearly a century and a half ago.
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COMBATING GENDER INEQUITIES IN LAW SCHOOL: TIME FOR A
NEW FEMINIST RHETORIC THAT ENCOURAGES
PRACTICAL CHANGE
By
Caitlin Howell*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that law schools are admitting men and
women in relatively equal numbers, they are failing to adequately prepare women for success.1 Not only do women report
feeling marginalized in law school classrooms, but also they
statistically under-perform men.2 Additionally, men continue to
dominate the upper levels of the legal profession.3 Recently
though, it has also become clear that men experience law school
negatively.4 Just like women, men are not being taught all the
skills they need to be effective attorneys.5
Over the course of contemporary women’s legal history, different feminist scholars have attempted to identify solutions to gender inequities in law school.6 Many feminist legal
scholars have hypothesized that the adversarial nature of law
school is inherently discriminatory against women because it
rewards masculine behavior.7 They argue that the Socratic
method, the hierarchical nature of law school journals, the fierce
competition for clerkships and externships, and mock/moot
court competitions all reward such behavior. These feminist
scholars, therefore, propose a reinvention of law school pedagogy that would reward feminine behavior. They also propose to
insert feminist perspectives into the curriculum.8 This essay argues that while this approach could benefit women and men, it
may perpetuate gender inequity by stereotyping a highly diverse
group of women.9
In Part II, I will provide a background on the concept of
gender inequity and negative experiences in law school. Then, I
will also sketch the different feminist approaches to address gender inequity in law school.10 In Part III, I will identify the gaps
in such feminist scholarship. I will also argue that feminists
should shift their critique to how law schools are failing to provide both women and men with all the skills they need to be
effective attorneys.11 Finally, in Part IV, I will suggest that law
schools would lessen gender inequity if they commit to producing lawyers who are capable of meeting diverse professional
demands.12

BACKGROUND
GENDER INEQUITY AND NEGATIVE LAW SCHOOL
EXPERIENCES
The scholarship devoted to examining the marginalization of law students on the basis of gender has risen with the
increase of women entering law school.13 By conducting empirical studies through the lens of feminist theory, scholars have
identified significant gender inequities in law school that negatively impact students’ experiences.14 Generally, in law school
women under-perform men in terms of grades.15 They are also
unrepresented on grade-based law journals.16 Specifically, studies show that women participate less than men do in the class36

room.17 Women are discouraged from participating partly because the majority of first year professors are males.18 Women
also report higher levels of anxiety, stress, and depression in law
school than men do.19 Studies indicate that, after their first year
of law school, women are less confident in their ability to become successful lawyers.20 Some women attribute their lower
rates of classroom participation, feelings of anxiety, and lack of
confidence in part to the Socratic method and competitive classroom environment.21 They also attribute these feelings to the
limited professor feedback in classes culminating in a “oneshot,” end of the year exam.22
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING GENDER INEQUITY
Feminist scholars have attempted to devise a variety of
solutions in response to finding that women under-perform men
and experience law school negatively.
INSERTING WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ISSUES INTO LAW
SCHOOL
Some scholars suggest that a basis for reforming legal
education should be inserting gender and feminist perspectives
into first year classes, such as torts and contract law.23 This approach would insert into the curriculum the legal accomplishments and contributions of women.24 This approach would also
recast classes on feminism and the law as essential.25 These
scholars argue that integrating women’s issues into the law
could help female students feel less alienated from law school.26
Not only would women participate more in the classroom, but
male students would also learn about pervasive gender attitudes
in the legal field.27
To achieve equality for women in law school, this approach would also increase both, the sheer number of female law
professors as well as the number of female professors in positions of seniority.28 In order to achieve equality for women in
law school, scholars argue that female faculty members are essential as role models because they bring greater diversity in
pedagogy and perspectives to the classroom.29 Scholars also
assert that having female role models would increase the comfort level of women in the classroom and female students’ selfesteem would rise by seeing successful women in the profession.30 This higher level of confidence could translate into
higher grades and improved overall performance rates for
women in law school.31
ADOPTING “WOMEN-FRIENDLY” TEACHING METHODS
Some scholars suggest going beyond introducing more
women and women’s issues into law school. They advocate restructuring the current adversarial law school model by using
more feminized teaching methods 32 to make it friendlier to
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women.33 Specifically, these scholars recommend making law
school a more “nurturing environment”. They suggest eliminating or tempering the Socratic method, encouraging small-group
discussions and smaller class sizes. They also suggest increasing
professor feedback. Professors would be encouraged to establish
a good rapport with students.34 As a result, women would be less
anxious and be more likely to participate in a “comfortable
classroom” environment where professors provide positive reinforcement and create a sense of community.35
Scholars that advocate making law school friendlier to
women also suggest importing aspects of feminist pedagogy into
the classroom.36 This would include encouraging more collaborative and cooperative styles of teaching and learning to decrease adversariness.37 Using more feminist teaching methods
could empower women to assert themselves in the classroom
and later, in the professional world.38
“HUMANIZING” LAW SCHOOL
Instead of changing law school to accommodate
women’s different learning style, some scholars argue that humanizing law school eliminates gender inequity without stereotyping women.39 Humanizing law school means fostering an
ethic of care in the classroom. This would include providing
positive reinforcement to students and demonstrating respect for
students’ opinions and ideas.40 For instance, professors would
encourage cooperation in class by asking students to assist their
colleagues or “co-counsel” when a student gets nervous and
then, return to the student after she or he has regained composure.41
Demystifying the learning process is another hallmark
of the humanizing approach.42 Instead of eliminating the Socratic method, professors should explain the purpose for using
it.43 Explaining to students that the Socratic method is more of a
dialogue rather than their only opportunity to demonstrate that
they can “think like a lawyer,” could relieve anxiety in the classroom.44 When professors explain to students that the Socratic
method is meant to generate discussion rather than a single
“correct” answer,, law schools would reward women’s ability to
think with a multiple consciousness, or a greater variety of perspectives.45
SETTING ASIDE THE ASSUMPTION OF GENDER
DIFFERENCE

ANALYSIS
GAPS AND PROBLEMS IN CURRENT FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP
“STIRRING IN” WOMEN AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
Feminist perspectives should be included in the law
school curriculum. However, introducing separate “women’s
issues” in basic classes may exacerbate the notion that these are
“outsider” interests or “asides to the more important objective
business that is the true subject of the class.”52 Moreover, addressing women’s issues in separate courses may perpetuate the
notion that women’s interests are personal having limited relevance to the law generally.53 Merely introducing feminist perspectives as asides also fails to address the current law school
methods and institutions that perpetuate gender inequity.54
Similarly, merely increasing the number of women on
law school faculty will not automatically alleviate gender inequity in the classroom.55 Female professors who heavily utilize
the Socratic method also intimidate women students.56 In fact,
seeing women “do law like men” can only heighten feelings of
inadequacy for female law students.57 Therefore, inserting more
women onto law school faculty without also restructuring the
pedagogy may only perpetuate gender inequity.58
SEX-STEREOTYPING GENDER NORMS
Attempting to humanize law school or make it more
women-friendly based on stereotypically feminine characteristics, necessitates defining what is feminine because it does not
escape essentializing both men and women.59 Restructuring law
school based on sex-stereotypes of masculinity and femininity
excludes from the discourse women that are “unfeminine” and
men that are more “feminine.”60 The humanizing approach purports to circumvent sex-stereotyping. However, it still seeks to
accommodate stereotypical feminine traits such as thinking with
multiple consciousnesses.61 The Socratic method does not disserve all women, just as it does not benefit all men.62 Envisioning femininities and masculinities as homogeneous norms only
serves to sex-stereotype a highly diverse student body. Sexstereotyping marginalizes differences with regard to race, class,
and sexual orientation.63
LOWERING EXPECTATIONS FOR WOMEN

Arguing from a very different viewpoint, some scholars
advocate setting aside gender differences as something occurring
prior to women’s marginalization in law school.46 Instead of
looking at gender as the problem, feminists should examine the
concept of gender as the consequence of the power structure of
law school.47 In other words, “gender” is nothing more than a
construct perpetuated by male-dominated law schools to keep
women from advancing with the same rates of success.48
Addressing gender inequity in law school then becomes
a question of examining operations of power rather than generalizing about women’s perspectives.49 Law schools should change
their focus from attempting to make law school a more
“feminine” place to increasing the political representation of
feminist ideas.”50 This approach contends that by imbuing the
content of legal education with feminist politics, not femininity,
women’s law school experiences would improve.51
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Feminist rhetoric advocating that law schools should
become more women-friendly exacerbates gender inequity and
lowers the expectations for women in law school. This rhetoric
encourages the notion that women cannot succeed in law school
unless it “softens up.”64 Advocating the need to make law school
more “nurturing” or “women friendly” as essential for women’s
success perpetuates female law students’ feelings of inadequacy
in the legal profession.65 This rhetoric does not address the law
schools’ failure to meet demands on lawyers. Instead, it can
wrongfully lead to the conclusion that restructuring law school
to accommodate women comes at the expense of professional
training for all students.66 Instead of addressing the way in
which gender inequity in law school is inextricably linked to the
failure of law schools to adequately depict the range of demands
on lawyers, the women friendly approach lowers the expectations for women in law school.67
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MEN ALSO EXPERIENCE LAW SCHOOL NEGATIVELY
Feminist legal scholarship largely ignores the negative
impact that the adversarial law school model also has on men.68
Studies on gender inequity in law school show that men experience law school negatively as well.69 Although 41% of females
reported a loss of confidence in law school, 16.5% of men did
too.70 While 16.5% is a significant percentage, the number of
men that experience a loss in self-esteem may be even higher
since men are less likely to report or seek help for feelings of
distress.71 Another study indicated that while one in two female
law students reported feeling less intelligent in law school, so
did almost one in three male students.72 The law school model,
therefore, is harming men as well as women.73 This is particularly true for men who represent a minority or less-traditional
male perspectives. By not stressing the fact that legal education
is failing everyone, feminists risk giving the impression that
reform should occur purely to accommodate women.74
SHIFT IN FOCUS
Feminist legal scholars should re-focus their critique of
law school to address the practical failings of the adversarial
model, which negatively impacts women and men as students
and professionals. By couching recommendations for reform of
law schools purely in terms of gender, feminists are not effectively identifying the gross failings of legal education. Addressing the failure of law schools to adequately prepare women and
men to meet the range of demands on lawyers could push law
schools to make real changes without exacerbating gender inequity.75
THE CURRENT LAW SCHOOL MODEL DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DEPICT THE RANGE OF DEMANDS ON LAWYERS
Law school currently overemphasizes certain skills and
underemphasizes others, failing to prepare women and men for a
diverse professional world.76 Currently emphasized skills include adversarial competition, aggressiveness, abstract doctrinal
analysis, quickness, and performance.77 Underemphasized skills
include collaboration, counseling, mediation, lawyer-client relationships, problem solving, and facilitating transactions.78 The
former model, primarily based on litigation and doctrinal analysis, only applies to a small fraction of real-world practice.79
Many lawyers do not litigate, go to court, or even work in large
firms.80 Additionally, “for those employed as in-house counsel
or are engaged in transactional lawyering, negotiation contrasts
starkly to the classic notion propagated by the Socratic method
of advocating one side before an appellate court.”81
Instead, the legal profession increasingly values collaboration, group problem-solving, role flexibility, and proffering question as well as criticisms.82 The American Bar Association has identified problem-solving, comprised of generating
alternative strategies and keeping the planning process open to
new ideas, to be a fundamental lawyering skill.83 Therefore,
learning collaborative skills is essential for students as lawyers
and firms expand the kinds of services they provide to meet their
clients’ diverse needs.84
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PRACTICAL CHANGES
Law schools committed to producing lawyers that are
more capable of meeting diverse professional demands should
recast academic priorities. Recasting these priorities would simultaneously lessen gender inequity.85 Combining more collaborative teaching styles with current law school pedagogy
would alter both the academic structure and educational substance of law school in a way that would benefit women and
men.86
In terms of academic structure, law schools should rely
far less on large lectures or Socratic questioning. Law schools
should, instead, add more emphasis to clinical programs and
experiential learning.87 With more emphasis on hands-on
lawyering skills and less on abstract and authoritarian interchange between students and professors, law schools should
give students more of an inside look at what it takes to be a professional instead of “hiding the ball.”88
Law schools should also increase small group discussion sections in basic courses. Small group discussion would
help students develop collaborative skills necessary for real
world practice. By developing collaborative skills, small group
discussions would simultaneously break down competitiveness
in the classroom.89 In addition, unlike an end of the year, oneshot exam, more exercises and class simulations would give
students increased feedback on a regular basis. Using diverse
teaching methods such as small group discussions, therefore,
would increase possibilities for students with different learning
styles and more accurately reflect the demands on lawyers in
practice.90
In terms of educational substance, more focus should
be on the contextual application of the law rather than on abstract doctrinal analysis.91 Topics such as race, gender, class,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation should become more central to
the discussion of legal institutions and lawyer-client relationships.92 Instead of the occasional insertion of gender and race
into the curriculum,93 these issues should become an integral
part of the core curriculum.94 Analysis that uses dimensions such
as gender to socially contextualize cases would move beyond the
“add women and stir” approach.95 Moreover, emphasis on interpersonal skills and diversity would more adequately equip students to deal with clients and colleagues. Students would move
away from the false notion that lawyering is always about adversariness.96 Focusing on the contextual application of the law,
therefore, will address the current professional failings of lawyers to understand and better represent a diverse client body.97

CONCLUSION
Since the 1980’s, more women have been admitted into
law schools. However, ever since then, feminist legal scholars
have identified more subtle forms of gender inequity in law
school.98 Many feminists argue that the source of inequity is the
inherently masculine law school model. This model, they argue,
rewards male behavior and penalizes women in terms of performance and experience.99 Similarly, scholars have proposed
solutions to the disparate law school experiences in terms of
gender without problematizing femininities or masculinities.100
However, these solutions rest on stereotypical definitions of
what is “male” and “female.” Stereotypical definitions only risk
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perpetuating gender inequity in law school.101 By using rhetoric
and strategies that suggest law schools should accommodate
women, feminists bolster the notion that women do not belong
in law school unless it “softens up.”102
The studies that feminist scholars have conducted show
that men, women, and minorities are all experiencing law school
negatively. Law schools are failing to teach everyone the skills
they need to be effective lawyers.103 Like the metaphor commonly used to describe women in law school, the canary is just
the first indication that the mine is toxic.104 Through their studies, feminist scholars have identified the institutional failings of
law school. It is time for a new feminist rhetoric that encourages

practical changes without sex-stereotyping men and women.105
Feminist rhetoric should encourage law schools to equip students to meet diverse professional demands. To meet these demands, law schools should change both the academic structure
and substance of legal education. These changes would simultaneously lessen gender inequity.106 Whether certain skills or behaviors are “male” or “female” or whether “masculine” skills are
currently overemphasized in law school while “feminine” skills
are underemphasized is irrelevant. One thing is clear: law
schools are failing a diverse range of students and need to
change.
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BANDING TOGETHER:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATION OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW
IN PROMOTING WOMEN’S RIGHTS
By
Jamie Rene Abrams and Daniela Kraiem*

T

he Washington College of Law and the Women’s Bar Archives”). The WCL Archives tell the story of a fledgling
Association of the District of Columbia share an im- feminist institution that struggled for legitimacy, achieved the
portant historical connection; Ellen Spencer Mussey stature of a respected (albeit much less feminist) law school, and
and Emma Gillett founded both institutions together, later rediscovered both its feminist and internationalist roots.
in 1898 and 1917, respectively. Mussey and Gillett were pioThe archived documents revealed several strong themes that
neers in legal education, legal reform, and the development of we explore in this essay. First, historians divide the broader
women lawyers.2 More significant than the work they per- feminist movement into a first and a second wave with a period
formed during their lives, however, is the legacy of activism, of abeyance in between. We noted that the work of women lawreform, and support that they ignited by founding two institu- yers associated with the WBA continued unabated even when
tions that advance women in the law. These institutions have the women’s movement was not generally active, indicating that
trained and supported generations of women lawyers through the WBA played a part in keeping the women’s movement alive
world wars and depressions, through the abeyance and resur- during its darkest days. Second, the legacy that Mussey and
gence of the women’s movement and the ensuing backlash, and Gillett began when they founded WCL and the WBA was a colthrough the dramatic changes in the legal profession and legal laborative one, a feminist legal method that has great lessons for
education that accompanied these events. We celebrate and our work today. Third, while women lawyers have made draexplore their legacy in this essay.
matic strides in a century – graduating from law schools at over
Sensing the importance
fifty percent today and breaking into careers
of their work, the Women’s
in the public, private, and non-profit sectors,5
the institutions that support women lawyers
Bar Association of the District of Columbia (“WBA”)
“Providing such a legal education nonetheless exist under objectives virtually
identical to the ones that Mussey and Gillett
and the Washington College
for women as will enable them to
espoused ninety years ago. This tells us that
of Law (“WCL”)3 preserved
practice the legal profession”
their institutional histories.
Mussey and Gillett, and the law teachers,
Yet, preserving these docu—Article of Incorporation, Wash- students and lawyers who joined them, hit
ments in a cardboard box or
upon something critical: a need for women
ington College of Law (1898).1
back room rendered them –
lawyers to work together not only as lawyers,
and with them the unique
but as women.
relevance of both institutions – isolated and known by only a
We begin in Section I by placing the origins and missions of
few. This issue of The Modern American commemorates the the WBA and WCL in historical context. Mussey and Gillett
“Shared History” project to preserve these archived documents, articulated three core pillars in the founding documents of the
to house these physical documents in the WCL library, and to WBA: (1) the administration of justice; (2) the advancement of
display them to the public in hard and digitized format, an effort women attorneys; (3) and the social and professional support for
that has both symbolic as well as practical significance.
its members. In Section II, we use these three pillars as the
The WBA’s historical materials include correspondence, framework for a historical analysis of the activities of these inboard minutes, newsletters, and photos compiled in informal stitutions, focusing on the WBA.6 Section III looks at the road
scrapbooks and formal archive files (collectively, the “WBA ahead for women lawyers. It considers how we can use the legArchives”).4 The WBA Archives tell the story of the WBA’s acy left by Mussey and Gillett to inspire a methodical, strategic,
historic efforts to secure property rights for women, to champion focused, collaborative, and inclusive response to today’s chalthe Equal Rights Amendment, to fight discrimination, to achieve lenges, such as advancing women to the highest ranks of the
fair pay, to support women lawyers, and to catapult women into profession and creating a meaningful inclusion for all women in
public leadership positions – a virtual rendition of women’s le- legal education and practice. We hope that the WCL and WBA
gal history from the perspective of one organization. WCL has Archives will ignite the dialogue necessary to achieve meaningits own archives, containing documents, yearbooks, graduation ful change and inspire the ongoing success of women in the law.
announcements, and advertisements (collectively the “WCL
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ORIGINAL MISSIONS
Buried in the archives at WCL is its Article of Incorporation
dated 1898. Its plainly worded statement of purpose belies a
number of radical ideas. Mussey and Gillett founded the coeducational Washington College of Law to educate women for
the practice of law at a time when the very notion of formal legal
education was new. Most lawyers at that time received training
through an apprenticeship, which had the effect of excluding
many women, immigrants, and members of minority groups.7 It
was almost unheard of for women to study law. Indeed, four out
of the five law schools in Washington, D.C. would not admit
women.8 And women generally could not find apprenticeships
unless they practiced in a family law firm.9
To contextualize the formal legal education of women in
1898, female lawyers could argue in court, but were not permitted to serve on a jury in the District of Columbia.10 Although
trained in the same constitutional and common law as their male
colleagues, women could not vote.11 The federal government
employed a number of female attorneys, but it was not until
1896 that women in the District of Columbia could hold property in their own names after marriage.12
Yet, both Mussey and Gillett had successful law practices in
Washington D.C. when they founded WCL. Mussey trained and
practiced with her husband, and kept his international law and
business practice for almost forty years after his death.13 Gillett
apprenticed under Belva Lockwood,14 the first woman to practice in front of the United States Supreme Court.15 Gillett later
graduated from Howard University Law School, the only institution in Washington D.C. that trained women at that time.16 She
practiced in a variety of fields, focusing mainly on what she
called “office work,” now termed transactional work.17
Mussey and Gillett incorporated lessons from their personal
and professional experiences into the law school structure.
From the outset, the school took the lived reality of its female
students into account. The founders set the cost of tuition as low
as possible to enable women, who often had little income, to
attend. They raised funds for scholarships for low-income students.18 They offered night classes to accommodate working
women.19 They even allowed one student to enroll under a
pseudonym because she feared her family would ostracize her
for studying law.20 Significantly, WCL’s early yearbooks and
newsletters show how Mussey and Gillett created an environment where women could study and teach law without being
isolated.
The WCL Archives illuminate the trailblazing accomplishments of the law school’s early years. Mussey served as the first
female dean of a law school,21 Gillett the second.22 The school
graduated six women in the inaugural class of 1899; by the
1920s it averaged approximately fifteen female students in its
graduating classes. Several female students and faculty members wrote the first law textbooks authored by women.23 Early
graduates went on to become some of the first female customs
agents (which was fairly scandalous because it involved inspectSpecial - Fall 2008

ing ships at sea,) government attorneys, and even judges.24 The
school also trained women from abroad. Some of the first
women to study law from countries such as Mexico, Sweden,
and Uruguay, were graduates of WCL.25
While Mussey and Gillett were pioneers of the formal law
school, a new form of entry into the legal profession, the school
was standard in many other ways. Beyond the radical fact of the
school’s existence, and Dean Gillett’s “caustic comments on
dower and some of the other provisions of the common law
whereby women were ‘protected,’”26 not much indication exists
that WCL faculty taught law any differently than other law
schools. Indeed, it seems unlikely since they strove for legitimacy as not only a female-run, but also a part-time institution.
Thus, while the act of founding the school was radical, and their
support for formal legal education progressive, Mussey and Gillet’s approach to education was consistent with that of their contemporaries.
The materials in the WCL Archives also reveal that the
school, while radical in its acceptance of women in all aspects of
legal practice and from many nations, remained mired in the
prevailing views on racial segregation. WCL excluded AfricanAmericans for over fifty years.27 The relationship of the founders and early graduates to the issue of racial discrimination is
complex.28 Mussey’s biography indicates that she was the
daughter of ardent abolitionists and grew up in a home that
served as a station on the Underground Railroad.29 However,
advertisements for the school through at least 1914, specifically
pointed out that it was for whites only, 30 presumably to make it
more attractive to white women than Howard University Law
School. The rhetoric softened slightly around the time when
WCL admitted a Native American woman, but it would be many
decades before the school took the first steps to remedy the injustice against African-Americans.31
A. WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
“Professional women cannot rise one at a time – they must
rise in groups.”
— Ellen Spencer Mussey, First Annual Address of the WBA
Nineteen years after the founding of the school, women still
faced overt discrimination in the practice of law even as they
entered the profession at an increasing rate.32 The D.C. Bar Association, the professional association that supported male attorneys, excluded women.33 Left without the support of a professional organization, it was up to the women to found their own.
Mussey and Gillett sent invitations on WCL Alumni Association letterhead to all of the female lawyers barred in the District of Columbia.34 On May 19, 1917, just after the United
States entered World War I, Mussey and Gillett convened a
meeting at WCL to form the WBA.35 Those present elected
Mussey as their first president.36 The WBA’s original constitution stated its mission:
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The object of this Association shall be to maintain the
honor and integrity of the
profession of the law, to
increase its usefulness in
promoting the administration of justice; to advance
and protect the interests of
women lawyers of the District of Columbia; and to
encourage their mutual improvement and social intercourse.37

beth Harris (WBA President, WCL graduate), Grace Hays Riley
(active WBA member, WCL Dean), Ida Moyers (WBA President, WCL graduate), Helen Jaimison (WBA President, WCL
Professor), Burnita Shelton Matthews (WBA President, WCL
Professor), Karen Lockwood (WBA President, WCL graduate,
WCL Adjunct Professor), and Jennifer Maree (current WBA
President, WCL graduate).52

PROGRESS MEASURED
The continuing legacy of these institutions is one of activism in pursuit of social and legal reform. Mussey and Gillett
founded the WBA on three core pillars: the administration of
justice; the advancement of women lawyers; and professional
and social support for women lawyers. We consider each pillar
in turn as a framework to analyze the achievements and significance of these institutions. Though innumerable themes emerge,
this section highlights only a few. First, while the broader feminist movement abated during certain points in history, the WBA
continued to work for the betterment of women lawyers and
women in the law. Second, these institutions have advanced the
rights of women through collaboration. Third, while the legal
reforms these institutions accomplished are truly remarkable,
perhaps their most timeless and enduring quality is the profound
need their professional and social support for women lawyers
fills.

The steady growth of the WBA indicated that it filled an
acute need for women lawyers in D.C. The WBA began with
thirty-one charter members.38 In her first annual address in May
of 1918, Mussey boasted that the WBA, then with forty members, had enrolled forty percent of its eligible members in less
than a year, while the D.C. Bar Association to which almost all
male attorneys were eligible, had only 300 members after thirty
years in existence.39 By May 1920, the WBA’s third year of
existence, Mussey put the WBA in context when she said:
“There are older and larger associations of women lawyers in
the country, but without boasting, we can truthfully claim that
none of them is more active, more harmonious, or more alive to
its responsibilities than our own.”40 Membership continued to
A. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
grow steadily, with 250 members in 1936,41 358 in 1944,42 427
in 1949,43 600 in 1966,44 and 1,100 in 1982.45 The WBA’s misOne of the most captivating aspects of the archives is the
sion today is nearly identical to its original language: record of legislative and administrative advocacy by the WBA
“Maintaining the honor and integrity of the profession; promot- and the faculty and administrators of WCL. While WCL itself
ing the administration of justice; advancing and protecting the did not engage in advocacy as an institution, there is no doubt
interests of women lawyers; promoting their mutual improve- that Mussey used her position as the Dean of the school, as well
ment; and encouraging a spirit of friendship among our mem- as her status as a well-respected lawyer in the community, to
bers.”46
advocate for women’s rights legislation as well as other
WCL and the
social policies. Gillett also did considerable legislative
WBA maintained
work, although she does not appear to have been as fond
important connecof testifying in public as Mussey eventually became.
tions, particularly in
while the broader feminist movement To put this into context, Mussey, who became one of the
the early years. The
most experienced lobbyists on behalf of women’s rights,
WBA held many of abated during certain points in his- did not dare speak in public until well into her forties for
its early meetings at tory, the WBA continued to work for fear of social scandal.53 Prior to the founding of the bar
WCL.47 One of the the betterment of women lawyers and association or the law school, Mussey and Gillett
WBA’s early initiaworked together on the passage of legislation (later
women in the law.
tives was an ongoing
called the Mussey Bill) granting women the right to hold
scholarship program
property in their own name after marriage, granting
for female students
mothers the same rights as fathers in custody disputes,
attending
WCL
and safeguarding dower rights.54 At that time, Gillett
48
(often at the behest of Mussey), and it contributed to the early was also a local leader of the woman suffrage movement.55
building fund drives (often at the behest of Gillett).49 Mussey Mussey appears to have been a late convert to the cause of
and Gillet both served as WBA Presidents50 and WCL Deans.51 woman suffrage, but a trip to Norway, where women already
Our non-systematic review of the archives turned up other im- had the right to vote, convinced her that the franchise was essenportant figures who bridged the two institutions, including Eliza- tial if women were to receive any consideration from lawmak44
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ers.56 By 1910, she testified in front of a Senate Committee “to
make a plea for the ballot.”57

changing times, it finally admitted its first African-American
student in 1950.68
The WBA, however, remained strong and active in the pe1. THE END OF THE FIRST WAVE: 1917-1925
riod stretching from just before World War II to the 1960s. Indeed, the WBA Archives suggest that the WBA served as one of
By the end of the first wave of the woman’s movement, the movement structures bridging the first and second waves of
WBA members and WCL faculty routinely appeared in the halls the women’s movement.69 The WBA continued to recruit young
of power to make demands for their rights and the rights of oth- members, and even started a new “junior” division in the
ers. Because of their location in Washington D.C. and their per- 1930s.70 In contrast, most feminist organizations in this time
sonal and professional contacts with members of Congress and period were increasingly populated by older women who had
various administrations, the women of the WBA were often the been part of the struggle for suffrage prior to 1920.71
local face of the national women’s movement. Although it took
Although many activists left the women’s movement after
many years and several generations of lawyers, the association the passage of woman suffrage, the WBA sponsored a bill for
participated actively and powerfully in each step of the slow gender parity in inheritance laws introduced in Congress in the
dismantling of legalized discrimination against women.
late 1920s.72 The WBA also endorsed bills to remove exempIn her inaugural annual address as president of the WBA, tions for women from jury duty.73 By the 1930s, the WBA fiMussey noted that the charter members organized the WBA nally succeeded in having Mrs. Mussey’s legislation restoring
after a dinner to honor the men who had marched with women women’s citizenship after marriage to a non-U.S. citizen signed
lawyers at the 1913 suffrage parade,58 which had turned vio- into law.74 The WBA also published a comprehensive report on
lent.59 The WBA formed just prior to the ratification of the the International Court of Justice that was incorporated into the
woman suffrage amendment. After its first few years, the assorecord of the Senate debates
ciation turned to advocacy on other aspects of
on the matter.75
women’s rights. They supported bills to allow
Two points are critical to the
women to retain their own nationalities after
importance of the WBA in
marriage to a non-U.S. citizen,60 to eliminate
Although many activists left the
the period between the first
the legal restrictions on the contractual capacity women’s movement after the passage and second waves of the mass
of married women,61 and to allow women to
of woman suffrage, the WBA spon- women’s movement. First,
serve on juries.62 Also concerned with social
the women who practiced law
welfare, WBA members supported measures sored a bill for gender parity in in- were still a small minority in
heritance laws introduced in Con- the legal community, and the
for compulsory education and reduction of
child labor in D.C.,63 as well as funding to regress in the late 1920s.
WBA Archives reveal that
duce maternal mortality.64 They supported
they remained concerned
resolutions calling for suffrage for D.C. resiabout discrimination against
dents, because despite having won themselves
women, especially in governthe right to vote as women, they still found
ment employment.76 Public opinion of women who worked for
themselves disenfranchised because of their status as residents wages outside the home ranged toward the cruel. Popular books
of D.C.65
labeled feminists “severe neurotics responsible for the problems
of American society.”77 The WBA served to protect its working
2. SURVIVING IN ABEYANCE: 1925-1965
women members from the stings of such attacks by legitimizing
their work in the public sphere.78
Historians often point to a period of “abeyance” in the
Second, the WBA’s membership developed the skills to
women’s movement between the passage of the suffrage amendlobby for legislation and the appointment of women to the judiment in 1920 and the start of the second wave of the women’s
ciary and political positions. The WBA, throughout even the
movement in the 1960s.66 Especially after World War II, most
most politically conservative 1950s and early 1960s, never
middle class women did not work outside of the home.
stopped taking positions on legislation. In the 1950s, the WBA
Women’s rights, which had been a hot-button issue for decades,
supported the creation of a Legal Aid Society for the District,
faded from public debate.
promoted a family division in the Municipal Court, and submitThe status of women at WCL reflects the decline of the
ted a report (a provision of which was later incorporated into the
women’s movement. As the founders and original graduates
legislation) abolishing dower and courtesy in the District.79 In
passed away, the memory of the school’s early radicalism faded.
the mid-sixties, the WBA endorsed the elimination of rules alThe school appointed its first male dean in 1949, perhaps to
lowing the federal government to specify “men only” when sesmooth the merger with American University in 1950.67 Like
lecting employees to serve under the Civil Service program.80 In
most law schools of the time, WCL continued to admit women,
1965, WBA members testified in support of divorce reform in
although in small numbers. In a more positive reflection of the
the District, as well as in support of laws affirming that there
Special - Fall 2008
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should be no discrimination as to sex in Federal Agencies’ hiring practices.81
Members of the WBA were experienced at testifying before
Congress in part because matters affecting the District of Columbia came before Congress, rather than a state legislature.82
In a gem of a letter from the WBA Archives, 1960-1961 President Ruth Joyce Hens83 described the work of the WBA to a
woman interested in organizing an association of women lawyers in Kentucky:84
Because of our proximity to Congress, legislation affecting the law,
the rights of women, the impact on the citizens of
the District of Columbia,
is important to our Association. We propose
legislation, we study legislative proposals espoused by other organizations or individuals, and
we testify
on those matters before appropriate Congressional Committees, giving
our views and recommendations.85
Considering that few women possessed the skills to testify in
Congress in 1950’s America, the fact that this was the primary
activity of the Association is remarkable when seen in context.
These skills proved vital when the mass women’s movement resurged in the 1960s and 1970s. WBA members knew
how to lobby and exert political influence, and they possessed
insiders’ knowledge of Washington politics. When the women’s
movement was almost ready to erupt again on a mass scale in
the 1960s, vocal members of the WBA moved it forward. Although not official business, the original White House Press
Release regarding the founding of the Federal Committee on the
Status of Women86 is tucked into the minutes of the WBA because WBA member Marguerite Rawalt served on the Citizen’s
Advisory Commission to that Committee.87 There are invitations to a meeting of Women’s Organizations of D.C. in 1966,
convened by the WBA, to demand that the D.C. Commissioners
create a Commission on the Status of Women for the District of
Columbia.88 While not necessarily radical feminist action, this
activity nonetheless reflects momentum towards women’s equality that perhaps only professional working women could have
contributed to, in this era.
3.

THE SECOND WAVE AND BEYOND: 1965-PRESENT

There is evidence of continued WBA activity from the
1960s to the present in the archives. The WBA continued to
work on issues pertaining to women and the law, and by the
mid-1960s, they had gained more allies. The WBA continued to
push for legislation that would enhance the lives of women. The
mass women’s movement, and the role of lawyers in the movement, shifted into high gear. The WBA counts among its members many legal pioneers, including several of the women who
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founded and staffed some of the most powerful women’s rights
organizations in the country, including the Women’s Legal Defense Fund.89 As litigation assumed a more prominent role in
movement strategy, the WBA took on the role of drafting and
signing onto amicus briefs. The WBA has influenced policies
on everything ranging from family medical leave to most recently, employment discrimination.90
B. ADVANCING AND PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF WOMEN
LAWYERS
1. A ROOM OF THEIR OWN AND A SEAT AT THE TABLE: THE
WBA’S ROLE IN MEETING THE NEEDS OF
WOMEN LAWYERS
Like the early WCL efforts to open the profession to
women described in Section I, early WBA efforts to advance
and protect the interests of women lawyers often involved basic
access to the profession itself – literally opening doors and finding space for women lawyers to practice their trade. One of the
WBA’s earliest efforts to support practicing attorneys was the
creation of a room of their own – the Women Attorney’s Room
in the District of Columbia Court House. The WBA women
discussed stocking, decorating, and cleaning this room regularly,
and allocated considerable amounts of money to the project.91
The Women Attorney’s Room created a space for women at the
courthouse to study, conduct research, meet, and prepare court
documents.92 A 1936 letter in the WBA Archives describes the
room as “the only pleasant place in the Court House, besides the
hall-ways, where women lawyers feel free to wait or meet, pending the hearing of their cases.”93
In other cases, the WBA was literally seeking a seat at the
table. Another of the WBA’s first official acts of business in
1917 was a discussion regarding the need to pursue law library
access for women lawyers, who at the time were not allowed
into the D.C. Bar Association library.94 A report on the 1919
ABA meeting notes that WBA members were the first women to
sit at a banquet of the American Bar Association, despite the fact
that some pioneering women had been in the legal field for decades.95
Early WBA efforts also included securing access to the formal education that was, by that point, practically required for
entry into the profession. By the 1920s, several schools in the
area admitted women and the WBA awarded one full law school
scholarship every three years and two pre-legal scholarships.96
The WBA offered both financial support to these students97 as
well as professional support, staying in active contact with the
recipients to ensure their success in school.98
2. THE NEXT STEP: PROMOTING FEMALE LEADERSHIP IN
THE PROFESSION

The WBA Archives tell the story of an unrelenting commitment on the part of the organization to support the appointment
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of women to “positions of public trust.”99 Its geographic, political, and social location in Washington, D.C. meant that the
WBA was one of the primary voices for the inclusion of women
in the federal government. As early as 1922, the WBA was
gathering data to survey the representation of women in legal
positions in the government, investigating problematic departments and demanding accountability.100 The WBA methodically
identified open positions, and encouraged members to apply or
identified people to formally nominate them.101 The WBA sent
letters and requested meetings with decision-makers, including
the President of the United States,102 to encourage them to appoint or hire the WBA-endorsed candidates.103
The WBA campaigned “to obtain effective publicity, to
interest influential persons, and to create a favorable public sentiment.”104 Occasionally, the campaigning required public battles with agency heads who refused to hire women. In 1934, the
WBA passed a resolution calling for the resignation of the District Attorney after he went public about his refusal to hire female Assistant District Attorneys, in part on the grounds that the
previous female Assistant District Attorneys had spent too much
time “worrying about canned goods”105 (no doubt prosecuting
violators of newly enacted food safety laws) and “hunting up
fleeing husbands for distracted wives”106 (likely attempting to
enforce support obligations.)107
For some time, advocacy on behalf of female lawyers operated on a position-by-position basis.108 In response to the
WBA’s expanded membership base by the 1960s, it began a
placement service to act as a “clearing house to advise those
interested as to where positions are available.”109 The WBA
also formalized its endorsement proceedings by convening a
committee and developing a formal Policy Statement Respecting
WBA Endorsement for Public Office.110
The Association also lobbied for women to represent the
United States in international legal proceedings. After a call by
WBA representatives at the State Department, the President appointed a woman to the American Delegation to the Conference
on the Codification of International Law in the Hague.111 The
WBA itself also sent delegates to meetings of the InterAmerican Bar Association for many years.112
3. EXPANDING ADVOCACY NETWORKS

Following decades of activism for women lawyers, the role
of the WBA as an advocacy organization in society also evolved
in important ways. The founders intended that the WBA provide professional support to women lawyers. They also founded
the Association at a climactic time in the woman suffrage movement. These dual functions placed the WBA at the intersection
of at least two distinct and important advocacy networks – advocating as a professional association for lawyers and advocating
for women’s rights. In these layered advocacy roles, the WBA
has a rich history of establishing and cultivating formal and informal connections with other groups to advance professional
women on certain issues, to advance lawyers and the legal proSpecial - Fall 2008

fession in other settings, and to advance women’s rights in other
contexts. For example, since its early years, the WBA has had
standing committees to work with organizations that shared the
WBA’s focus on promoting the rule of law and the efficient administration of justice, including the D.C. Bar Association, the
American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, and the
Inter-American Bar Association.113
The WBA also formed a node in the women’s rights advocacy network, focusing on using legal tools to achieve women’s
equality and advancement in the profession. As early as 1920,
records emerge of the WBA’s involvement in a nationwide conference of women lawyers.114 In 1930, it formally voted to pay a
group membership to affiliate with the National Association of
Women Lawyers (“NAWL”), and many WBA members have
also been active in NAWL throughout the decades.115 WBA
members often acted in conjunction with the Women’s Business
and Professional Association of D.C., especially when that organization was under the leadership of active WBA member
Marguerite Rawalt.116 Several prominent members of the WBA,
including Emma Gillett, Rebekah Greathouse, and Judge Burnita
Shelton Mathews, were also active in Alice Paul’s National
Women’s Party.117
C. Professional and Social Support Functions
Today, just as in 1917, it is impossible to separate the social
support function of the WBA from its goals of advancing
women lawyers and developing professional skills. When
women lawyers interact, whether casually or formally, it serves
to advance individual lawyers and the profession. Since its
founding, one of the WBA’s formal goals has been to promote
the professional development and social interaction of women
lawyers. The 1917 constitution states that the WBA’s purpose
includes the “mutual improvement and social intercourse” of
women lawyers in the District of Columbia.118 Interestingly,
documents in the WBA Archives indicate that this prong of the
WBA’s mission was likely added as a line-edit to a draft of the
temporary constitution.119 The WBA’s current constitution articulates this continued focus on “promoting [women lawyers’]
mutual improvement and encouraging a spirit of friendship
among our members.” 120
1. TO BE SIMPLY UNDERSTOOD: LENDING SUPPORT IN
MALE-DOMINATED PROFESSIONS

For what can be so refreshing to an aspiring soul that has been stifled under narrow conventionalism, as to be simply understood?121—
Martha K. Pierce (early woman lawyer)
The WBA Archives tell us of the timeless and persistent
need for social support among women lawyers. When the roster
of women lawyers in the WBA tallied thirty-one, this need was
sharply pronounced, and was for many women a matter of pro47

fessional survival. The isolation felt by the first female lawyers members renders a school more welcoming to its female stuwas likely intense as they negotiated a delicate balance between dents.126 It follows that the mere presence of other female facprevailing notions of femininity and their public professional ulty members at the turn of the century must have been a source
of great social support to the first women law teachers.
role.122
In its first four decades, WCL provided an opportunity for
Embedded in the loneliness of charting a new path for
women were the more concrete concerns about the practice of women to serve as deans of a law school, a position of power
law, their clients’ expectations, and their family lives that per- that was not meaningfully open to other women until recently.127
haps only another female lawyer could comprehend. Early Additionally, the early yearbooks show that the women faculty
women lawyers faced questions about women’s physical fitness members taught in all areas of the law, from common law subfor the practice of law, appropriate behavior (and dress) in the jects to international law. For example, in the 1940s, WBA
courtroom, and the logistical and social challenges of accommo- member (and later Judge) Burnita Shelton Mathews taught evidating children and marriage into a life that also included a pro- dence at WCL.128 This is in stark contrast to the gradual increase of women in other law school faculties (which started
fessional and public career.123
The early WBA provided women lawyers with the compan- only very slowly in the 1950s to employ women and did not
ionship and support of other women who simply understood. accelerate until the late 1970s), where they tended to cluster
The WBA Archives reveal that in its first years, social gather- women in fields such as law librarianship,129 family law, trusts
ings were an interesting blend of private intimacy and public and estates, and legal writing rather than offering women opporexposure, organic institutional programming and social hosting. tunities across the legal curriculum.130
There was an early tradition of private monthly dinners, a tradi2. SOCIAL STATUS AND RECOGNITION
tion which emerged formally in the late 1920s, but appears from
the records to have continThe social events also provided much needed
ued for some time.124 The
public recognition to the women attorneys and
terse notes and budgetary
allocations do not reveal These dual functions placed the WBA their work. By the mid-1930’s, entertainment
comprised an average of forty-eight percent of the
much about these private
at the intersection of at least two dis- WBA’s budget over a six-year average.131 This is
dinners, their location, the
tinct and important advocacy net- further evident from the regular Washington Post
attendees, or the discussions had there, but it is works – advocating as a professional coverage of the WBA social events, especially the
132
difficult to overlook their association for lawyers and advocat- annual dinner, which has always been a public
occasion. The women tried to secure the WBA’s
vital importance in keeping
ing for women’s rights.
place in Washington society with invitations to
these pioneering women
the President of the United States, Supreme Court
connected, informed, and
Justices, Congressmen and women, and promisupported.
nent speakers such as Pearl Buck. While attenWCL’s parallel role
dance
at
the
dinner
was originally limited to women and women
providing social support for women law students and law teach133
ers is evident from the first yearbooks, announcements, and guests, over time, the dinner expanded to include a large
newspapers of its early era. Women who attended other law population of male attorneys. At the twentieth anniversary of
schools were often the only female members of their class, and the dinner in 1937, the report on the success of the dinner noted
faced years of education with only male classmates and all male that fifty of the 250 attendees were men “of whom I am told
instructors. Especially in the hyper sex-segregated world that ‘came to scoff (or be bored) but remained – to be highly enter134
existed around the turn of the century, this meant that women tained.’”
Over ninety years later, the need for “social intercourse”
studied law in relative isolation, at home with neither their male
among women lawyers and the WBA’s role in filling that need
peers, or their female friends and family members.
Since its inception, WCL has been co-educational, and em- seems to have changed very little. The WBA’s annual dinner
ployed many male faculty members.125 But, at least in its early continues today, including a 2008 address by Justice Ruth Bader
years, women could feel confident that they would not be sub- Ginsburg where she was honored with the 2008 Reno
Torchbearer Award,135 attended by approximately 800 people136
jected to the ridicule or resistance found at other schools.
and sponsored by dozens of local law firms and businesses. The
Many of these women would find female mentors and role WBA also hosts annual judicial receptions, a golf classic, and
specialty dinners for women corporate counsel, women partners,
models at WCL.
137
WCL also offered female law teachers a fellowship and and senior women in government.
The WBA also played hostess over the years, entertaining
opportunities that simply did not exist elsewhere. In her authoritative and comprehensive article on the history of WCL, Profes- various delegations of women attorneys, ranging from the ABA
sor Mary Clark notes that the presence of more female faculty visits to Washington, to visits by lawyers from the Inter48
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American Commission of Women.138 The hostess function
eventually yielded a formal Courtesy or Hospitality Committee.139 In many instances, this often included the role of entertaining the wives of visiting officials.140 Minutes from 1931,
record a discussion regarding whether it was the WBA’s responsibility to entertain the wives of lawyers. Those present at the
meeting agreed to “accept the responsibilities for arranging” this
entertainment – one of many examples where the minutes likely
do not do justice to the richness of the issue.141

WBA minutes and notes do not note the race of the membership
of its leadership, but this organization was certainly not racially
inclusive, particularly in Jim Crow-era Washington. For example, a volume of the “The Woman Lawyer” from 1935 in the
WBA Archives, contains simultaneously a proud profile of the
WBA,148 an advertisement for WCL,149 and a racist joke that
mocks the intelligence and understanding of the legal system of
two men of color.150 While there were only a handful of female
lawyers of color at the time, the WBA and WCL’s tolerance for
the prevailing prejudice is unacceptable by modern standards.

3. WOMEN’S SPACE: CULTIVATING FEMALE LEADERS

4. TRAINING FOR THE FUTURE
The social component of the organization is still thriving
today, a telling reality when we consider the number of women
in the profession today as compared to the WBA’s early years.
In 1920 there were 1,738 women lawyers and 1,711 women law
students.142 In contrast, women have been graduating law
school at a rate of 40 percent or higher since 1985.143 Along
with the entry of more women into the profession, comes the
opportunity for organic social interaction with other women in
the traditional office setting as well as formal women’s committees and initiatives.
But through these immense changes, the WBA’s social
functions have survived, which indicates that they serve a more
complex purpose than contact with other women. At a minimum, the social interaction of organizations such as the WBA,
offers modern lawyers a broad network of support, role models,
mentors, and professional contacts.144 Maybe they offer a space
where a woman’s femininity and her professional identity are
reinforced rather than challenged.145
Even more powerfully, perhaps women professionals benefit from having a unique women’s space where they can develop
into leaders. The early members of the WBA faced the familiar
tension between fighting for inclusion in power structures, while
recognizing that a separate women’s space was sometimes necessary because women’s voices were often drowned out or devalued in those existing power structures. Even after the admission of women to the D.C. Bar Association, for example, it was
many decades before women rose to prominent positions in the
organization,146 stunting women’s opportunities to gain meaningful leadership experience – as heads of committees, organizers of campaigns, or officers in the organization.
In contrast, the WBA provided its members an opportunity
to cultivate leadership and management skills. As sociologist
Cynthia Fuchs-Epstein pointed out in her 1981 study of women
in the legal profession, due to discrimination, women, who could
often not “easily rise in the male-dominated bar organizations,
[could] climb to positions of leadership in the women’s bars …
some of the prestige attached to high office in them may be carried over into the male organizations and into the profession.”147
It is important to acknowledge and consider, however, that
the history of social support at the WBA and WCL failed to extend to women of color in many ways. As noted above, WCL
did not accept African-American students until the 1950s. The
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As the WBA membership base expanded, the WBA Archives tell of an increased emphasis on professional development, demonstrating the organization’s adaptability and ability
to keep the organization relevant to a broader membership base.
Beginning in the 1930s, the WBA Archives begin to show explicit professional development components to the meetings,
merging business meetings with educational programs,151 such
as a talk on Chinese Women in the Law and a lecture on changes
to the Federal Rules.152 By the 1940s, the informal dinners that
began many years earlier also started to include a speaker or
discussion about a current topic.153 Dinner speakers over the
years covered topics such as the European recovery effort after
World War II,154 “Democracy’s Chances in Japan,”155 and investment strategies for professional women.156 Many of these
events reveal much about the political tenor of the time. For
example, notes from a program on the Labor Relations Board in
1961 record the speaker telling his audience that lawyers have a
responsibility to fight communism,157 and topics in the 1980s
included “work/family balance.”

THE ROAD WINDS UP: UNFINISHED BUSINESS FOR THE
WBA AND WCL
Our review of the archives led us to one fundamental, yet
critical, point. Women lawyers can, should – and indeed must –
carry the baton as individuals and in organizations. In the words
of Dean Gillett in her address to the Section of Legal Education
of the American Bar Association in 1921,
I want to say… that the woman’s day is
here. The women are not yet at the top.
Does the road wind upward all the way?
Yes, to the weary end, and we women who
are studying law and practicing law are not
at the top yet. It is possibly just as well that
the road should wind somewhat as we go
up.158

49

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING THE PAST

our predecessors used have not been as useful in addressing the
more embedded barriers that exist today. Today, women face
Gillett’s words from 1921 still ring far too true today – discrimination that is more entrenched and subtle. Traditional
women are not yet at the top of the path. As the road winds up, legal tools have not proven successful in advancing and retainwe look ahead for ideas and behind us for inspiration. It is our ing women in the highest ranks of the legal profession.161 Elimihope that this section will ignite that dialogue by highlighting nating cognitive bias, isolation, and the role of “preference” in
why these Archives matter, what they tell us about the current hiring and promotion decisions requires new forms of advocacy,
challenges facing women in the profession, and where we go as well as new mechanisms of accountability.
Despite legal protections and great numbers of female law
from there.159
The value of our shared history is best illustrated by WCL’s school graduates, there is strong evidence of discrimination
own winding path. The WCL Archives have already rescued against women in the legal profession. The National Association
WCL’s feminist history from obscurity once before, fundamen- of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”) points out that in the private
tally changing the direction of WCL and perhaps providing a sector “almost one out of two law firm associates is a woman,
blueprint for continued work. By the 1980s there were no full which approximates the law school population but at the highest
time female faculty members, erasing the history and even mem- level of law firm practice, equity partner, in the average firm
ory of the pioneering women law teachers. Around this time, only one out of six equity partners is a woman.”162 Within the
firm leadership structures, NAWL reports that
the then-WCL Director of
women generally comprise only 15% of the
Development was searching
seats on the law firms’ highest governing comfor a way to connect WCL
The WBA can leverage its organiza- mittee, and 15% of firms have no women on
with its alumni base, particutional status to create pressure for their leadership committee.163 Only 8% of all
larly in light of faculty turnreform in specific law offices that managing partners are women.164 NAWL data
over and the school’s location
on the American University have high attrition, low promotion or also reveals an increasingly widening income
Main Campus. The Director
part-time policy utilization rates, or disparity as women165progress to the highest
The National Associaranks of partnership.
of Development went into the
dusty WCL Archives looking insufficient family leave policies, to tion of Law Placement reports that in law firms
name just a few.
it surveyed, 10.07% of associates are minority
for pictures of the old buildwomen.166 1.65% of partners are minority
ing. There, in antique phowomen nationally.167 The statistics in Washtos, crumbling newsletters,
ington, D.C. are only slightly better, at 10.33%
and faded scrapbooks, he
found the early feminist and internationalist roots of WCL; roots for minority associates and 2.11% for minority partners.168 The
ABA Commission on Women in the Profession’s study,
that he recognized made WCL a different kind of law school.
The faculty used this information to position WCL as the “Visible Invisibility,” reported that less than 1% of minority
unique institution that it is today. They created a strategic vision women remained at law firms by their eighth year.169
Women are similarly underrepresented in the senior ranks
emphasizing WCL programs in international law, clinical legal
education, and women’s legal studies. WCL faculty founded the of other legal sectors as well. According to the ABA’s CommisWomen and the Law Program and the Women and the Law sion on Women in the Profession, in 2006 women comprised
Clinic. They supported the creation of a Journal of Gender, So- 15.7% of General Counsels in Fortune 1000 corporations, 16.6
cial Policy and the Law. Faculty later founded the Center for % of General Counsels in Fortune 500 corporations, and 23% of
WorkLife Law,160 until recently housed at WCL, as well as the district court and circuit judges.170 Women currently make up
Domestic Violence Clinic. The faculty recruited and hired fe- only 20.4% of law school deans, and 26.5% of tenured law
male scholars in all areas of the law and bolstered its faculty school faculty around the nation.171
These challenges reinforce a continued demonstrable
scholarship in the areas of gender and law. The students joined
in the resuscitation of WCL’s feminist roots. The Women’s need for both the WBA and for the women’s legal studies proLaw Association, with the support of the administration, started gramming at WCL. And, to paraphrase Judge Burnita Shelton
an annual “Founders’ Day” conference, out of which has blos- Mathews, a reason for women to “band together.” It is noteworsomed an extensive Spring series of over sixty conferences and thy not only that Mussey and Gillett were women, but also that
events that form the centerpiece of WCL’s contributions to dis- there were two of them. WCL legend has it that Mussey would
course with the broader legal community. The Archives have not even consider opening the first Women’s Law Class if Gillett would not co-teach.172 It is also no coincidence that the
proved their value once before.
What lessons do the Archives hold for us today? The Ar- WBA emerged in the aftermath of the pivotal woman suffrage
chives teach us that women lawyers used every advocacy tool at parade in 1913, a classic form of collective action.173 There is
their disposal, primarily lobbying, litigating, and legislating to much rhetoric about the importance of working together, but the
address de jure discrimination. We also see that the tools that Archives provide a stark reminder that the women’s movement
50
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will not survive if we do not build coalitions strategically. In
building a modern coalition to address the current needs of
women in the profession, both the WBA and WCL have unique
and irreplaceable roles to play.
B. THE WBA IS AS NECESSARY AS EVER
The WBA remains relevant because it is uniquely positioned to find the next set of advocacy and accountability tools,
to train future generations of women lawyers, and to maintain
the steadfast focus on advancing the interests of women in the
profession. The forces faced by women in the legal profession
— the ones that push them out of law firms at alarming rates,
and that keep them from entering the highest ranks of the profession — are not forces that will be changed by individual women
working independently. Simply put, women’s advancement in
the profession is not another project for the WBA. It is the project, the very reason for its continued existence.
The WBA’s position is unique in several ways, including its
capacity to leverage the institutional power of the WBA to create accountability, the positioning of the WBA as an authoritative voice, and in continuing to build the capacity of individual
women lawyers.
1. LEVERAGING INSTITUTIONAL POWER TO CREATE ACCOUNTABILITY

Over the past ninety years, the WBA has banked institutional capital to wield for the benefit of women in the profession. The WBA can utilize this organizational clout by creating
new norms for what is acceptable in the legal community. One
way to change norms is by better using the publicly available
data we already have documenting the current situation of
women in the profession. While the data detailed above regarding the lack of women in leadership positions in firms are regularly cited as proof that women are not advancing to the highest
ranks of the profession, their continual repetition may serve only
to reinforce to employers that maintaining the status quo aligns
them with the competitive market.
Instead, the WBA should use the data as an advocacy tool.
The WBA can leverage its organizational status to create pressure for reform in specific law offices that have high attrition,
low promotion or part-time policy utilization rates, or insufficient family leave policies, to name just a few. On the flip side,
the WBA can also change culture by celebrating and recognizing
firms that are identifying new and innovative strategies that
work to retain and promote their female work force.174
For example, the WBA can promote and reinforce broader
definitions of the “ideal worker.” The traditional model of new
attorneys following in lock-step to partnership pretends that all
lawyers, all firms, and all legal jobs are all the same. In concrete
terms, the WBA can work to open up the marketplace to attorneys who leave the job market for a limited period and return.
In October 2008, WCL launched a Re-entry Program for lawSpecial - Fall 2008

yers who have taken time out of the legal profession and who
are searching for ways to re-enter. The WBA and NAWL cosponsor the program.175 The WBA as an organization and its
members, particularly senior members and leadership, can advocate employers to hire talented re-entry applicants, and create
employment policies that enable these workers to use their skills
and experience. The WBA could then celebrate and applaud
those efforts. The proposal starts with something as simple as
offering internships to re-entering lawyers; it ends with something as complex as creating workplaces that value diversity of
experience.
2. USING EXPERIENCE TO SET A RESEARCH AGENDA

The WBA’s ninety year history of fighting for the inclusion
of women in the legal profession, and the personal experiences
of all of its members, give it a tremendous well of experience.
The WBA has unique expertise that it should use to frame a
complete and strategic research agenda for the collection of the
empirical research needed to advance the dialogue regarding the
place of women in the profession. The WBA is in a unique position to help researchers discern the right questions and then
answer them.
For example, the WBA is well positioned to ask why certain
existing policies or systems, such as part-time policies implemented by well-meaning employers, are not achieving the necessary results. The large membership of the WBA is a huge untapped source of knowledge about the lived realities of women
attorneys, but researchers must pull all of that information together to help make sense of systemic problems. Despite a number of excellent studies, many outstanding research questions
remain on issues such as the gendered impacts of billable hour
structures, the practical functionality of part-time jobs, the role
of unpredictable work hours in job satisfaction, the impact of
micro-level interactions among personnel, the perceived value of
specific kinds of labor, the particular ways in which women of
color, lesbians and women with disabilities are largely marginalized in complex ways, whether men and women approach their
tasks differently in a way that disadvantages women, and,
whether women still lag behind in management and business
development, and if they do, what the implications of this lag
might be. The WBA can play a critical role in re-igniting the
dialogue by communicating with the academic community about
what the stumbling blocks to success might be. The WBA may
also help researchers locate funding for studies to test those
ideas, and place interested social scientists in contact with research subjects or perhaps even commission the work itself.
The WBA can also engage with researchers, such as labor
economists, to improve the arguments needed to convince legal
employers to change. For example, the legal community has put
a lot of stock in the argument that there is a “business case” for
the retention and advancement of women and women of color.176
Law firms are inherently bottom-line driven. If the “business
case” for diversity were as persuasive as the rhetoric would sug51

gest, one might assume that the numbers would speak for themselves in client’s “voting with their feet.” The WBA can marshal resources to examine this argument rigorously.
Of course, being a vocal critic of law firm employment policies and business models, and advocating for change, may create
challenges for the WBA as well. Early WBA documents suggest that the WBA was very reluctant to solicit formal sponsorships because they undermined the ability of the organization to
take controversial positions on issues.177 To play the leadership
role in changing the current legal culture, the Association must
be free to make unconstrained assessments of the field. Law
firms support, both socially and financially, the excellent work
of the Association, especially with regard to professional and
leadership development. So, the WBA, like all professional
organizations, must strike a careful balance between finding
ways to support the diverse range of programs it offers its membership base, while still positioning itself to leverage its institutional capacity for advocacy.
3.

DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP CAPACITY

The WBA Archives also reinforce the WBA’s unique role
in the development of women’s leadership capacity. Much like
the benefit of pro bono legal work, which is often seen as one
way for young associates to gain practical experience as well as
perform a public service, working in the leadership structure of
the WBA should be seen as a public good as well as of personal
benefit to the women who develop their talents for networking,
development, organization and, of course, multi-tasking. The
women’s bar remains a critical forum through which active
women can rise quickly, while working on an issue about which
they are passionate—their own profession. Given the alarming
attrition rates among women of color, development of the leadership talents of women from historically discriminated groups
is particularly pressing.
One area of leadership capacity-building that the WBA is
uniquely positioned to address is the gap—be it perceived or
real—in the business development skills of women lawyers.
This subject is nearly invisible in law schools, perhaps because
law professors generally have little experience or interest in
managing law practices. Rainmaking seminars seem to have
made only a small dent in the perception that women do not rise
in firms because they do not contribute as much as men to the
generation of business. The leadership of the WBA is positioned well to question the underlying assumptions regarding the
economic value to firms of various kinds of labor, and to present
a role model of the business of law to new attorneys.
The development of leadership should extend to law students—and cover the concept of civic leadership and professional responsibility as well. The recent Carnegie Report on
Legal Education178 points out that law schools do an excellent
job of training students in the substantive knowledge of law, yet
a poor job of training students in what they call the
“apprenticeship of professional identity and purpose.” The con52

cept goes beyond legal ethics as tested for admission to the bar.
The concept instead stretches to what the identity of a lawyer—a
professional—entails in the sense of personal, community and
civic responsibility. The WBA and similar organizations can
step into this breach by working directly with students, modeling
for them what it means to engage in a self-reflexive law practice
that includes not only their billable work, but also work for the
larger community. Even better, it could more actively engage
law students concretely in the work of the Association, helping
them to learn not only about women in the profession, but also
to absorb the business development, organizational and social
skills a great lawyer needs.
B. ACADEMIA PLAYS A ROLE IN SUPPORTING WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION
With women making up half of all law school graduates, the
Archives also reinforce the ongoing role of women’s legal studies. Legal education in most U.S. law schools looks remarkably
like it did in Mussey and Gillett’s day. While many law schools
offer limited courses in sex-based discrimination, the needs and
concerns of women remain largely invisible or unexplored in
mainstream law school classes.179 Notably, the young lawyers
who exit law firms were also recently students, and it is likely
that law schools have a part to play in the advancement of
women in the profession. In all of these areas, there is still a
strong role for WCL and similar academic institutions.
Legal academics have a role in changing the nature of law
itself—in this case making sure it is not used as a tool to perpetuate gender inequality, questioning its foundations to ensure
that they do not rest on outmoded stereotypes, and ensuring that
it meets the needs of today’s women. But, changing the culture
of legal academia to open law up to this kind of inquiry is difficult and complex. While scholars have written on these topics
extensively for the past forty-five years, and there has been improvement in many case books, there are some aspects of the
law school curriculum (such as the basic content of the first year
of law school, or the use of the Socratic method) that appear to
have changed little in response. Academics with institutional
support have a better chance at changing curricula, publishing
research, and changing law school pedagogy to better account
for the needs and experiences of women. There is still much
room for improvement, even in schools such as WCL, who have
made enormous efforts to integrate gender across the curriculum.
Law schools shape the expectations and experiences of
young lawyers. Mussey took a long-term interest in the careers
of her “girls,”180 and law schools today must do the same. Today, law schools’ interest must extend to understanding the reasons why their women alumni are leaving the private practice of
law. Many lawyers, particularly female lawyers, report that they
leave law firms because they simply cannot make law firm life
square with the rest of their life.181 Law schools can play a role
in teaching their students how to identify the firms, jobs, and
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fields that will lead to a satisfying life as well as a career in law.
Students who can discern what law firms put genuine resources
into promoting and retaining women, and women of color in
particular, will probably fare better in finding wonderful opportunities for a satisfying career that do exist in practice.

CONCLUSION

tion, and training generations of women lawyers. Ninety years
later, we can be certain that Mussey and Gillett would be proud
of the partnership that continues between these two institutions.
For this project, we have gone back to the proverbial well, looking into the legacy of Mussey, Gillett, and the women they
worked and struggled with for inspiration and ideas. We hope
that with the availability of these Archives, others will do the
same and wind up the unfinished business of Mussey and Gillett.

Mussey and Gillett founded these two organizations –
one to train lawyers, one to support them in their practice. But
their work is not nearly complete. The archives tell us that our
“mothers-in-law” succeeded in opening doors to every legal
sector for women, obtaining the vote, securing fair pay legisla-
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SPOTLIGHT: FINDING UNITY IN DIVERSITY
MAYDA COLON TSAKNIS, THE HONORABLE JEANNIE J. HONG, AND JENNIFER MAREE
By
Sabrina Khan

W

hile the women I interviewed have distinct racial
and ethnic backgrounds, unique legal careers,
and a wide array of perspectives, each is an inspirational trailblazer who overcame multiple
obstacles in order to achieve success. The women shared with
me their distinguished histories and revealed how differences in
gender and culture impact one’s legal experiences. As a current
law student, I was impressed by their passion for the law and
their remarkable contributions to the legal field. As a female
minority law student, I was able to identify with their battles and
left each interview with a new appreciation for my own history,
gender and ethnicity.
As a young Hispanic attorney, Mayda Colón Tsaknis noticed a significant need to deal with legal issues unique to the
Hispanic community, and so founded the Maryland Hispanic
Bar Association in 1993. She quickly became its first president.
Colón Tsaknis was born and raised in Puerto Rico and attended
St. Mary’s University School of Law in Texas. Soon after
graduation, she joined the US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s first trial team. She then became General Counsel
for the Puerto Rican Federal Affairs Administration (“PRFAA”).
Colón Tsaknis now practices in Rockville, Maryland, at the fully
bilingual women’s law firm she created in 1992 .
When The Honorable Jeannie J. Hong was sworn in on
August 14, 2002 to the District Court of Maryland in Baltimore,
she became the first female Asian American judge in Maryland.
She was born in Seoul, South Korea and immigrated to the
United States at age 2. After growing up in Centreville, Virginia, she graduated from American University, Washington
College of Law in 1992. Hong spent eight vibrant years as an
Assistant State’s Attorney for the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office in the Juvenile Division before taking her seat on
the bench.
Jennifer Maree, an Associate Attorney at Patton Boggs
LLP, is the current President of the Women’s Bar Association of
the District of Columbia, which is now celebrating its 91st anniversary. After having spent her childhood moving throughout
the Western United States, she received her Juris Doctorate from
American University, Washington College of Law in 2001. Before joining Patton Boggs, Maree was an Honors Attorney at the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

MAYDA COLON TSAKNIS
When did you decide that you wanted to pursue a career
in law, and what were some of the motivational forces behind that decision?
My family raised my three siblings and me to believe that
men and women were identical in terms of professional capability. While I was growing up, it was unusual to see many female
lawyers in the states, however that was not the case in Puerto
Rico; I was used to seeing female lawyers around. For a long
time I envisioned myself becoming an attorney because I beSpecial - Fall 2008

lieved that profession really fit my personality. I was determined to go to law school either in my country or elsewhere.
Could you recall a professional experience when you
were particularly self-conscious of or inhibited by your sex
and/or race?
In regards to gender, not so much. But race, yes. The other
attorneys on the first trial team of the US Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) consisted of six or seven
Caucasians and African Americans. Regardless of the fact that
it was racially diverse, I felt like I was treated as an unequal. I
also stood out for my accent. To compensate for that, I was always very well-prepared. This made me not feel intimidated
even when, for example, I represented the government by myself
against corporations who hired ten or so attorneys. I carried the
confidence I gained from that experience into my future endeavors.
You mentioned that your accent influenced how you
were received in court. Would you mind elaborating?
One of my law school professors once told me, “I believe
your accent will be an asset with a jury.” I have found that to be
very true. The fact that it is something different makes people
listen more carefully to me. Once, however, a federal judge in
D.C. stated, “Speak English. I don’t understand you.” This was
very offensive so I asked, “Your Honor, I would like to please
know whether your saying this is going to be prejudicial to my
client because you have a bias.” He was totally taken aback and
apologized, claiming he didn’t mean it that way. We have since
become very good friends and he hasn’t asked me about my
accent again!
Would you please briefly outline the history of
Maryland’s Hispanic Bar Association (MHBA)--particularly
your role in its foundation and as its first president? How
did you deal with some of the challenges you faced?
I went through the Maryland Lawyers’ Manual to identify some Hispanic attorneys, wrote letters asking them to be the
first members of the MHBA, and explained the need for a Hispanic Bar Association in our state to protect the rights of our
people. Our first agenda in 1993 focused on the issue of the
interpreters. There had previously been no minimum qualifications for Spanish interpreters in Maryland so courts could not
always distinguish which ones were credible. The Washington
Post’s coverage of the MHBA’s initiative to make some minimum qualification requirements generated a lot of publicity and
our testimony to Congress helped us eventually achieve our goal
of having very good interpreters in court.
There were some non-Hispanics who felt that there shouldn’t be a separate bar association for Hispanics because general
associations were sufficient. I disagreed and told them that we
have certain needs particular to us. A group of people in the
larger community greatly benefit from our (the MHBA’s) interpretation of legal issues.
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Famous scholars, perhaps most notably Samuel
Huntington, have asserted that the Latino/Hispanic population in our country is severely insulated due to linguistic and
cultural differences, and therefore, unlike past immigrant
populations, will not integrate well into American society.
Do you agree or disagree, and why?
People should not lump all Hispanics together. There are
professional Hispanics, and Hispanics who have not had the
opportunity to be educated to the same degree. There is a large
group of Hispanic immigrants, the first generation, who only got
the chance to complete up to fifth or sixth grade levels of education in their mother countries. They deserve a lot of credit because in an effort to provide their children with the best opportunities possible, they have come to a country which primarily
uses English, one of the most difficult languages to learn, and
often work multiple menial jobs that nobody else wants. They
are so busy trying to maintain their families that they have no
time or means by which to improve their English. After all
every first-generation population is a little isolated, not because
they want to be, but because the general population forces them
to be isolated. However I think people in the general population
are increasingly willing to take the time to not only understand,
but even embrace, the Hispanic culture. We are a very warm
people who take well to this.

THE HONORABLE JEANNIE J. HONG
As a first-generation Asian American woman, did
you feel pressure from your community and/ or family to
pursue certain professions?
Around the time I was born, there weren’t many career opportunities available to women in Korea. Their expected aspirations were mainly to get married. My parents had two daughters
for whom they wanted to provide better opportunities so we
came to the States. That’s why they sometimes acted like the
stereotypical Asian parents who pushed their children to become
professionals.

was thirty-six years old when I began this job so when I entered
the courthouse my first day, the people at the entrance pointed
me in the direction of the law clerks’ office! I’ve been doing
this for six and a half years now so I think everyone is used to
seeing me around. However I think there are always some hurdles, especially as a young woman trying to gain a reputation for
herself, and this is regardless of race.
Do you think your heritage influences your work? If so,
how?
Even though I have to evaluate everyone equally, I come
from a different cultural perspective which helps me understand
the dynamics of certain cases well. For example, it’s rare but
every once in a while I hear a criminal case involving Koreans
pooling their money together in what is called keh, a practice
that has been in our culture for generations. In one situation,
somebody cheated everyone else out of the money, so another
member of the group assaulted him. Because I understood the
culture, I believe I understood what happened in a different way
than someone who may not have ever been familiar with that
idea beforehand. Also in regards to domestic violence cases, I
think I understand why Asian women can often be more reticent
to come to court. They often fear losing face for the family.
You have two children and an intense job as a federal judge in a bustling metropolis with very busy dockets.
How do you balance all your obligations, whether they be
familial, professional, personal, etc.?
Prioritizing is key. I could not do this without the support
of family. As you embark on your legal career, you’ll see that
through periods of your life, things will ebb and flow. For example, when women have children, the brunt of child-rearing,
overseeing homework, and similar things may make them feel
like they cannot participate in as many associations as they’d
like. You will always have to balance multiple commitments
but like I said, prioritizing them and keeping the ebb and flow
idea in mind is important.

JENNIFER MAREE
Why did you choose this career path?
My father always aspired to become a judge and was intrigued with the law so during my first year as an undergraduate
student at The University of Virginia, he handed me an LSAT
book and said, “Start studying!” I think it was always engineered into me to pursue this career. But after all that I’ve
learned and done, I am very glad that I did.
As the first Asian-American female judge in Maryland, were you constantly reminded of your racial and cultural background in the courthouse?
Oh yes, very much. In Maryland I am one of only two
Asian American judges, the other being Judge Brian Kim in
Montgomery County. When I first got on the bench, I felt like I
wasn’t just Jeanie Hong, but really Jeanie Hong the representative of my entire group of people. There was a lot of pressure
for my actions, demeanor, and the way I dressed not only reflect
me, but all Asians in general. That’s why especially in the beginning, I really made an assertive effort to be professional, respectful, and dress very nicely because I felt like I was being
observed under a microscope. It didn’t help that the stereotype
that Asians look younger than their age actually applied to me. I
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You have been an active member of both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the Women’s Bar Association (WBA). Besides that the WBA caters specifically to
women, how would you distinguish its culture from that of
the ABA?
I appreciated the fact that the ABA promoted networking
and career-building experiences. However as a woman, I didn’t
really feel like my voice was heard as well as it should have
been. Sometimes at ABA events, guys would approach me and
speak to me in ways that probably weren’t the most professional.
That’s why I joined the WBA. I felt much more comfortable in
that setting, like everyone was on an even playing field. We
were there to progress causes particular to women in our field
about which I felt strongly. It was nice to be treated completely
as an equal.
Today, while the U.S. bans gender discrimination,
glass ceilings and other mechanisms used to suppress women
remain prevalent throughout many professions, including
the law. Have you or any of your female colleagues faced
professional challenges due to your gender?
THE MODERN AMERICAN

Absolutely. Of course it’s in subtle ways. Even firms and
other legal organizations which especially pride themselves on
diversity in terms of numbers, that’s both racial and genderwise, have it built into their inner workings.
How would you advise women to deal with such
situations in their legal careers?
My advice is to be persistent, be patient, and assertive
while maintaining a sense of humor about any awkward or frustrating situation into which you’re put. It’s important to especially remember to be assertive so that we may dispel stereotypes of us being quiet and submissive, and convey to our male
colleagues that we notice if we are not being treated as equals.
True or false: Women have it harder than men in
the working world. How about the legal world?
It’s difficult to generalize but I feel that women definitely
have it harder than men in the working, including the legal,
world. Typically, though not always, women have to balance
taking care of children and managing the household activities
with work. If your schedule is like mine, which is the average
at a large law firm, you spend most of your time at work! This,
combined with the fact that women have to work harder to assert
ourselves, can sometimes transform work into quite an uphill
battle. However it’s one definitely worth fighting.

be feminists because they may fear that guys will think they are
the types to take issue with every single innocent thing they say
and turn their statements into sexist remarks. What I think is the
true definition of feminist, however, is simply someone who
stands up for the equal rights of women. There’s nothing anyone should ever be ashamed of in that. Keep in mind that I’ve
also met quite a few male feminists.
You graduated from WCL, founded by the same
women who played a large part in the creation of the National Women’s Bar Association--do you believe this history
helps strengthen women’s ability to assert themselves in the
legal profession?
WCL, more so than probably many other law schools,
offers so many courses, extracurricular activities, and clinical
programs which specifically promote women’s rights. I’m not
saying that just because a female law student doesn’t participate
in them does not mean she does not do so in her own way outside of school. But I certainly suggest that everyone, not only
the female students, check them out. I feel the same way about
any other law school experiences, like clubs, which enhance our
understanding of diversity issues. I can’t emphasize how important it is to always be cognizant of the different perspectives
people bring to the table in our everyday and professional discussions.

The term ‘feminist’ has been both celebrated and
stigmatized. Do you consider yourself a feminist? How
would you define the term?
Oh yes, I’d definitely say I’m a feminist and I’m proud
to call myself one. Too often women shy away from claiming to

(from left to right) Teresa Godwin Phelps (Director of Legal Rhetoric, Professor at the Washington College of Law), Jamie Abrams
(Professor at the Washington College of Law and author of Banding Together: Reflections of the Role of the Women’s Bar Association of the District of Columbia and the Washington College of Law in Promoting Women’s Rights), and Erica Lounsberry (law student at the Washington College of Law).
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THE UPBRINGING OF A CREATURE: THE SCOPE OF A PARENT’S
RIGHT TO TEACH CHILDREN TO HATE
By
Brooke A. Emery*
child racist speech. By focusing on the child as the hearer of
hate speech, First Amendment roadblocks that typical hate
speech regulations run into may be bypassed. After showing that
First Amendment principles such as “marketplace” theory and
autonomy theory are unpersuasive when applied to a child, this
article will show that the captive audience doctrine allows the
State to regulate a parent’s decision to raise her child as a racist.
Parent-to-child racist speech also implicates the constitutional
right
of a parent to raise her child as she sees fit. AlINTRODUCTION: THE BIRTH OF A CREATURE
though a parent has the right to control the upbringing of her
This paper examines racist2 speech that is passed down child, she does not have a right to raise her child as a racist. The
from parent to child and asks whether the State can constitution- Supreme Court has long recognized a parent’s fundamental right
ally impose regulations3 on such speech.4 The regulation of par- to control the upbringing of her child as a liberty interest protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendent-to-child racist speech implicates
ment. The Fourteenth Amendment, in
two distinct constitutional rights:
turn, requires that courts show deference
one’s right to free speech and a parto a parent’s decisions.22 Underlying this
ent’s right to control the upbringing
right is the presumption that most parents
of her child.
The United States Consti- parent-to-child racist speech can be act in the best interest of their children. In
reality, however, a parent’s decision is not
tution contemplates that its citizens
23
be free to “think as [they] will and regulated without violating either a always in the best interest of her child.
5
speak as [they] think.” The First parent’s right to free speech or a par- To accommodate this reality, a parent’s
fundamental right is limited by the rights
Amendment protects this freedom
ent’s right to control the upbringing of the child and the State’s interests in
by prohibiting laws that limit or
protecting children from harm and promotof her child.
punish speech.6 Perhaps because of
ing societal well-being.24
its prominence as the first of all
7
When a child’s “physical or menenumerated rights or because of its
tal health is jeopardized,” the State has the
simple but magnanimous message,8
power to abrogate the parent’s rights if it
the First Amendment has captured
is in the best interest of the child.25 Teachthe hearts and minds of its citizens:9 it is romanticized by the
10
to a child jeopardizes a child’s mental and physical
avant-garde as a protector of art and intellectual freedom, it ing racism
26
reverberates throughout suburban lunchrooms as irreverent re- health. Once the harm to a child is established, the State can
buttals to schoolhouse teasing,11 and it is proclaimed a tool for potentially limit a parent’s fundamental right. In sum, parent-topolitical and social change by the downtrodden and oppressed.12 child racist speech can be regulated without violating either a
There is no doubt that its tenets, secured by our country’s foun- parent’s right to free speech or a parent’s right to control the
ders, have allowed American culture to breathe unorthodox air,13 upbringing of her child.
Part I begins with a discussion of the legal proceedings
a communicative freedom that is often stifled by less expansive
speech protections in other countries.14 Lurking in the shadows, through which the State has the opportunity to regulate parenthowever, is speech’s power to harm.15 Speech, capable of much to-child racist speech. It then discusses how the transmission of
more than mere offense, can cause psychological16 and physi- racist speech from parent to child harms the child. Part II addresses the substantive due process analysis. This Part discusses
cal17 harm to its intended targets, as well as message recipients.18
There has been much debate over the legitimacy and the scope of the parental rearing right, and it shows that the
propriety of regulating racist speech.19 This debate has typically State’s interest in protecting the welfare of the child and promotfocused on racist speech made in a public setting that causes ing societal well-being may allow the State to interfere when a
harm to the target of the hate speech. Efforts to regulate such racist upbringing exists. Part III begins with an examination of a
speech have largely failed20 because of the doctrinal prohibition child’s speech rights. It moves into an explanation of the underlying justifications for free speech and argues that they are inapon regulating speech based on the ideology of its message.21
This article argues that the unique nature of parent-to- posite to parent-to-child racist speech. Finally, it introduces the
child racist speech allows it to be regulated under the present captive audience exception and shows that parent-to-child racist
First Amendment framework, notwithstanding the failed at- speech is not protected because a child is essentially “captive” to
tempts to regulate other racist speech. The article further argues her parent’s racist speech. Part IV concludes with a discussion
that such speech should be regulated because the core principles of the obstacles and implications of regulating parent-to-child
that underlie speech protection are not applicable to parent-to- racist speech.
There is no absurdity so obvious that it cannot be firmly
planted in the human head if
you only begin to impose it
before the age of five, by
constantly repeating it with
an air of great solemnity.1
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CHILDREN AND RACISM IN THE REAL WORLD
At a county fair, a young girl sings sweetly in front of a
small crowd:
Well sit down and listen, to what I have to say.
Soon will come a great war, a bloody but holy
day. And after that purging our people will be
free, and sing up in the bright skies, a sun for
all to see.
Times are very tough now for a proud White
man to live. And although it may appear that
this world has no life to give. Times are soon
changing, this can[’]t go on [f]or long. And
on that joyful summer’s day, we’ll sing our
Victory song.27
In another part of the country, a young boy comes
home after school and becomes a virtual Klansman, killing
Blacks, Latinos, and Jews in an “ethnic cleansing” video game.
28
Somewhere else, a child creates a kid’s page for his father’s
hate group’s web site.29 A six-year-old African-American boy
riding on a school bus sees a group of white men and women
through the window and proclaims, “I hate white people.”30
Somewhere else, a group of middle-school children paints swastikas on cars in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood.31 A
group of high-school students is on trial for brutally beating a
young girl because of her race.32
The aforementioned acts, based on real events, invoke a
response of sadness for the child, rather than revulsion. This
response to children exhibiting racist tendencies stems from a
sense that the racist child has been robbed of the innocence of
childhood, and that the adult that she becomes will have been
robbed of opportunities as she matures down a path already
paved for her. Although there are many factors that cause a
child to hate another based on race, 33 this article addresses only
parental influence.34 This article sets out to determine whether
the State may prevent harm to a child and to society from parents who pass racist hatred down to their children. This section
begins with a description of the legal arenas in which the State
may wield its power to restrict racist parental indoctrination.
SOCIAL CONTEXT: INHERITING RACISM
Parents pass down many things to their children: genes, personality traits,35 values, oral histories.36 Some parents pass down
racism to their children through racist speech.37
For the purposes of this article, racist speech is hate
speech that targets groups or individuals based on race. There
are several defining characteristics of hate speech.38 First, hate
speech sends a message of hatred or contempt. Second, hate
speech usually conveys a message of inferiority. Third, its message targets a specific group or an individual because she is a
member of that group. Racist speech includes racial threats,
slurs, epithets, symbols, depictions, and “sanitized racist comments.”39
The effect on a child of growing up in a racist home has
not generated much scholarly work and a need exists for a larger
body of social science and legal research on this topic. HowSpecial - Fall 2008

ever, some observations can be gleaned from the field of developmental psychology and research on racism in general. Available research indicates that “[a]ttitudes of prejudice begin to
form between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with immediate family
members having the most profound effect on the development of
attitude and values.”40 Moreover, younger children have a decreased cognitive ability to discern reasonable from unreasonable information, making them more susceptible to racist
speech.41 Thus, racism should have a more profound effect on
children, especially younger ones, than on adults. It is with an
eye sensitive toward this impressionability of young children to
racist speech that we turn to discuss racism’s effect on the racist
speaker.
Hate is a defining characteristic of racist speech. Hate
is a “complex, affective state alloyed with aggression. It is
aroused by the experience of frustration and, in its most stark
and uncompromising manner, by events that are felt to threaten
life.”42 Within the psychiatric community, there has been debate
over whether extreme racism is a serious mental illness. Some
psychiatrists propose its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.43
Those who argue that racism is a mental illness explain
that “[extremely racist] patients experience problems of impulse
disturbance. This disinhibition may activate inculcated, socially
learned, biased beliefs; adverse cognitive appraisals and stereotypes; hostile behaviors toward out-group persons; or some combination of these things.”44 Children, who have lower impulse
control relative to adults, are therefore more prone to act upon
racist beliefs. Researchers have also discovered psychological
and physiological problems associated with clinical racism: “[f]
requent clinical problems include lability, hypo-mania, and
marked anxiety. Additionally, these patients evidence relational
deficits. Psychotherapy patients who expressed biased attitudes
toward members of cultural out-groups . . . also had higher ratings for . . . paranoid, borderline, and antisocial personality disorders, when compared with other psychotherapy patients.”45
While there is no conclusive evidence that learning
racism causes psychological or physiological harm to the racist,
the law does not always require conclusive evidence in order to
protect children from likely harm.46 Moreover, racial bias has a
severe impact on the social competence of the racist:
For patients who evidence severe forms of bias, intergroup contact is predictably aversive. For these patients, out-group persons are often seen as threatening.
For some clinically biased patients, the solution is
avoidance. Other patients experience marked anxiety,
and yet others express overt hostility. . . Pathologically
biased patients may engage in overtly hostile behaviors
in benign intergroup situations.47
An inability to engage in culturally diverse interactions
is also a practical disability. It prohibits the child and future
adult from fully participating in society, inhibiting even the most
basic activities, such as going to the grocery store, workplace, or
voting booths.
Parents who instill racist beliefs in their children contribute to their children’s feelings of threat, anxiety, and fear.
For example, most members of the American white racist movement believe that “they, as White men, are members of an endangered species.”48 Racist parents strip their child of any sense
of personal security.49 The fear instilled by racist parents goes
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beyond teaching a child to be cautious about talking to strangers
or crossing the street. Whereas there is a rational basis to fear
crossing the street, the fear of people of another race is irrational.50 Further, racism not only instills fear, but also creates
contempt and hatred. It is the combination of both fear and hatred that harms the child.
Some members of the psychiatric community have argued that teaching racism to a child is a form of psychological
abuse, which constitutes child abuse in some States.51 Psychological abuse is “sustained inappropriate behaviour which damages, or substantially reduces, the creative and developmental
potential of crucially important mental faculties and mental
processes of a child . . . [including] intelligence, memory, recognition, perception, attention, language and moral development.”52
One reason offered to show that racist indoctrination is
psychological abuse is that it adversely affects a child’s moral
development. For example, “children taught to hate are prevented from incorporating the desirable virtues of tolerance,
reverence for life, respect for individual differences and mutual
understanding,” causing these children to “suffer an arrest in
their moral development.”53 Recent neurobiology studies have
also linked early childhood psychological abuse to abnormalities
in brain development.54 Thus, parent-child hate indoctrination
may have an irreversible effect on a child’s developing brain.
A related concern is that children who are taught to
hate will later commit hate crimes. While no definitive link has
been shown between racist indoctrination during childhood and
hate crimes, it is estimated that 70% of all hate crimes are committed by juveniles.55 One possible reason for this statistic is
that young people are more likely to act on racist beliefs than
adults.56
The power of the State to interfere with a parent’s decision to raise her child as a racist person rests on the availability
of legal forums in which the State can exercise its power, the
type and degree of the parent’s racist behavior, and the extent of
harm the behavior has on the child. The next section discusses
the jurisprudence that has developed around the State’s ability to
interfere with the family.
LEGAL CONTEXT
The State plays several substantial roles in protecting
and supporting children.57 Under the child protection umbrella,
the State provides services ranging from family counseling to
parenting education,58 and it governs the removal and termination of parental rights.59 Under the family dissolution umbrella,
the State may determine custody of a child, limit visitation
rights, and order a parent to behave in a specific way to retain
custody of a child. Through public assistance, the State aids a
parent in supporting her child. In addition, the State influences a
child’s upbringing by providing public education and mandating
medical care.60 Each of the aforementioned roles potentially
provides the State with the opportunity to interfere with a parent’s decision to teach racism to her child.61 However, as State
intervention is often tied to family failure or dysfunction,62 parents of intact families may be granted more freedom to teach
racism to their children, and children of intact families may not
be appropriately protected from racist indoctrination.
Today, some courts consider a parent’s use of racist
speech as a factor in determining custody and visitation rights.63
In In re Bianca W.F.,64 the Superior Court of Connecticut found
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that “the father’s use of racial slurs or derogatory racial references” in front of the children constituted a “continuing form of
neglect of the children’s educational and moral needs.”65 Courts
have also ordered parents not to use specific racist language in
front of their children.66 While this practice has largely escaped
the notice of all but a few First Amendment scholars,67 this article argues that prohibiting or restricting a parent from teaching
her child to hate is constitutionally permissible. The contrary
view is that the consideration of speech in such proceedings is
impermissible because it violates free speech and substantive
due process.68 The debate survives partly because of the little
attention paid to family law proceedings.69
Today, amidst war, increasing intolerance of immigration, and rising hate crime statistics, racist indoctrination of children by parents must be examined. The State can and should
use its power to protect children from such indoctrination.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:
BALANCING RIGHTS
Three interests are implicated when the State interferes
with a parenting decision: (1) the parents’, (2) the State’s, and
(3) the child’s.70 A court will weigh these interests to determine
whether a State statute or action infringes on a parent’s constitutional right.
The ability of the State to interfere with a parent’s right
to teach her child racism depends, first, on the relative importance assigned to the parent’s right to control the upbringing of
her child. The United States Supreme Court has found that a
parent’s right to raise her child is a fundamental right.71 This
fundamental right of the parent to raise her child as she sees fit
rests on a presumption that parents act in the best interests of
their children.72 The parental right in part derives from the
child’s interest in being taken care of properly; however, real
world experience calls into question the validity of the presumption that parents always act in their children’s best interest.
The Court has also recognized that the State has the
authority to intervene when a child’s welfare is at stake. The
State has greater power over children than it has over adults because “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity
as citizens, with all that implies.”73 The State may interfere with
the parent-child relationship where necessary to protect the welfare of the child or to educate future citizens.74
The State’s ability to impose itself into the parent-child
relationship derives not only from its own interest in protecting
its citizens, but also from the unique constitutional status of the
child. A child has constitutional rights, but not to the extent that
adults do.75 The limitations on a child’s rights are explained by
the unique characteristics of childhood. For example, the child’s
underdeveloped cognitive processes limit a child’s ability to
make appropriate decisions about her life. Young children “are
not able to think abstractly, have a limited future time sense, and
are limited in their ability to generalize and predict from experience.”76 For this reason, the law restricts a minor’s choice to
marry,77 engage in sexual activity with adults,78 consume alcohol, and vote in elections.
It is often unclear how a parent’s right to control the
upbringing of her child ought to be balanced against the State’s
interest in protecting the well-being of the child and the child’s
individual rights. The Supreme Court has failed to define the
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scope of the parental right to control the upbringing of chil- underlying purpose of the parental right is “to recognize and
dren.79 States have largely filled in this gap on a case-by-case prepare him for additional obligations.”99 According to the
basis.80 Legal scholars and social scientists have also weighed Court, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State.”100 The
in. One view is that a parent should not have a fundamental right State thus has a limited role in raising a child.
to control the upbringing of her child at all.81 A more common
Meyer and Pierce both suggest that the parent’s interest
view—that a parent should have some rights—stops short of in controlling the upbringing of her child can outweigh the
relegating the child to parental property.82 Under this view, a State’s interest. Later cases reinforced the fundamental right of
parent should make decisions about her child with limited State a parent to control the upbringing of her child.101 In 2000, in
interference for several reasons: (1) a child cannot support her- Troxel v. Granville, the Court struck down a Washington statute
self or make important decisions; (2) optimal child rearing in- that allowed a judge to override a parent’s decision not to allow
cludes intimate and continuous relationships; (3) parents are in third-party visitation with her child.102 The plurality reaffirmed
the best position to know what is best for the child, and they care the presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best intermore about their child than anyone else; and (4) parents have est.103 The Court recognized the parental interest in the care,
traditionally held these rights.83 Additionally, some commenta- custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recogtors justify parental rights by noting
nized by the Court.”104 The broad nature
that parents have a personal interest
in molding their children in accorof the statute105 and the failure to accord
84
the limit on a parent’s fundamental deference to the parent’s choice made
dance with their desires and ideals.
The issue of parent-child racist right and the State’s powerful interest this statute unconstitutional.106
speech falls into the gray area of
long as a parent adequately cares for
in protecting the well-being of its So
parent-child-state jurisprudence.
his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
children leaves room for the State to normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the
SCOPE OF PARENTS’ FUNDAMENintervene when a parent’s racist
family to further question the ability of
TAL RIGHT
speech harms the child’s mental
the parent to make the best decisions
Two of the earliest cases to
concerning the rearing of that parent’s
health, public safety,
recognize the right to parent were
children.107
or
peace
and
order.
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Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.86 Both cases inLIMITS ON PARENTS’ RIGHT
volved parents’ right to educate
The parental right is not without limits. The State’s
their children as they see fit. Meyer addressed a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages, with the power to limit a parent’s child rearing discretion is at its highest
exception of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, to school children below when the child’s physical or mental health is jeopardized.108
the eighth grade.87 The purpose of the statute was to “promote The State, however, has the power to interfere even if the parcivic development” by ensuring that children “learn English and ent’s decision does not severely jeopardize the child’s health.
acquire American ideals” before they are educated in foreign An early case to recognize the limits on parental rights was
languages and ideals.88 The plaintiff, a parochial school teacher, Prince v. Massachusetts.109 In Prince, the Court held that the
was convicted under the statute for teaching a ten-year-old stu- State’s power to ensure that “children be both safeguarded from
dent to read German.89 The Court struck down the statute as abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and indeunconstitutional for unreasonably interfering with three inter- pendent well-developed men and citizens” outweighed the parests: the “calling of modern language teachers,” the ent’s interest.110 The statute in Prince imposed criminal sanc“opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge,” and the “power tions on guardians who permitted their minor children to sell
of parents to control the education” of their children.90 The newspapers or other literature on the street.111 The plaintiff, a
Court was also concerned that the statute would disadvantage Jehovah’s Witness, was charged with violating the statute when
the foreign-born segment of the population91 absent proof that she and her niece were distributing religious pamphlets for a
learning foreign languages harmed the health or well-being of a suggested donation of five cents.112 The Court concluded that
child.92 In Meyer, the Court noted that teaching a child German while the “custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
was not in fact harmful and that there was some evidence that it the parents,” the State can override the parent’s right in order to
guard the child’s well-being,113 which may include “matters of
was actually helpful to a child.93
Pierce v. Society of Sisters also recognized a parent’s conscience and religious conviction.”114 State power over matright to control the upbringing of her child.94 In Pierce, the ters of conscience strengthens its ability to regulate parent-child
Court struck down an Oregon statute that required all parents hate indoctrination, which is largely a matter of conscience.
Thus, the limit on a parent’s fundamental right and the
and guardians of children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to send their children to public school.95 Two private schools State’s powerful interest in protecting the well-being of its chilchallenged the statute on the basis that compulsory public school dren leaves room for the State to intervene when a parent’s racist
attendance threatened business.96 The Court rested its decision speech harms the child’s mental health, public safety, or peace
on the statute’s impermissible interference with the plaintiff’s and order. Even so, before the State may intervene it must overproperty rights.97 In reaching its decision, however, the Court come a separate constitutional concern: the parent’s and the
found the statute was not a proper exercise of State power be- child’s right to free speech. This constitutional concern is the
cause it unreasonably and arbitrarily interfered “with the liberty focus of the following section.
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.”98 The Court reasoned that the
Special - Fall 2008
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argument is applicable to hate speech. There is a presumption in
much of the scholarship that the State and parents agree that
Under the First Amendment, regulating parent-to-child children should not be subject to obscenity and violence, or that
racist speech implicates both the parent’s right to speech and the the State can regulate only in situations where the parent invites
such intervention.
child’s right to access speech.
Kevin Saunders discusses the effect on a child of learning hate speech,125 arguing that “a racist child is of questionable
psychological health, and the existence of hate-based crime
CHILDREN AND FIRST AMENDMENT COMMENTARY
demonstrates the danger of racism to community safety, so attempts to teach racism to children harm both the psychological
The cognitive, moral, and emotional immaturity of
126
Saunchildren can render them especially vulnerable to some forms of health of children and the physical safety of society.”
ders focuses on the constitutionality of prohibiting third parties
expression that they are ill equipped to protect themselves from.
from teaching racism to a child. In developing his thesis, howThey depend on others to advance their crucial interests and
ever, he states without analysis that the State would have no
protect them from harm.115
right to interfere if the parent wanted the child to receive hate
127
This article rejects that argument
Over the course of a lifetime, welfare interests wane material from a third party.
and liberty interests wax. When a person is born, she cannot because it fails to consider the State’s two distinct interests in
care for herself and therefore has the greatest interest in being protecting a child: a parens patriae interest and an interest in
cared for. As she matures, she becomes better able to take care aiding the parent. Saunders thus overlooks the ability of the
of herself, so her welfare interest decreases. Liberty interests, or State, as parens patriae, to protect the child from receiving racinterests in being free, increase as a child grows into an autono- ist information even when the parent wants the child to receive
mous being. Paternalism is thus less offensive to a child than to the information.
The Supreme Court recognized the two interests of the
an adult.116
The scope of the child’s right to free speech depends on State in Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court upheld the
a balancing of welfare or developmental interests and liberty conviction of a luncheonette owner for selling sexually explicit
128
The
interests.117 Developmental interests are comprised of two types magazines to a minor, in violation of New York law.
Court
identified
two
legitimate
interests
that
granted
the
State
of interests: those interests that affect the present well-being of
the child and those interests that are held in trust.118 Describing the power to restrict children’s access to speech. The first interthe present developmental interests of a child, one commentator est is the State’s “independent interest” in fulfilling its parens
patriae function—in protecting the well-being of its youth and
suggests:
in seeing “that they are safeguarded from abuses which might
[B]ecause we must show concern for the quality of the prevent their growth into free and independent well-developed
129
The second interest is the State’s function
experience of childhood, we have reason to insulate men and citizens.”
130
The first interest is
children from unsettling materials even if exposure in aiding parents in their role of parent.
most
salient
in
determining
the
State’s
power
to interfere with
does not result in significant harm . . . We do not augment the quality of children’s lives by exposing them to parental discretion.
Restricting a parent’s ability to transmit racism to their
materials that they cannot grasp, but which nonetheless
children serves the State’s parens
elicit strong unsettling responses
patriae interest when the child’s
from them.119
Indoctrinating a child with racist well-being is harmed and her abilto grow into an independent,
The developmental interests of a child are
hate or fear of race extinction si- ity
well-developed citizen is hindered
harmed by racist indoctrination.120 If a
child manifests the psychological and lences future speech, thus degrading by the parent’s racist ideas. For
physical effects of clinical racism,121 her the interest that the First Amendment example, the parens patriae interest is served by protecting a young
quality of life during childhood is low.
was meant to protect.
child from being taught songs that
Future-oriented interests are
call for a racial holy war and prothose that “equip children with the habits
and capacities for reflective deliberation and self-direction that claim the inferiority of other races. The developmental effects
will permit them to live successful and responsible adult of racism on a child, which support this assertion, are discussed
lives.”122 If an activity harms a child’s ability to develop a sense in Part I.
Modern cases that restrict a child’s access to harmful
of justice or hinders growth of deliberative faculties, then the
child’s developmental interests are harmed.123 It is in this sense information must deal with the effect that any restriction may
131
FCC v. Pacifica Founthat it can be said that hate speech indoctrination has a have on adult access to information.
“silencing effect” on the child. “If children are to become the dation recognized that children can be protected from offensive
sort of beings for whom full rights of free expression are valu- speech by restricting broadcasting of offensive speech to hours
132
able, then the moral capacities on which the value of these rights when children will not likely be listening. Unlike restricting a
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depends must be suitably nurtured and developed.”
Indoctri- radio broadcast to certain hours, which may potentially affect a
nating a child with racist hate or fear of race extinction silences large number of willing adult radio listeners, restricting a parent
future speech, thus degrading the interest that the First Amend- from teaching racism to her children will have only a nominal
ment was meant to protect. While most of the scholarship dis- effect on third-party adults. Any restrictions would affect only a
cussing First Amendment rights during childhood primarily ad- parent’s speech to her own child. It is likely that no one but the
dresses children’s access to obscenity and violence, much of the parent and child will be affected by the restriction.

III.FREEDOM OF SPEECH
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NO MARKET PLACE FOR CHILDREN
An abundance of scholarship has been dedicated to
explaining why speech must be protected from government
regulation. The first justification is that free speech unearths the
truth.133 Justice Holmes argued that free speech is essential to
finding truth and that only through a clash of ideas can truth be
attained.134 According to Holmes, “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.”135 John Stuart Mill, British philosopher and political economist, provided a similar justification for protecting
speech:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as
well as the existing generation; those who dissent from
the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is
almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error.136
Suppressing speech would have the unintended ramification of driving speech underground and
effectively allowing bad ideas to “smolder,” rather than
being ousted through opposition.137 Consistent with the
marketplace of ideas is the argument that offensive
speech should be combated with more speech rather
than with censorship.138
The marketplace of ideas argument has been criticized
on several grounds.139 First, proponents of the market-failure
model argue that there are inequities in the speech market, such
as lack of media access, that create a need for market intervention.140 Second, critics argue that absolute protection of speech
is unjustifiable even though “truth” may eventually prevail because the harm caused in the short term is too great.141
In the context of speaking to a child, the marketplace of
ideas is untenable. First, children “lack the experiential basis of
adults and are more likely to be led astray.”142 They often lack
the capacity to distinguish poorly reasoned ideas from wellreasoned ideas.143 The marketplace theory presupposes that the
“buyers” of ideas will have the capacity to reason. Thus, where
the “buyers” in a market are children, the truth is less likely to
surface, if at all. Our society acknowledges that a child has no
real bargaining power and cannot be counted on to make serious
decisions responsibly. This is exemplified by the fact that children are shielded from other free markets as well (e.g., children
may not work, buy cigarettes or alcohol, or obtain a credit card).
Second, with respect to children, the marketplace of
ideas is not competitive. Parents are the major source of ideas
for young children, especially those who are home-schooled or
isolated. If prejudices begin to form around three or four years
of age, being exposed to different ideas in school after age three
or four will not successfully correct the bias.144 Just as there is
skewed access to media for adults,145 parents occupy a disproportionate market share when it comes to their children.
The second justification for free speech is that it acts as
a check on abuse of governmental authority by enabling people
to speak out against the government and reveal truths about
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those who have political power.146 One view is that this justification survives when applied to parent-to-child speech:
“Government power to coercively restrict parental speech, on
top of its power to engage in its own speech in public schools,
would tend to cement existing orthodoxies and suppress potentially valuable but unpopular ideas.”147 This argument misses
the point that whatever value the expression of potentially valuable but unpopular ideas may have, this value is lost on children
who are unable to comprehend the information. When a child
reaches maturity, a parent’s racist speech will be less harmful to
the child, and thus such “unpopular ideas” will not be absolutely
prohibited.
The third justification for free speech is that a democracy relies on the ability of its members to debate political issues
and make informed choices. Free expression must be the centerpiece of self-government. The self-governance argument148 suggests that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is
assumed to express.”149 When we are speaking of those who do
not participate in the political process, however, this argument is
not persuasive. Because children are not allowed to vote, the
political process is not weakened by restricting adults from expressing political ideas to children. This is especially true for
very young children who do not possess the cognitive ability
even to understand political ideas. Of course, children become
future voters, so there is an interest in preparing them for their
political role by exposing them to diverse beliefs when they are
capable of understanding them. However, these goals are furthered by preserving the autonomy of future generations of voters, not by indoctrinating with racist hate. Where a child has
been taught to hate, she will not be in a position to make informed choices, for her ability to make choices based on reason,
rather than on preprogrammed fear and contempt, will have been
impaired.
A non-instrumental justification for protecting speech
is that it respects individual autonomy and nurtures certain beneficent character traits.150 According to this view, the practice
of tolerating offensive speech rather than punishing it serves the
individual and society by providing a forum for people to exercise their “capacity for tolerance,” which translates generally
into a disposition of restraint and self-denial.151 For example,
“[s]imply coexisting and overcoming the wish to establish an
overly homogenized society are important goals,” and “free
speech may simply function as a zone of extreme tolerance, not
because the behavior tolerated is important to human selfrealization or to truth, but because as a practical matter living
with divergent behavior is necessary.”152 It is inapposite, however, to argue that teaching children to hate based on race creates a general atmosphere of tolerance on the playground. An
adult racist arguably has chosen to be racist. Thus, it makes
sense to suggest that forcing one to hear another’s racist beliefs
may create a more tolerant society. Unlike racist speech among
adults, allowing children to be indoctrinated for the sake of nurturing a tolerant society sacrifices the well-being of the child for
the mere possibility that a tolerant society will emerge. This
sacrifice is too costly.
One argument against the absolute protection of hate
speech that is relevant to parent-to-child hate speech focuses on
the expressive function of the law. In the hate speech context,
the proponents of this view argue that by protecting hate speech,
the law endorses of hate speech. This argument is even more
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persuasive when applied to parent-to-child hate speech. A child,
with a developing identity and a developing sense of self, may
look to the law as guidance on what society approves. By permitting a parent to teach racist hate to a child, the law implies
societal approval and even suggests encouragement of prejudicial ideas.153
CONTOURS OF FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
The most basic and inaccurate interpretation of the First
Amendment is that it is absolute, that it protects all speech.154
Until 1931, the First Amendment applied only to Congress.155
Thus, free speech protections were once much more limited than
most people have come to expect.156 The key to assessing and
predicting the constitutionality of certain speech regulations lies
in navigating the turbulent waters of free speech rules and exceptions. One of the most important rules in First Amendment
jurisprudence is that speech restrictions must be both content
and viewpoint neutral:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content . .
. [T]here is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’
and government must afford all points of view an . . .
opportunity to be heard.157
The regulation of parent-to-child racist speech
violates the content-neutral requirement. One could
argue that the restriction derives from the harm it
causes to children and not its message, but that argument masks the true motivation.158 Even if the regulation is content-based, the captive audience doctrine
may allow the speech to be regulated.
The Supreme Court has identified a hierarchy of protected speech based on the value of the speech.159 The speech
with the highest value is political speech because there is
“practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the
First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”160 Political speech “includes discussion of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all
such matters relating to the political process.”161 Restrictions on
this category receive strict scrutiny, the most stringent protection
under the First Amendment. Speech with lower value, such as
obscenity162 and commercial speech,163 is easier for the government to regulate.
Thus, a relevant question is whether parent-to-child
racist speech is high-value or low-value speech. Some racist
speech carries a political message and therefore should be considered high-value speech, although perhaps not as valuable as
speech directly concerning a political campaign. On the other
hand, some parent-to-child racist speech (e.g., speech regarding
the social characteristics of a race and degrading speech) may
not be political speech and should receive lesser status. However, a viable argument may be made that no speech to a child is
political speech because a child cannot comprehend such political ideas. Even if parent-to-child racist speech is considered to
be of lower value, the Supreme Court has held that contentbased regulations of unprotected speech must still meet strict
scrutiny.164 In sum, parent-to-child racist speech regulations that
restrict political speech based on content place an extremely
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high burden on the government to overcome. That burden may
be overcome by the captive audience doctrine.
FREEDOM FROM BEING CAPTIVE TO RACIST SPEECH165
[A]child—like someone in a captive audience—is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees.166
Under the captive audience doctrine, speech is exempted from First Amendment protection if it is delivered to a
captive listener.167 The exception potentially allows the Court to
sidestep the content-neutrality requirement of the First Amendment and to curtail political expression.168
A captive audience, in the First Amendment sense, describes listeners who, under certain circumstances, cannot escape offensive language.169 The degree and type of captivity
necessary to invoke this doctrine is often a central point of contention and confusion.170 Critics first point to the ambiguity of
the word “captive,” arguing that “[w]e are always captive in
some senses, and never captive in others . . . [W]e are virtually
never captive, because there is almost always something we can
do to avoid exposure to whatever we find most offensive.”171
The more central problem in employing this doctrine,
however, is that the Court has been unclear in its application of
the doctrine.172 It is difficult to find guiding language in case
law or a common thread among cases that apply the captive audience doctrine.173 For example, the Court has found people
entering health facilities captive to anti-abortion protests.174 It
has also found a person riding in a car or at home listening to the
radio captive to an offensive radio broadcast;175 a homeowner
captive to focused residential picketing;176 a homeowner captive
to sexually oriented mailings that she has requested not to receive;177 and a public bus rider captive to political campaign
advertising on the bus.178 It is difficult to discern an identifiable
pattern from which a person can determine whether the captive
audience doctrine should apply in a specific case.
Several concepts have been offered to make sense of
First Amendment captivity.179 The first basic concept is that the
captive audience doctrine is founded upon preserving “the right
to be let alone” or “the right to privacy.”180 Two principles underlie this right: an autonomy interest and a right to repose.181
The second concept is that the State has an interest in protecting
the privacy rights of an unwilling listener.
The autonomy principle is common to both the right to
free speech and the right to privacy. Being free to speak one’s
mind nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.182 Likewise,
being able to choose the ideas and thoughts to which one is exposed nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.183 Despite
the various plausible definitions for the word “captivity,” at its
core, captivity suggests that a captive person is one who is deprived of autonomy or meaningful choice. With that definition
in mind, the captive audience doctrine can be understood as a
tool that balances power between the captor and the captive in
order to restore individual autonomy.184
These underlying principles reveal that the goals of the
First Amendment and the right to privacy are not in conflict: by
placing a premium on autonomy, both require protection of the
child from racist indoctrination. Because the young mind is so
easily, and often irreversibly, shaped, parent-to-child racist
speech disturbs the autonomy of the future adult. The State has
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an interest in protecting the autonomy rights of the future adult
disturbed by such speech.
In addition to the right to make individual choices, the
right to be let alone is concerned with the right to repose or to be
at peace. This right is most often violated when a person is being disturbed at home. This is so because if she cannot retreat to
her home, there may be nowhere to retreat at all. Consequently,
the home has a special status in captive audience jurisprudence.185 The right to repose in one’s home has a strong implication for parent-to-child racist indoctrination because such
communication likely occurs in the home. Thus, the child has
nowhere to retreat from unwanted racist inculcation. In sum,
both the child’s autonomy interest and the child’s right to repose
the two interests the captive audience doctrine endeavors to protect will be served if the captive audience doctrine is applied to
the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm.
The State also has an interest in protecting the unwilling listener. In the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm, the
child may seem to be a willing listener. Being willing, however,
presupposes that the listener has a choice. In the parent-to-child
model, the child has no choice and is therefore presumptively
unwilling. A young child is truly captive to her parents.186 She
cannot decide to be born, to be born into a particular family, or
to be provided with a particular level of care.187 In addition,
“[w]hatever chance [she] may have at achieving autonomy depends on the emotional and material resources invested during
[her] childhood.”188 Because a child is dependent upon her
guardian189 for everyday necessities, a child has no choice but to
listen.190 In that sense, a child is powerless to turn off harmful
speech.

CONCLUSION: WAIT UNTIL THEY’RE OLDER
Free speech and a parent’s right to control the upbringing of her child are two of the most important rights granted by
the United States Constitution. Both rights protect and reflect
autonomy and privacy. They secure a profound sense of liberty,
under which this country has flourished. At the same time, both
rights have limitations founded on a basic principle of collective
well-being. Those limitations are at its strongest when the wellbeing of a child is at stake. While a child is not a mere creature
of the State, neither is a child a mere creature of her parents.
The reality is that some parents do not act with the best interests
of their child in mind. As social science research suggests, a
parent who raises her child as a racist does not act in the best
interests of her child. Therefore, a parent’s right to control the
upbringing of her child may be limited by the State’s power to
protect the child’s well-being.
The State’s power to restrict a parent from indoctrinating her child is governed by both the free speech doctrine and
the substantive due process doctrine. Under the best-interestsof-the-child standard, the State may interfere with a parent’s
right to control the upbringing of the child, though the State action must meet strict scrutiny to prevail on constitutional
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grounds. The precise scope of the State’s power under this standard is unclear and is largely within the court’s discretion. Wide
discretion in this area may be problematic because it leaves it up
to a judge, with little guidance, to decide what is best for the
child.
Under the captive audience doctrine, a state may have
the power to limit a parent’s racist speech to her child because
the child is captive to her parent’s speech. The main theoretical
obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate speech is that it interferes with one of the central tenets of free speech: the content
and viewpoint-neutrality requirement. It is not up to the government to prescribe orthodoxy. Proscribing parent-to-child hate
speech can be considered a viewpoint-neutral restriction—that
is, no one can teach their children to hate. Even if the neutrality
requirement is not met, the captive audience doctrine may allow
the State to bypass the requirement when the child is deemed
captive to her parent’s hate speech.
There are also several practical obstacles that must be
addressed if the State is to regulate parent-to-child hate speech.
First, the State may not be in a position to know what a child is
learning in the home. A possible answer to this obstacle would
be to treat parental racist indoctrination as akin to child abuse.
Like child abuse, there are physical and verbal manifestations of
racism. A second related obstacle is finding a plaintiff to assert
the child’s rights in court. A possible solution is that, as in child
abuse cases, the State could assert the child’s rights. A next
friend or a guardian ad litem can be assigned.
Even if a way to enforce a regulation or rule is found,
there is the potential that the restrictions will disproportionately
affect divorced parents, single parents, or African-American
parents because of their overrepresentation in the legal system.
Affording a judge broad discretion may also lead to inconsistent
application.
Another obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate
speech is the ability to find an appropriate remedy. Absent other
evidence of abuse, separating a child from her parent may be too
extreme, especially when such separation is based on inconclusive science and inconsistent application of the law. A practical
response would instead be a judicial order not to use specific
language in front of the child or mandatory enrollment in a tolerance workshop for the parent and child.
This article is just a small step toward the goal of protecting children from their parents’ racist indoctrination. It sets
forth a possible goal, though one with many well-intentioned
legal obstacles in the way.
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THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
By
Jason Gubi*
INTRODUCTION
While there has been debate as to what the religion
clauses protect, nearly all observers would agree that the First
Amendment prohibits the federal government from establishing
a national religion.1 Yet, from 1882 to 1932, the federal government subsidized the conversion of Native Americans to Christianity, while simultaneously banning Native American spiritual
practices.2
Moreover, courts have treated Native American religions differently from “mainstream”3 Judeo-Christian religions
for much of this nation’s history. Beginning with Johnson v.
M’Intosh, the Supreme Court noted that the “character and religion” of the Native Americans stood in stark contrast to the
“superior genius of Europe,” helping to justify European control
of the land.4 In exchange, the Europeans gave the Native
Americans civilization and Christianity, believing this to be
“ample compensation.”5 M’Intosh’s view of the Native American religions as being somehow inferior to those of Western
Europe thus informs the Court’s subsequent unbalanced treatment of Native Americans in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
This article will discuss the extent to which the Free
Exercise Clause creates rights to freely exercise religion for Native Americans in comparison with adherents of mainstream
religions and the effects, if any, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) has had on such rights.6 Section II of this
article examines the law governing Native American land use,
including the First Amendment, the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), and the RFRA. Section III illustrates
some key issues arising in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence
cases: (a) how central an asserted right must be for the courts to
recognize that the right must be protected from government action; (b) how substantial a burden on religion must be to be protected under RFRA; and (c) what constitutes a compelling government interest. Section IV reviews Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in general, with an emphasis on Native American Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, to illustrate the difference in application of the clause to mainstream religions as opposed to
Native American religions. Section V analyzes and predicts the
manner in which Native American religious freedoms are protected, positing that although the law has historically provided
little protection for Native American religions, courts may now
be more receptive to securing Native American religious freedoms under RFRA.

THE LAW GOVERNING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The free exercise of religion in the United States is secured first and foremost by the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
…”7 Taken together, the Establishment and Free Exercise
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clauses prohibit the government from establishing a state religion and prevent the government from unduly restricting the exercise of religious freedoms.
Congress has also passed statutes to effectuate the purposes of the First Amendment with regard to religion. The
AIRFA protects Native Americans’ rights to “believe, express,
and exercise” their traditional religions, “including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and
the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites.”8 The AIRFA initially offered only weak protection, however, and Congress had to amend the law in response to a landmark Supreme Court case concerning religious use of peyote.
In Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court
upheld a statute barring the use of peyote even for religious reasons. 9 The Court found that neutral, generally applicable laws
could be applied to religious practices even when they substantially burden the free exercise of religion and were not supported
by a compelling government interest. In response to Smith,
Congress amended the AIRFA to allow the use of peyote in religious rituals10 and passed the RFRA.11
The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially
burdening the free exercise of religion unless it can show a compelling interest, and accomplish its ends through the least restrictive means possible.12 Although the RFRA was found unconstitutional as applied to the states,13 it has been found constitutional
as applied to the federal government.14

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
APPLICATION OF THE RFRA
To determine whether the RFRA protects a right the
courts consider several key interests such as: (a) the central nature of the asserted right; (b) whether the burden on religion is
substantial; and (c) what constitutes a compelling government
interest. Courts sometimes analyze the centrality of an infringed
practice in determining the constitutionality of the governmental
action. RFRA defines exercise of religion as “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”15 Section IV of this article, addresses the extent to which a given religious practice must be central to trigger
protection under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA frameworks.
The RFRA only protects religious practices that are
substantially burdened by governmental action.16 Some of the
approaches courts have taken to analyze the substantiality of the
burden are: (a) making a case specific determination;17 (b) requiring coercion of a religious adherent;18 (c) assuming sufficiency of the asserted burden;19 and (d) requiring that an individual be prevented from engaging in religious conduct or having a
religious experience.20
Only compelling governmental interests can infringe
the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court defines compelling interests as interests of “the highest order and not otherwise served.”21 Maintaining a uniform tax code,22 preserving
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Native American culture,23 protecting bald and golden eagles,24
and enforcing participation in the social security system25 are
examples of compelling governmental interests.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
This section will compare how courts have analyzed
Free Exercise claims in a number of different scenarios, highlighting the differences between the treatment received by adherents of Native American and mainstream religions.
GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a South Carolina unemployment benefits
scheme which exempted people from benefits if they were able
to work but chose not to work.26 This scheme benefited Sunday
worshippers while indirectly burdening the free exercise of religion of non-Sunday Sabbath-worshippers. The Court, therefore, established a burden switching, or compelling burden
test.27 For an action to be constitutional, the government must
prove that it has a compelling interest in the regulation or action
and that the means of achieving this interest are the least restrictive possible.28 Under this test, the Court noted that non-Sunday
worshippers were forced to choose between taking the unemployment benefits and observing their religion.29 The Court
found such a choice repugnant under the Free Exercise Clause as
an undue burden on religious freedom.30
In Bowen v. Roy, the Court declined to apply the burden switching test that it had used in Sherbert.31 Native American recipients of welfare benefits, on behalf of their minor child,
objected to a government policy requiring the parents to submit
the child’s social security number in order to receive benefits.
The child’s father believed that the use of an arbitrary number as
a means of identification contradicted his religious convictions,
as it cut against an individual’s uniqueness.32 Though the Court
recognized that the test applied in cases like Sherbert would
seem to be applicable because an ostensibly neutral governmental policy was creating a burden on the free exercise of religious
practice, it declined to do so.
In Bowen, the court found a lesser burden upon a religious practice, and a higher governmental interest in enacting
the regulation.33 The Court distinguished government regulations that only “call[] for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adhering to a religious belief[]…from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find
objectionable for religious reasons.”34 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Sherbert ruling may be viewed "as a protection
against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored treatment for the members of the religious sect."35 Therefore, while
the Sherbert test was appropriate in cases involving unequal
treatment,36 there was no need for a more stringent test in Bowen.
The Court appears to favor Judeo-Christian
beliefs in determining whether or not to apply
the Sherbert test.
While the Court distinguished Bowen from Sherbert,
both instances involved a religious adherent who had to choose
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between following his religion and receiving a government
benefit. The Bowen Court did not analyze the centrality of the
infringed religious practice. It noted, however, that while the
governmental interest was compelling, the religious practice was
not substantially infringed. In finding that the burden imposed
on the Native American family was minor, the Court thus implicitly regards that choosing to obey a Sabbath is more important than a religious belief in an individual’s uniqueness.
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS THAT THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION.
The following cases illustrate the Court’s treatment of
governmental practices that are neutral on their face, but indirectly threaten the entire existence of religious practices.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Wisconsin’s compulsory schooling law forced Amish parents to send their children to public
school after the eighth grade violating core Amish religious beliefs.37 Although this law was a neutral government regulation,
the Court applied the Sherbert test to find that Wisconsin’s law
would debilitate the continuance of the Amish faith and therefore unduly burden the free exercise of religion. 38 The Court
found that a regulation that is neutral in application may nonetheless “offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”39 In
Yoder, the neutral regulation ran afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause because its neutral application would have the effect of
debilitating the continuance of the Amish faith. The Court thus
expanded the scope of protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association,
the government proposed the construction of a six-mile road
cutting through a National Forest in northwestern California.40
Though the Forest Service’s expert was against building the road
because the area was viewed as indispensable41 to the religious
practices of three Native American tribes, the Forest Service
rejected that recommendation.42
The tribes initially achieved some success in the lower
courts.43 The district court acknowledged the centrality of the
infringed right to their religious practice44 and issued an injunction.45 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of the
injunction, holding that the road construction did not further a
compelling state interest and violated the tribes’ free-exercise
rights.46
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Lyng from
other cases where the indirect burden was found unconstitutional
in that they involved governmental coercion, while concluding
that Lyng did not.47 The Court said the First Amendment does
not involve what individuals can extract from the government;
rather it involves what the government is prohibited from doing
to the individual.48 Even if the road would destroy the tribes’
religion, the Court reasoned that because the governmental action did not “coerce” the tribes into violating their religious tenets, it did not sufficiently burden their religion.49
In rejecting the tribes’ claim, the Court also stressed
that the government has the prerogative to decide what to do
with its own land.50 It feared that recognizing the claim could
give rise to religious servitudes on government property, thereby
inhibiting the government’s ability to advance the public interest.51
The Free Exercise Clause did not protect Native
Americans from a governmental action that
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ing an undue burden on the free exercise of religion so long as
the law is otherwise valid and within the government’s prerogative to regulate.63 The Smith Court viewed accommodation of
The Lyng Court seemed to be holding that ostensibly religious minorities as preferring one religion over another. This
neutral laws that eliminate Native American religious practices accommodation would create a constitutional right to ignore
are constitutional so long as they are not an outright ban on the neutral laws of general applicability.64 Therefore, the Court depracticing of a religion. Both Yoder and Lyng involve govern- cided not to apply the compelling interest test that it had applied
ment policies that risked the destruction of a religion, yet only in in cases such as Sherbert and Yoder.65 Rather, a rational basis
Lyng was the government action found to be constitutional.52 for the regulation was sufficient to pass constitutional muster.
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
The difference in the outcome of these cases resulted from the
fact that the proposed action in Lyng involved government Vegetal, a small religious sect sought a preliminary injunction to
land.53 Therefore, the Lyng case can be interpreted to mean that prevent the federal government from enforcing a ban against
the First Amendment cannot be invoked to challenge the govern- using a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances
Act.66 The district court granted the injunction, and the Court of
ment’s use of real property.54
Indeed, this
Appeals affirmed.67
interpretation of Lyng
The court applied the Sherbert test because the fedwas expressed when the
eral government was seeking to impose restrictions
RFRA was passed in
that burden religious practice.68 Under this test, the
55
November 1993.
Government failed to show that it had a compelling
in not allowing an exception to the ConRFRA calls for the appliRFRA creates a right of action for interest
trolled Substances Act. Neither the evidence related
cation of Free Exercise
analysis from before individuals privately owning land, to diversion of the drug away from its religious use,
Smith, including cases but not when the federal government nor the evidence as to its adverse health effects was
strong.69 The Supreme Court affirmed noting that
such as Lyng, which reis
managing
federal
land.
fuse to extend judicial
RFRA expressly requires an individualized inprotection when governquiry.70 The Court also noted that the Controlled
ment action on federal
Substances Act does make an exception to halluland is at issue.56 Concinogens such as peyote.71
gress was thus not atThe Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v.
tempting to change the
Hardman found that a governmental scheme aimed
way the courts interpret cases that deal with governmental land at restricting access to eagles’ feathers violates individuals’ Free
management. Yet, an express aim of RFRA was to create a right Exercise rights because the regulatory scheme was not the least
of action for individuals suffering infringement of their right to restrictive means possible to accomplish the government’s comfreely exercise their religious beliefs as a result of indirect, os- pelling interest.72 The regulatory scheme required a permit from
tensibly neutral, government action.57 Therefore, RFRA creates the federal government to collect eagles’ feathers.73 Only mema right of action for individuals privately owning land, but not bers of federally-recognized tribes could apply for this permit.74
when the federal government is managing federal land. MoreAs a preliminary matter, the circuit court found that
over, since Native American religious practice often occurs on because an eagle’s feather is sacred in many Native American
federal land, such practices will be subject to greater infringe- religions, any scheme limiting access to feathers substantially
ment than those who practice their religion on their own prop- burdened the free exercise of a religious belief.75 In addition,
erty. 58
the court also found that there was a compelling governmental
In Yoder, a government policy that risked the destruc- interest to combat spurious claims for eagles’ feathers and to
tion of a religion was found unconstitutional,59 yet in Lyng, a protect Native American culture.76 However, the government
government action that posed an even greater risk of this same never showed the nexus between preservation of this culture and
result was found constitutional.60 In Lyng, the centrality of the selectively allowing application for permits based on memberreligious practice at issue was recognized by the district court ship in federally-recognized tribes.77 The court found that testiand the substantiality of the burden was clear because experts mony in support of the notion that the prohibition would help to
believed the proposed action would damage an area viewed as preserve Native American culture was equally indicative of a
indispensable to the religious practice of three Native American tendency to cause its destruction since the ineligibility of adhertribes.61 However, because the proposed action was to occur on ents to apply for a permit could just as easily lead to poaching as
too long a waitlist.78 As a result, the court found that the regulagovernmental land, it was allowed.62
tion was not the least restrictive way to preserve Native American Culture. 79
In United States v. Tawahongva, the United States DisRELIGIOUS OBJECTS AND OBSERVANCES
trict Court for the District of Arizona found that a Native AmeriCase law has been inconsistent in its treatment of gov- can’s freedom to exercise his religion was not substantially burernment regulations affecting the use of objects that are used for dened by the government’s requirement that an individual seekreligious observances, but whose use is also regulated by a fed- ing to acquire an eagle’s feather apply for a permit.80 The court
eral regulatory scheme. This inconsistency continues even after admitted that the permit requirement substantially burdened the
passage of the RFRA.
free exercise of Native American religion in other cases. HowIn Employment Div. v. Smith, the Supreme Court held ever, rather than making a particularized inquiry as to whether
that neutral statutes are not unconstitutional by virtue of impos- the means of achieving the asserted governmental interest was
threatened a religious practice because of the
government’s interest in managing its land.
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the least restrictive possible, the Tawahongva court merely inquired as to whether the defendant’s burden was particularly
burdensome.81 The defendant only objected to the requirement
to apply for a permit from the Hopi tribal government, and did
not object to the need to apply for a permit in general. The court
concluded that the burden was not substantial for him.82 Even if
the burden was substantial, the court nevertheless determined
that the government has a compelling interest in regulating access to eagles’ feathers and the means used to accomplish it
were the least restrictive possible.
Judicial interpretation of RFRA
with regard to the use of religious
objects and religious observances
in the face of governmental regulatory schemes remains inconsistent.
In Smith, the Court rejected using the balancing test
from Sherbert and Yoder even though the regulation indirectly
burdened religion. The Court questioned neither the centrality
of the practice, nor the substantiality of the burden. Had the
Court undertaken the Sherbert and Yoder analysis, it likely
would have struck the government regulation for not being the
least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling interest.
Mainstream religions had for decades been protected
from governmental infringement of religious practice via Sherbert and Yoder’s analytical framework. Yet, the Court in Smith
eschewed that analysis in consideration of a burden imposed
upon a non-mainstream religion. After passage of the RFRA,
the O Centro Court overturned the governmental action in a case
factually similar to Smith. Thus, the RFRA can be understood to
convey greater protection for the free exercise of religion than
the Free Exercise Clause.
While the Hardman and Tawahongva courts both assumed that the infringed right was central enough to trigger an
analysis under the Free Exercise clause, the two courts differed
as to the substantiality of the burden imposed. This difference is
likely due to the Tawahongva court’s subjective inquiry on the
substantiality of the burden for the defendant. Therefore, the
Tawahongva court rejected the defendant’s claim even while
recognizing that the statute as generally applied substantially
burdens the free exercise of religion.83 This subjective RFRA
inquiry involved greater scrutiny of the defendant’s asserted
injury than courts ordinarily undertake in Free Exercise cases.
The RFRA protected non-mainstream religions use of
controlled substances for religious purposes. However, as in
Tawahongva, Native American tribes are still unable to freely
practice their religion as mainstream religions are.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF
FEDERAL LAND AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES.
Cases involving land use have traditionally been decided in favor of the government, and thus against the free exercise of religion by Native Americans. 84 Though the RFRA did
not appear to change this analysis, case law may be evaluating
Native American Free Exercise land use claims similarly to
mainstream religions.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority upheld the
proposed governmental construction of the Tellico Dam on the
Little Tennessee River.85 Cherokee Indians claimed the dam
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would flood their sacred homeland.86 The court found that, although the complaint asserted an irreversible loss of Cherokee
culture and history, these were not interests protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.87
The Cherokee Indians failed to demonstrate that worship at Little Tennessee Valley was (1) inseparable from their
way of life; (2) the cornerstone of their religious observance; (3)
or that it played a central role in their religious ceremonies and
practices.88 The land at issue was, therefore, not the theological
heart of their religion and thus the Free Exercise clause did not
apply.
In Badoni v. Higginson, the Navajo sought to order the
government to lower a reservoir that partially flooded the Rainbow Bridge National Monument, a sacred site. 89 The tribe also
tried to compel the government to issue regulations controlling
tourist behavior at the monument; and to temporarily close the
monument to the public, on notice, for religious ceremonies.90
The court first noted that the government had a compelling interest in maintaining the level of the reservoir because it
supplied both water and electricity for the region.91 The court
next stated that a governmental action must be coercive in order
to potentially violate the Free Exercise Clause.92 Here, the government was not forcing the Native American groups to do anything that was against their religion, nor depriving anyone of a
governmental benefit for failure to take an action that was abhorrent to their religion. Finally, because the plaintiffs were
seeking to compel the government to prevent the public from
accessing areas of religious significance, the court reasoned that
taking such action would violate the Establishment Clause.93
In Wilson v. Block, the Navajo and Hopi Indians sought
to enjoin the clearing of fifty acres of forest to expand the Snowbowl ski resort in the Coconino National Forest in Northern Arizona.94 However, they failed to show a substantial burden upon
their religious practices.95 To show a substantial burden, unlike
in Sequoyah, this court did not require that the religious practice
be central to the religion. Nonetheless, it required that the affected religious practice could not be performed elsewhere.96
The Wilson Court then considered whether the AIRFA
protected the tribes from the proposed expansion.97 Based on
the legislative record, the court found that AIRFA did not create
any additional rights. Rather, it merely required federal agencies
to consider the impact of proposed regulations and actions upon
Native Americans.98
More recently, in a similar dispute the Ninth Circuit in
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service overruled the Arizona District Court’s finding that the proposed expansion of the Snowbowl ski resort was constitutional under the First Amendment.99
Contrary to the district court, the circuit court held that the proposed action constituted a substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion. Moreover, it also held that the government did not
have a compelling interest in the expansion of the Snowbowl ski
resort.100
The owners of the ski resort and the government were
seeking to expand the size of the resort and introduce artificial
snow-making.101 Although artificial snow-making expanded the
ski season, it also entailed the use of treated sewage effluent.102
The circuit court found that the proposed use of sewage effluent
would be a burden of the highest order upon the tribes’ right to
freely exercise their religion.103 The court noted that a burden
must prevent the plaintiff from “engaging in religious conduct or
having a religious experience” in order to trigger RFRA analysis.104 Here, the proposed expansion would severely burden the
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religious exercise of the Hopi and Navajo because it polluted the elsewhere.116 Since the religious activity could be conducted
most sacred place of those tribes. Since their religious practices elsewhere, the infringement did not violate the free exercise of
require pure natural resources, use of the treated sewage effluent religion.
would prevent the Navajo from conducting some ceremonies
The Navajo Nation Court, however, defined a substanand would undermine the Hopi’s entire system of belief.105
tial burden upon the free exercise of religion as actions preventThe circuit court agreed with the district court in that ing an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or having
the government in general has a compelling interest in managing a religious experience.”117 This definition is broader than the
public recreational land. However, it argued that O Centro re- definitions provided by the Sequoyah, Badoni, and Wilson
quires a more particularized compelling interest analysis than courts. A potential explanation for this more inclusive definition
the lower court employed. Under that analysis, expanding the is that the Navajo Nation case occurred after passage of the
size and operating season of a ski resort that is located in the RFRA.
desert is not a compelling governmental interest.
The Navajo Nation Court noted that the term ‘exercise
The government also argued that it had a compelling of religion’ is defined more broadly under RFRA in distinguishinterest in developing snow-play areas for non-skiers. Without ing cases that allowed governmental activities that gravely imthese areas, non-skiers were having accidents by playing close to pacted Native American religious practices.118 Before, the Free
the road. 106 The circuit court rejected this argument because Exercise Clause analysis examined whether an action prohibited
nothing in the trial record indicated that these safety concerns the free exercise of religion. Under the RFRA analysis actions
had any relationship to expansion of the resort.107 The circuit merely burdening the free exercise of religion may violate Free
court found that even if creation of a snow-play park was a com- Exercise rights.119
pelling interest, introducing artificial snow-making and expandThe circuit court differentiated the Lyng and Wilson
ing the resort were not the least
decisions because of this greater protection
restrictive means of furthering
provided by the RFRA and also on factual
such an interest.108
differences.120
These land use cases
The owners of the resort
hinged on the definition of what was a subalso argued that complying with
stantial burden on the free exercise of rethe Establishment Clause was a
In Native American Free Exercise ligion. Therefore, while RFRA does not
compelling governmental interthe method of determining when a
jurisprudence, courts have required change
est.109 Therefore, in furtherance
substantial right is infringed, its interpretaof this interest, the government a higher showing that a practice was tion in Navajo Nation marks a post-RFRA
should not accommodate Native substantially burdened than in cases land use case that protected Native American religious practices.
American religious practices.110
involving mainstream religions.
However, the circuit court noted
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution
ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS
requires accommodation, rather
than mere tolerance, of all religThis section will review federal court interions.111 The circuit court viewed refusal to allow the proposed pretation of when religious practices are protected from governexpansion as a “permitted accommodation to avoid callous in- ment actions or regulations; when governmental action substandifference.”112
tially infringes such a right; and what constitutes a compelling
governmental interest. Finally, it will predict the direction of
The post-RFRA Navajo Nation defederal court jurisprudence in light of the Navajo Nation decicision interprets burdens upon the
sion.
free exercise of religion more
broadly than the pre-RFRA caselaw.
INTERPRETATION OF KEY ISSUES
These land use cases hinged on the definition of what
was a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. For
example, the Sequoyah Court did not view destruction of the
Cherokee’s ancestral lands as a substantial interest protected by
the First Amendment.113 Rather, to find a substantial burden it
examined whether the infringed practice was (1) inseparable
from a way of life; (2) the cornerstone of a religious observance;
or (3) central to religious ceremonies and practices.114 Since the
destruction of the Cherokee’s ancestral lands did not fall under
any of these categories, the governmental action did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. The Badoni Court analyzed the substantiality of an imposed burden via whether or not the act or
regulation is coercive.115 Since the governmental act was not
coercive, the Court did not find it in violation of the free exercise of religion. Also, the Wilson Court analyzed substantiality
by asking whether a given religious practice could not be done
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In Native American Free Exercise jurisprudence, courts
have required a higher showing that a practice was substantially
burdened than in cases involving mainstream religions. In Free
Exercise cases regarding mainstream religions, courts ordinarily
decline any ability to measure the centrality of a religious practice.121 In many Native American Free Exercise cases, however,
courts have required the Native American group to prove the
centrality of the religious practice. For example, for mainstream
religions, it has sometimes been sufficient that a religious practice be in any way affected by a governmental act.122 Conversely, in Tawahongva, the court subjectively examined the
claimant’s burden even when, in general, the act substantially
burdened the free exercise of religion.123 Other courts have required that a given practice could not be done elsewhere. Only
when these high substantial burden requirements were satisfied
would the courts be willing to apply the compelling interest test
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analysis.124
However, even when this test is applied, courts are
quicker to find both a compelling interest and that the government engaged in the least restrictive means of accomplishing
this interest in cases involving the government’s management of
federal land.125 Such an approach negatively impacts Native
American religious practice because Native American sacred
sites are often located upon federal land.

FREE EXERCISE AND THE RFRA GOING FORWARD
Post-RFRA cases only addressing what the First
Amendment prohibits the federal government from doing miss
the point. The RFRA increases the prohibitions on what the
federal government can do through the requirement that the government pursue its aim by the least restrictive means possible.126
Cases that fail to recognize that the RFRA protects a broader
range of conduct are also misguided because RFRA’s expansive
definition of ‘exercise of religion’ includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”127
The RFRA was amended in 2000 upon passage of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) of 2000 to change the understanding of the term
‘exercise of religion.’128 While the RFRA previously relied on
the Court’s understanding of the term as required by the First
Amendment, RLUIPA expanded its meaning.129
Finally, based on Navajo Nation’s different interpreta-

tion of the RFRA, courts may in the future analyze Native
American Free Exercise cases in the same manner as the Free
Exercise cases of mainstream religions. Such an interpretation
of the RFRA would provide greater protection of Native Americans’ rights to freely practice their religion. RFRA restored the
method of analysis from before Smith130 when mainstream religions received more protection than Native American religions.131
Therefore, the RFRA alone would not seem to increase protection for the free exercise of Native American religious practices
in the land use context.132
However, Navajo Nation used the RFRA framework
with the RLUIPA definition of ‘free exercise of religion’ to protect the rights of Native Americans. The Navajo Nation court
seriously questioned the government’s asserted interest in expanding a ski resort and protected sacred Native American land
from destruction. Also, contrary to previous cases, Navajo Nation did not examine the individual’s ability to have this experience elsewhere or the coercive nature of the governmental action.133 Rather, it analyzed whether the government had prevented an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or
having a religious experience.” Therefore, if Navajo Nation
indicates a change in the way courts will evaluate governmental
burdens on Native American religious practices, then Native
American religious practices may receive the same level of accommodation as mainstream religious practices in the future.
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Whose Body Is It Anyway: Justice and the Integrity
of the Person1
By
Meghan Boone

T

he human body enjoys a special place in the law.
Many of our most basic rights as citizens, including
the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, the right to be free from physical assaults by
others, and the right to privacy, arise from the idea that we
should be able to control what happens to our own bodies. This
principle of the inviolable body is also the basis for preventing
individuals from utilizing their body or body parts in the economic marketplace and gives rise to legislation such as the prohibition on the sale of organs, the invalidation of surrogacy contracts, and the criminalization of prostitution. In the book,
Whose Body Is It Anyway: Justice and the Integrity of the Person, Cécile Fabre posits that the current legal system would be
more just if we disavowed ourselves of this principle of the inviolable body, or the idea that the body is legally special, and
instead accepted a legal system in which we all have a right to
each other’s bodies, including our own. She points out that,
“justice requires conferring on the sick a right to the organs of
the dead and, in some cases, the living; and…requires conferring
on individuals a right to buy and sell organs, sex, and reproductive services.”
Fabre admits at the outset of the book that because the principles she advances may disturb our traditional doctrines and
principle, she expects little popular support. However, despite
my initial distress with an argument that asserts I should not
have the right to decide what happens to my own body, I eventually found that the text raised interesting questions about the
contradictions inherent in our legal system’s treatment of the
physical body. As Fabre aptly notes, “our legal and political
tradition is such that we have the right to deny others access to
our person, even though doing so would harm those who need
such access; however, we lack the right to use ourselves as we
wish in order to raise income, even though we do not necessarily
harm other by doing so...” After reading her book, I found myself agreeing with these inconsistencies under our legal system;
while the law tells us that we have complete control over our
physical persons, we are in reality legally barred from selling
our organs or sexual services, even if doing so causes no harm to
others and, in the case of organ sales, even helps those in great
need.
To advance her argument, Fabre relies on the fundamental
soundness of the principle of distributive justice, which states
that some redistribution of wealth or resources across society is
necessary in order to achieve justice for all. She points to examples from western society, such as the prevalence of social programs like welfare and the redistribution of wealth through taxation, to illustrate that the principle of distributive justice is already generally accepted. Fabre does not argue that it is necessary to have a wholesale redistribution of resources in which
every member of society is given resources in exactly equal
amounts. Instead, she works from a framework that stipulates
only that each individual has a right to the resources he or she
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requires in order to live a “minimally flourishing life,” and pursue a “conception of the good.” Fabre argues that the natural
consequence of meeting these basic goals is allowing those in
need, a right to the material resources, including the body, of
other members of society. Without these resources, many people
are unable to live a minimally flourishing life, or even any life at
all.
After asserting that the principles of distributive justice dictate that members of society have a right to the bodies of others,
Fabre then explains how the “redistribution” of bodily resources
would be accomplished. In chapters 3 through 8, respectively,
Fabre advocates for the creation of a mandatory civilian service,
the confiscation of organs from both cadavers and living people,
and the legalization of the sale of organs, prostitution, and surrogacy contracts.
The arguments I found most compelling were those contained within Fabre’s thesis as it relates to the confiscation of
organs. Fabre attempts to convince the reader that many of the
arguments in favor of absolute bodily autonomy are both misguided and unjust. First, she claims that, compared to another
individual’s right to live a minimally flourishing life, or in many
cases to live at all, a right to absolute bodily integrity seems
weak. Moreover, Fabre argues that the confiscation of organs
does not deny bodily autonomy, but instead places on it a qualification that the redistribution of organs should occur when individuals are impaired in their ability to lead a minimally flourishing life. She does allow those with true conscientious objections
the option to refuse to give their organs to those in need; an absolute requirement that would violate an individual’s conscience
would also harm his or her ability to realize the “conception of
the good.” By allowing for these conscientious objections,
Fabre addresses the only strong argument against instituting an
organ confiscations system. Further, these allowances give her
argument internal consistency because they reveal she is equally
concerned that all members of society are able to live and pursue
their own ideals.
While I was tempted to agree with Fabre’s oral arguments
in favor of an organ confiscation of the system. I failed to find
her chapter regarding the legalization of prostitution persuasive.
Her defense of prostitution is especially relevant to current discussions in the feminist community, who questions power differentials, gender equality and the commodification of women’s
bodies in the marketplace. Fabre acknowledges these issues exist
but ultimately argues that the legalization and regulation of the
sex industry would shield women from the harm they might otherwise face for supplying such services on the black market.
Unlike the more persuasive moral arguments Fabre makes for
practices such as organ confiscation, she never reaches a similar
conclusion that the legalization of prostitution is moral or just in
its own right. Instead, Fabre concludes that the problem with
prostitution is not the act of providing sexual services for money
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admits that the vast majority of women would not choose to
prostitute themselves if they had access to other economic opportunities. Thus, her position that an absolute right to prostitute
oneself is required in the interest of justice, is not persuasive.
In the end, Whose Body Is It Anyway? is best read as a philosophical text, and not a practical guide to possible changes in
the legal treatment of the body. Although it sheds light onto
contradictory aspects of both the application of distributive justice and the sacrosanct treatment of the human body in the legal

system, it is neither an “endeavour in social policy,” nor a “party
manifesto.” Additionally, due to both Fabre’s writing style and
the often dense and complicated philosophical ideas she relies
on to make her arguments, the book is neither an easy nor a
quick read, especially for anyone who does not have a background in philosophy. However, what is effective about her
book is that it both provokes and engages the reader by challenging us to reexamine one of our most basic ideas - that our bodies
should belong solely to ourselves.
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EXTENDING TITLE VII PROTECTION TO NON-GENDERCONFORMING MEN
By
Colleen Keating*
When an individual with biologically male genitals takes female
hormones and/or undergoes gender reassignment surgery, she
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits violates the social dictate that she should present herself as a
sex discrimination in employment,1 is generally seen as a meas- person of the gender she was assigned at birth. I. Bennett Caure intended to “remedy the economic deprivation of women” by pers, a professor of law at Hofstra Law School, suggests that gay
placing them “on an equal footing with men” in the workplace.2 men and lesbians, by their very existence, call into question the
of the sexes and their respective accepted
While the overwhelming majority of sexual harassment com- “complementarity”
8
characteristics.
Similarly,
transgender people challenge sociplaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency that enforces Title VII, are brought by ety’s dichotomous concept of gender; they undermine the notion
women,3 men are also victims of sex discrimination in the work- that men and women are opposites of one another and that9 cerplace—especially those who do not present themselves in the tain traits are naturally linked to a person’s biological sex. Caway their coworkers or employers believe a man should. For pers contends that women will continue to face subordination in
as long as the concept of a binary gender system
example, men who wear lipstick and skirts refuse to conform to the workplace
10
exists.
Accordingly,
courts would best further Title VII’s pursocial demands about the way men “ought” to look. Quietness
pose
by
reading
the
statute
as covering a “continuum of genand passivity defy the stereotype that men are generally assertive
11
ders,”
including gay, lesbian, and transand aggressive. Men who have
gender individuals.
sexual relationships with other men
This article surveys a number of
challenge the heterosexist view that
cases and identifies three mechanisms
only male-female sexual relationemployed by courts to deny non-genderships are “natural.” However, federal courts have been reluctant to discrimination against non-gender- conforming individuals’ Title VII claims.
First, the majority of courts fail to distinextend the protections afforded
conforming
individuals
is
sex
disguish between conduct and status. Indiwomen under Title VII to nongender-conforming men.
An crimination grounded in sex stereo- viduals who self-identify or are labeled as
overly narrow conception of sex typing and heterosexist expectations. homosexual or transgender often lose Title
VII claims because courts conflate this
discrimination blinds courts to the
unprotected status with the individuals’
fact that these men are also victims
non-gender-conforming conduct. A secof sex discrimination. And in turn,
ond denial mechanism is closely related.
the denial of protection for nonIn many cases involving homosexual or
gender-conforming men directly
transgender plaintiffs, both sexual orientacontributes to the continued subortion/gender
identity
discrimination
and sex discrimination are at
dination of women.
Many scholars have argued that the plain language of work. The existence of the former, which is not prohibited under
Title VII and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in current Title VII jurisprudence, often obscures the existence of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides a sufficient framework the latter. Finally, courts fail to recognize that sexual orientation
for protecting men who experience discrimination as a result of and gender identity/expression discrimination are actually forms
failing to conform to gender norms.4 Although federal courts of sex discrimination. Homosexual and transgender men and
roles that society asacknowledge that sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimina- women refuse to conform to the gender
12
5
signs,
on
the
basis
of
biological
sex.
This
article argues that
tion, men who do not satisfy social expectations of masculinity
discrimination
against
non-gender-conforming
individuals is sex
have had difficulty succeeding on Title VII claims. Courts often
conflate effeminacy with homosexuality,6 viewing “feminine” discrimination grounded in sex stereotyping and heterosexist
behavior in men as a manifestation of homosexuality (that is, a expectations.
marker for one’s status), rather than recognizing “homosexual”
I. EARLY CASES
as a label that society places on men who engage in non-genderconforming conduct (namely, having sex and/or romantic relationships with other men). Consequently, when faced with a sex
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen and Co.13 was one of the
discrimination claim asserted by an “effeminate” male plaintiff first Title VII cases brought by a transgender individual. The
who is either gay or perceived to be so by his coworkers, courts plaintiff, Ramona Holloway, was born a biological male. After
typically rule against the plaintiff on the ground that Title VII starting female hormone treatments, Holloway informed her emdoes not protect people who are discriminated against on the ployer, Arthur Andersen, that she was preparing to undergo sex
basis of sexual orientation.
reassignment surgery.14 She began wearing lipstick and nail
Courts have also rejected the majority of sex discrimi- polish to work, as well as a feminine hairstyle, clothing, and jewnation claims brought by transgender persons.7 Changing gen- elry.15 A few months later, after she requested that company
ders can be seen as the ultimate form of gender nonconformity. records be changed to reflect her new female name, Holloway
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was fired.16
Holloway’s supervisor explained in an affidavit that
Holloway was terminated because her “dress, appearance, and
manner . . . were such that it was very disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned.”17 This evidence clearly indicated that
Holloway was fired because her employer did not approve of her
non-gender-conforming behavior.18 Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Arthur Andersen had not violated Title
VII by firing Holloway for initiating the process of sex transition.19 The judges stated: “Holloway has not claimed to have
been treated discriminatorily because she is male or female, but
rather because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex .
. . A transsexual individual’s choice to undergo sex change surgery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class,
within the scope of Title VII.”20 The court further reasoned that
the purpose of Title VII was “to remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class” and that Congress had not “shown any
intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its original meaning.”21
Circuit Judge Alfred T. Goodwin dissented, interpreting the plain language of the statute to protect Holloway.22 Although Congress “probably never contemplated that Title VII
would apply to transsexuals,” he argued, Holloway had a legitimate sex discrimination claim.23 Judge Goodwin found that because Holloway was a female on the day she was fired, she was
a member of the class that Congress intended Title VII to protect.24 He argued that the manner in which a plaintiff became a
member of the protected class, whether via birth as a biological
female or through gender reassignment surgery, should not matter for the purpose of a Title VII analysis.25
Even though Judge Goodwin would have allowed Holloway to proceed with her Title VII claim, his analysis of the
case fell short. Because he stressed the fact that Holloway was a
woman and therefore a member of “the disadvantaged class”
that Congress intended Title VII to protect, it is doubtful that he
would have similarly held in favor of a female-to-male transgender plaintiff. Moreover, Arthur Andersen did not discriminate against Holloway because she was a woman. Holloway’s
supervisor suggested that Holloway find a new job where her
transgender identity would be unknown26—indicating that Holloway’s femaleness was problematic only because her employer
was aware that Holloway had been born a biological male and
was uncomfortable with her presenting as a woman.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar
Title VII claim brought by a transgender plaintiff in Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines.27 Karen Ulane, born a biological male, was a
pilot for Eastern Airlines when she began taking female hormones, developed breasts, and underwent sex reassignment surgery.28 She was fired when she attempted to return to work after
her surgery.29 After Ulane sued the airline on a Title VII theory,
the district court reinstated her as a pilot with full seniority, back
pay, and attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit overturned that
ruling, holding that Title VII did not protect transgender people.
The appellate court reasoned that “[a] prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with
a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s
sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which
they were born.”30 The court maintained that if Congress had
intended the statute to “apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex,” then “surely the legislative history would
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”31
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Like Holloway, Ulane suffered discrimination because
she did not conform to gender stereotypes. At the time of these
decisions, courts had not yet recognized that gender stereotyping
is a form of sex discrimination.32 The courts’ analysis in Holloway and Ulane was similar: The plaintiffs were discriminated
against because they were transgender; their status, rather than
their non-gender-conforming conduct, was the basis for the discriminatory treatment. The next step in the analysis was simple:
Transgender individuals are not a protected class under Title
VII, so the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily failed. Under early
Title VII jurisprudence, it would always be legal for employers
to discriminate against transgender employees.

II.THE COURTS’ DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court
broadened its concept of “sex discrimination,” holding that Title
VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
who do not conform to sexual stereotypes.33 The plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, was the only woman among eighty-eight candidates up
for partnership in Price Waterhouse’s Washington, D.C. office
in 1982.34 Hopkins neither made partner nor was rejected; instead, her candidacy was held over for reconsideration.35 When
Hopkins was not nominated for partnership the following year,
she sued the firm under Title VII.
The district court found compelling evidence that Price
Waterhouse’s decision not to offer Hopkins partnership in the
firm was directly tied to her sex. The court noted that “none of
the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major
contracts for the [firm].”36 Partners and clients alike praised
Hopkins’s work, calling her “extremely competent and intelligent,” “strong and forthright, very productive, energetic, and
creative.”37 Many Price Waterhouse partners, however, “reacted
negatively to Hopkins’s personality because she was a
woman.”38 One partner called her “macho,” while another felt
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and a third said
that she needed to take a class at “charm school.”39 Another
male partner explained that if Hopkins wanted to improve her
chances of making partner, she should “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”40
Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that
“Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyping.”41 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holding.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan declared: “We are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”42 The Court ruled that
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions”43 and that
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender.”44
It logically follows from the Price Waterhouse decision
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that an employer who discriminates against a male employee typing. Discrimination against homosexual men is grounded in
based on his refusal to conform to gender norms has violated heterosexist expectations that “real” men should date and have
Title VII. Nevertheless, for years after Price Waterhouse, fed- sex with women and not other men.59 Dillon’s coworkers
eral courts disagreed about whether the statute prohibits dis- mocked him by suggesting that he took the submissive, stereocrimination against Ann Hopkins’s male counterpart: the effemi- typically “female” role in fellatio. Mary Ann Case, a professor
nate man.45 For male plaintiffs, a significant obstacle was the of law at the University of Chicago Law School, has suggested
tendency of courts to conflate impermissible sex stereotyping that the harassment of gay men for their receptive role in sexual
with sexual orientation discrimination, which courts have repeat- activity is a form of discrimination against the feminine, since it
edly held is not prohibited by Title VII.46 Put differently, when is based on the assumption that “real men . . . always tak[e] the
considering a “feminine” male employee, courts generally as- active/masculine role in bed and elsewhere.”60 Thus, the suborsumed that he faced discrimination because he was gay or per- dination of both gay men and women is closely linked.
ceived to be so, rather than finding that the employer had penalCourts may be more inclined to protect female victims
ized the plaintiff for not conforming to male stereotypes.
of sex stereotyping, like Ann Hopkins, than effeminate men beFor example, in Dillon v. Frank,47 plaintiff Ernest Dil- cause “masculine” qualities in a woman are typically far less
lon’s coworkers verbally abused him, calling him a “fag” and socially problematic than “feminine” behavior in a man.61 Furtaunting, “Dillon sucks dicks.”48 Graffiti at the work site de- thermore, male employees do not find themselves in a Hopkinsclared “Dillon sucks dicks” and “Dillon gives head.”49 After like bind because characteristics typically labeled as feminine
three years of harassment, Dillon quit his job and sued his for- are not as valued in the workplace as those characteristics
mer employer under Title VII.50 Dillon argued that his was a deemed masculine. Consider, for instance, a 2004 incident in
which California govercase of sex stereotyping, contending that he was
nor, Arnold Schwarharassed because he was not “macho” enough in his
zenegger, criticized his
coworkers’ eyes.51 While the Sixth Circuit acpolitical opponents by
knowledged that the harassment Dillon suffered
calling them “girlie
“was clearly sexual in nature,”52 the court held that
Dillon was subjected to a hostile work environment Discrimination against homosexual men.”62 Schwarzenegger
because his coworkers believed he was gay; theredid not mean to suggest
fore, their actions constituted sexual orientation men is grounded in stereotypes that that the lawmakers in
discrimination not prohibited by Title VII.53 The “real” men should date and have sex question were homosexual or effeminate; incourt found there was no evidence of sex stereotypwith women and not other men.
stead, he was accusing
ing and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
them of being weak or
Dillon’s lawsuit.54
ineffective. A spokesDillon offers an example of how federal
person for the governor
courts often treat male and female Title VII plaineven explained that the
tiffs differently. In cases of male-on-female sexual
term was “an effective
harassment, courts tend to take an “I-know-it-whenI-see it” approach.55 Had Dillon been a woman, he would have way to convey wimpiness.”63 Schwarzenegger’s statement imhad a quintessentially actionable sex discrimination case, and the plies that the only people who belong in positions of power are
court almost certainly would have come out in his favor. But “real” men, who are physically strong, macho, and aggressive.64
when it comes to male plaintiffs harassed by other men, courts The underlying assumption is that women – and men who are
set the bar much higher.56
too much like women – cannot perform effective work. Case
Why did the Dillon court get it wrong? First, the possi- has argued that this “disfavoring of characteristics gendered
bility that the plaintiff was a victim of sexual orientation dis- feminine may work to the systematic detriment of women and
crimination, as suggested by the “fag” epithet, obscured the sex thus should be analyzed as a form of sex discrimination.”65 Indiscrimination at work in the case. No evidence existed in the terpreting Title VII to protect men who “act like women” is thus
record indicating why Dillon’s coworkers believed he was gay; absolutely crucial to ending discrimination against women in the
presumably there was something about Dillon’s appearance or workplace. “If women [are] protected for being masculine but
mannerisms, as he argued, that his coworkers believed was not men [can] be penalized for being effeminate, this. . . would send
“macho” or “masculine” enough.57 The court’s second error a strong message of subordination to women, because it would
was its failure to distinguish between non-gender conforming mean that feminine qualities, which women are disproportionconduct and homosexual orientation. Dillon’s coworkers har- ately likely to display, may legitimately be devalued although
assed him by referring to sexual acts that Dillon allegedly per- masculine qualities may not.”66
formed with other men; the discrimination centered on Dillon’s
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit became one of the first
perceived conduct. The court, however, found that Dillon was courts to recognize that discrimination against a man who does
discriminated against because of his perceived homosexual not satisfy social expectations of masculinity is sex discriminastatus. This reasoning was problematic because even if Con- tion. The sixteen-year-old male plaintiff in Doe v. City of Bellegress amended Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi- ville67 was dubbed a “fag” and “queer” by his coworkers benation, effeminate men—both gay and straight—might remain cause he wore an earring.68 One coworker asked if the plaintiff
unprotected.58 That is, while it would be impermissible to fire a was a boy or a girl, called the plaintiff his “bitch,” and repeatgay man because of his homosexuality, it might be lawful to fire edly threatened to take him out into the woods and “get [him] up
the ass.”69 He also grabbed the plaintiff’s testicles to “find out if
him for being a man who acts too much like a woman.
This case helps illustrate that discrimination against [he was] a girl or a guy.”70
men who are gay, or perceived to be so, is a form of sex stereo84
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Fearing that he would be sexually assaulted, Doe quit his job
and sued his former employer for violating Title VII.
The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding
that the plaintiff could not show that he was harassed on the basis of sex because his coworkers were also heterosexual men.71
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that a straight
male plaintiff could not be sexually harassed in violation of Title
VII by another straight male. The appellate court pointed out
that if the plaintiff had been a woman and her breasts had been
grabbed, most courts would accept this as prima facie evidence
of sex discrimination. The motivation for the harassment is beyond the point, the court said: “When a male employee’s testicles are grabbed . . . the point is that he experiences that harassment as a man, not just as a worker.”72 It further reasoned:
“[i]f [the plaintiff] were a woman, no
court would have any difficulty construing
such abusive conduct as sexual harassment.
And if the harassment were triggered by that
woman’s decision to wear overalls and a flannel shirt to work, for example – something her
harassers might perceive to be masculine just
as they apparently believed [the plaintiff’s]
decision to wear an earring to be feminine –
the court would have all the confirmation that
it needed that the harassment indeed amounted
to discrimination on the basis of sex.”73
The circuit courts remained divided over whether samesex harassment was actionable under Title VII until the Supreme
Court answered in the affirmative in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.74 The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, was part of
an all-male crew on an offshore oil rig.75 He was apparently
targeted for being slender, longhaired, and wearing an earring.76
Oncale’s coworkers threatened to rape him, and one held Oncale
down while another pushed a bar of soap into his anus.77 Oncale
quit soon after the assault in the shower, scared that he would be
raped on the job.78
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fifth
Circuit’s decision that Oncale could not bring a Title VII claim
against his (male) harassers. Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia noted: “As some courts have observed, male-on-male
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII .
. . But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our law rather than the principle concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”79
Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that not all sexual
harassment violates Title VII. A plaintiff “must always prove
that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive
sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination . . .
because of . . . sex.”80 The Court held that when the harasser
and the victim are of the opposite sex, there is a reasonable inference that the harasser was acting ‘because of’ sex.81 A similar inference can be drawn when the harasser is homosexual and
the victim is of the same sex.82 When such an inference is not
available, however, a same-sex victim must offer evidence that
the harasser either treated men and women differently, or was
motivated by hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the
workplace.83
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Although Oncale acknowledged that men could sexually harass other men, the three evidentiary paths to a same-sex
Title VII claim that the Court laid out did not represent a significant broadening of the Court’s understanding of sex discrimination. Justice Scalia failed to cut through the gender dichotomy
and merely incorporated same-sex relations into the mix.84 Notably absent from his analysis was a discussion of male sex
stereotyping or non-gender-conforming behavior. In fact, the
opinion did not mention Oncale’s appearance, which might have
been insufficiently “masculine” for his coworkers and thus an
impetus for the discrimination. Justice Scalia did not even cite
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, which had been decided only nine years earlier. The concept of a man who wore
lipstick or walked and talked in an overly “feminine” way does
not seem to have crossed the Justices’ minds.

III. THE COURTS’ CONTINUING FAILURE TO PROTECT
NON-GENDER-CONFORMING MEN
Even after Price Waterhouse and Oncale, homosexual
and transgender Title VII plaintiffs continued to face an uphill
battle. In theory, under the mixed motives doctrine, if the evidence suggests that an employer’s decision was partly motivated
by sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination (both of
which are not prohibited by Title VII), a plaintiff is still protected by Title VII if he or she was also discriminated against for
non-gender-conforming behavior.85 Yet in reality, in the majority of cases where both sexual orientation discrimination and sex
discrimination occur, the existence of the former blinds courts to
the plaintiff’s cognizable Title VII claim.86
For example, in Bibby v. Coca-Cola,87 a coworker repeatedly called the male plaintiff a “sissy” and yelled,
“everybody knows you take it up the ass.”88 The court granted
summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s Title VII
action, finding that the plaintiff, who was gay, was harassed
because of his sexual orientation and not because of sex (that is,
his failure to adhere to gender norms).89 The court overlooked
the fact that “sissy” is an insult reserved for boys and men who
are not perceived as sufficiently masculine.90 A New York district court similarly disposed of a gay male plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims in Martin v. Department of Correctional Services.91 The plaintiff’s coworkers left sexually explicit photos in
his work area and drew sexually explicit graffiti on the restroom
walls, yard booths, and the plaintiff’s time card and interoffice
mail.92 They also harassed him with derogatory language, like
“cocksucker” and “fucking faggot.”93 But because the court
found no evidence that Martin acted in an effeminate manner,94
it granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.95 It
ruled that in order to ensure that plaintiffs do not bootstrap sexual orientation claims under Title VII, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that he does not, or at the very least is not perceived to, act
masculine”96 in order to make out an actionable case of sex discrimination.
While not all gay men are effeminate, and not all
straight men are “macho,” Martin illuminates the troubling necessity for a homosexual plaintiff to emphasize his “femininity”
in his complaint in order to convince the court that sex discrimination, not sexual orientation discrimination, was the root of his
harassment. As one commentator has put it: “[E]ntitlement to
Title VII protection ultimately depends on spurious factors such
as whether the particular words and actions used by harassers
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are sufficiently ‘sexual,’ whether the victim is an ‘effeminate’ or
‘masculine’ homosexual, and whether the victim pleads his
claim in language sanctioned by the courts that downplays or
does not mention if the plaintiff is gay.”97 Under this jurisprudence, Title VII will protect the stereotypically effeminate gay
man, but not the gay man who “acts straight,” or passes as
stereotypically masculine. This also presents a problem for the
male plaintiff who is deemed to be too feminine by his coworkers, but not quite feminine enough for the court to find that he
was a victim of sex stereotyping.
Heterosexual men who are perceived as gay have also
had difficulty establishing Title VII claims. For example, in
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,98 coworkers called
Michael Hamm, a straight male, a “faggot” and a “Girl Scout.”99
There were rumors that Hamm had a relationship with another
male employee, and coworkers often asked him whether he had
a girlfriend and why he was not married.100 After Hamm complained of sexual harassment, he was fired. Hamm then sued his
former employer under Title VII. Concluding that the term
“Girl Scout” was unrelated to gender, the court found that
Hamm was not a victim of sex discrimination; rather, he was
harassed because of his perceived homosexuality.
In this case, the gender nonconformity suggested by the
term “Girl Scout” was hidden behind the “faggot” epithet.
Hamm suggested to the court that “when a heterosexual male is
harassed and the basis offered for the harassment is ‘perceived
homosexuality,’ then it is likely and reasonable to infer that gender stereotyping is present and is the real basis for the harassment.”101 The court rejected this argument, insisting that “courts
have never focused on the sexuality of the parties involved when
determining whether sexual harassment occurred.” Hamm offers another example of how courts fail to distinguish conduct
and status. Ironically, the court defined Hamm’s heterosexual
status as irrelevant and at the same time made his status as a
perceived homosexual determinative.
Hamm also illustrates that discrimination based on sexual orientation, or perceived homosexuality, is in itself a form of
sex discrimination. Social norms prescribe that men should be
sexually attracted only to women, should date only women, and
ultimately should marry women. “It is essential to the maintenance of heterosexism that these two genders are interpreted as .
. . being ‘naturally’ attracted to one another.”102 Deviation from
this pattern of normative behavior arouses suspicion. Hamm’s
coworkers discriminated against Hamm because he was unmarried and may not have had a girlfriend. This case is an example of how courts have declined “to recognize that sanctions
levied on individuals for behaving or presenting themselves in a
fashion commonly associated with homosexual orientation or
transgender status are themselves a function of community disapproval of the plaintiff’s refusal or failure to adhere to gendered notions about appearance, attire, as well as sexual and
nonsexual behavior.”103
In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.,104 the court held
that an employer had not engaged in sex discrimination when it
fired the male plaintiff for presenting himself as a woman outside of work. In his off time, Peter Oiler, a truck driver for
Winn-Dixie, occasionally adopted a female name, Donna, and
wore makeup, skirts, nail polish, a bra, and silicone prostheses to
enlarge his breasts.105 After the president of Winn-Dixie learned
that Oiler sometimes appeared in public as Donna, Oiler was
fired.106 At trial, Oiler’s supervisor testified that crossdressing
was “unacceptable” in the area where Oiler worked, indicating
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there was “a large customer base there that have various beliefs,
be it religion or a morality or family values or people that just
don’t want to associate with that type of behavior . . .”107
Winn-Dixie contended that Oiler had not been terminated for refusing to adhere to masculine stereotypes, but instead
because he was a man who publicly pretended to be a woman.108
The district court accepted this distinction and agreed that Oiler
was not a victim of sex discrimination. The court distinguished
the case from Price Waterhouse, maintaining that “the plaintiff
[in Price Waterhouse] may not have behaved as the partners
thought a woman should behave, but she never pretended to be a
man [n]or adopted a masculine persona.”109
Oiler is yet another example of the courts’ insistence on
maintaining a gender dichotomy. In Oiler’s own words: “[T]oo
many people don't see the middle ground between black and
white. And that's where people in my situation really are. People
hadn't even heard the word transgender. There are a whole
bunch of people in the middle.”110 So long as courts refuse to
recognize that gender identity discrimination and sex discrimination are parts of the same whole, individuals like Oiler, who
identify as male, but also want to express female parts of their
identity, will remain vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace.

IV. RECENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
There is some reason for optimism, however. Several
non-gender-conforming plaintiffs have recently succeeded on
sex discrimination claims. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., plaintiff Antonio Sanchez alleged that he was
verbally harassed for not adhering to social demands of masculinity.111 Coworkers used feminine pronouns to refer to Sanchez
and mocked him for walking and carrying his serving tray “like
a woman.”112 The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence that other
employees referred to Sanchez using female gender pronouns
and taunted him for behaving like a woman amounted to actionable gender stereotyping.
In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., Medina Rene, an
openly gay man, worked as part of an all-male butler staff.113
Rene was constantly harassed by his coworkers, who called him
“sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking female whore.”114 They
told crude jokes, gave him sexually oriented ‘gifts,’ and forced
him to look at pornography.115 Rene was also repeatedly sexually assaulted; his coworkers touched him “like they would to a
woman,” grabbed his crotch, and poked their fingers in his
anus.116
The district court dismissed Rene’s Title VII suit, finding that Rene was targeted because he was gay,117 but the Ninth
Circuit reversed. The appellate court found that since the assaults targeted sexual body parts, Rene had been harassed
“because . . . of sex,”118 and whatever else may have motivated
the attacks was of no legal consequence. The court cited Oncale, noting that the plaintiff “did not need to show that he was
treated worse than members of the opposite sex. It was enough
to show that he suffered discrimination in comparison to other
men.”119 However, the court’s decision in favor of Rene relied
heavily on the severity of the offensive sexual contact; had Rene
not been sexually assaulted, or had the touching been less egregious, the court may not have ruled in his favor.120
Although the majority ignored the fact that Rene’s coworkers called Rene “sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking female whore,” and missed the logical conclusion that Rene was
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on-duty, and as a woman while off-duty. He had a French manicure, arched eyebrows, and occasionally came to work wearing
makeup.133 After Barnes was promoted to sergeant,134 he was
the only sergeant subjected to extra supervision during the probationary period.135 Rumors circulated through the police department that Barnes was either homosexual or bisexual.136 One
of Barnes’ supervisors told him that he did not appear to be
“masculine” and needed to stop wearing makeup.137 Another
supervisor told Barnes that he was going to fail probation because he was not “acting masculine enough.”138 Although his
scores were above the minimum for passing, and even higher
than at least one other sergeant who passed the probationary
period, Barnes failed.139 According to several other officers,
Barnes lacked “command presence” and did not have the respect
of his subordinates.140 Barnes was the only person to fail probation between 1993 and 2000.141
At trial, Barnes successfully claimed that his demotion
from sergeant violated Title VII, and the jury found in his favor.142 Barnes argued that he was discriminated against because
he failed to conform to sex stereotypes.143 The Sixth Circuit
upheld the judgment on appeal, holding that Barnes had produced evidence sufficient to support his claim of sex discrimination. The court relied on the comments made by his superior
officers and noted that Barnes was singled out for intense scrutiny. It also found that Barnes’s “ambiguous sexuality” and his
practice of dressing as a woman outside of work were wellknown within the CPD.144
One of the most recent cases involving a transgender
plaintiff was Schroer v. Billington.145 Diane Schroer was born a
biological male. Before she legally changed her name or began
“[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who
presenting herself as a woman, she applied for job at the Library
discriminates against women because, for inof Congress. She interviewed as “David,” her legal name at the
stance, they do not wear dresses or makeup is
time, and wore traditional male clothing. After she was hired,
engaging in sex discrimination because the
Schroer told the interviewer that she was transgender, would be
discrimination would not occur but for the
transitioning from male to female, and would begin work as
victim’s sex. It follows that employers who
Diane. The next day, Schroer was informed that she was “not a
discriminate against men because they do
good fit,” and the job offer was retracted. Schroer then brought
wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
a Title VII suit against the Library of Congress.146
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimiThe court granted summary judgment in favor of
nation, because the discrimination
Schroer, finding that she was a
would not occur but for the victim’s
victim of sex discrimination.
sex.”129
District Judge James Robertson
that the Library may
Sex stereotyping based on a person’s observed
have perceived Schroer as “an
Smith alleged that his conduct and mannerisms did not conform to his employers’ and non-gender conforming behavior is insufficiently masculine man,
coworkers’ ideas of how a man should look impermissible discrimination, irre- an insufficiently feminine
woman, or an inherently nonand behave.130 The court agreed that if this
were the basis for his termination, Smith had spective of the cause of that behav- gender-conforming individual”
an actionable sex discrimination claim: ior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is and that each of the three
amounted to impermissible sex
“Discrimination against a plaintiff who is a
not fatal to a sex discrimination
stereotyping.147 The court also
transsexual – and therefore fails to act and/or
claim . . . ”
identify with his or her gender – is no differagreed with Schroer’s argument
ent from the discrimination directed against
that “because gender identity is
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in
a component of sex, discriminasex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a
tion on the basis of gender idenwoman. Sex stereotyping based on a person’s non-gender con- tity is sex discrimination.”148 It determined that the Library had
forming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective violated Title VII’s plain language prohibiting discrimination
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is “because of . . . sex” when it revoked its offer upon learning
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim . . . ”131
that Schroer, a biological male, intended to become “legally,
In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,132 the plaintiff, Philecea culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane.”149 The court
Barnes, had been an officer in the Cincinnati Police Department noted, critically, that other courts “have allowed their focus on
for seventeen years. Barnes presented himself as a man while the label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory language

targeted because his coworkers did not find him to be masculine
enough, three concurring judges found that this was a case of
actionable gender stereotyping.121 Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson pointed to the evidence that Rene’s coworkers touched him
and spoke to him “like a woman.”122 “There would be no reason
for Rene’s coworkers to whistle at Rene ‘like a woman,’ unless
they perceived him to be not enough like a man and too much
like a woman,” Pregerson wrote.123 “This is gender stereotyping, and that is what Rene meant when he said he was discriminated against because he was openly gay.”124 Thus, some judges
are beginning to understand that men who are harassed for being
gay are targeted because they do not conform to their coworkers'
expectations of what a ‘real man’ is like, and that this is sex discrimination.
In two recent cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against individuals who do not present themselves as members of the gender
they were assigned on the basis of biological sex. In Smith v.
City of Salem,125 plaintiff Jimmie Smith was a lieutenant in the
City Fire Department. When Smith started “expressing a more
feminine appearance” at work, his coworkers commented on
Smith’s appearance and told him that he was not acting
“masculine enough.”126 After Smith informed his supervisor
that he intended to transition into living as a woman, the department planned to fire Smith.127
The district court dismissed Smith’s sex discrimination
claim, ruling that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
against transgender people.128 The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that:
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itself.”150
The Schroer decision indicates that federal courts are
beginning to acknowledge that discrimination based on sexual
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression are all forms
of sex discrimination. Individuals like Peter Oiler, Diane
Schroer, and Medina Rene experienced discrimination because
they did not conform to their employers’ expectations of masculinity. Demanding that a person behave or present himself or
herself in a certain way at work because of the gender that society assigned to that person based on his or her genitals is sex
discrimination. The Supreme Court has held already that sex
stereotyping violates Title VII; breaking down the sociallyconstructed gender dichotomy may go past the Court’s analysis
in Price Waterhouse, but it is the logical next step. Moreover,
analyzing Title VII claims would be far easier for courts if they
stopped trying to maintain a gender divide that has become increasingly non-credible.151

V. TITLE VII AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The remaining question is whether a broadened conception of sex discrimination conflicts with congressional intent.
Many courts have refused to extend Title VII’s protections to
homosexual or transsexual plaintiffs on the grounds that doing
so would contravene the purpose of Title VII. For instance, in
Ulane, the Seventh Circuit declared, “[t]he total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption clearly indicates that
Congress never considered nor intended this 1964 legislation to
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex. Had
Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”152
Courts and commentators who express this view ignore
the fact that the Supreme Court left the legislative history of
Title VII behind with Price Waterhouse. And in Oncale, where
the Court acknowledged that same-sex harassment is actionable
under Title VII, Justice Scalia – a strict textualist153 and one of
the most conservative Justices – wrote: “As some courts have
observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII. But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our law rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”154
In light of courts’ gradually broadening interpretation of Title
VII, their refusal to extend the statute’s protections to transgender and homosexual persons based on legislative history
seems disingenuous.
The court in Schroer v. Billington
agreed, stating, “[t]he decisions holding that Title VII only prohibits discrimination against men because they are men, and
discrimination against women because they are women, represent an elevation of ‘judge-supported legislative intent over clear
statutory text.’”155
Some commentators who oppose an expanded reading
of Title VII have pointed out that Congress has rejected proposals to amend Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination.156 They argue that this shows that Congress did not intend the statute to protect homosexual and transgender people. However, the Schroer Court expressly rejected
such an argument, stating that the Supreme Court has cautioned
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against using legislative history in this way:
Subsequent legislative history is a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier Congress. It is a particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a
prior statute when it concerns, as it does here,
a proposal that does not become law.
Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction,
including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change.157
The Schroer Court suggested that Congress may have rejected
the passage of bills that would amend Title VII to expressly prohibit gender identity discrimination because the statute already
forbids it. Thus, the legislative “non-history” of Title VII may
demonstrate that “some Members of Congress believe that the
Ulane court and others have interpreted ‘sex’ in an unduly narrow manner . . . and that the statute requires, not amendment, but
only correct interpretation.”158 Joel Friedman, a professor of law
at Tulane Law School, has argued that interpreting discrimination on the basis of “sex” to encompass sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination would not circumvent congressional intent.159 He points out that Congress often paints “in
broad remedial strokes,” leaving the work of interpretation up to
the courts.160
Moreover, the courts’ narrow interpretation of Title VII
frustrates the statute’s broad remedial purpose.161 By refusing to
protect gay men, lesbians, bisexual, and transgender people who
face discrimination because they do not conform to a binary
gender system, “courts perpetuate the very subordination that
Title VII was designed to eliminate.”162 Courts’ insistence on
maintaining a strict gender dichotomy reinforces the notion that
women and men “are” and “should be” a certain way. If employers are allowed to demand that men not act “like women,”
this sends a message to all people that being “feminine” is not a
very good way to be – reinforcing patriarchy in the workplace
and society as a whole. This result is antithetical to the statute’s
goal of “plac[ing] women on equal footing with men.”163

CONCLUSION
“[T]he world will not be safe for women in frilly pink
dresses . . . unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as
well.”164 The refusal of courts to recognize gender nonconformity discrimination as sex discrimination legitimizes social devaluation of the feminine. Instead of breaking down barriers in
the workplace, as Title VII was intended to do, courts are actually reinforcing stereotypes about men and women when they
allow employers to discriminate against non-gender-conforming
men. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court declared that
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”165 To
give proper effect to Title VII, courts must recognize sexual
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression discrimination as sex discrimination and interpret the statute so as to protect individuals no matter where they fall along the gender continuum.
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LEGISLATIVE
LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
UPDATES
By Shiwali Patel
S. 3406 “ADA Amendments Act of 2008”
Introduced by Senator Thomas Harkin (D -IA)
This Act amends the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) of 1990 to make it more inclusive by redefining the
term disability, and defining the phrases “major life activities”
and “being regarded as having such an impairment.” It broadly
construes disability as an impairment that substantially limits
one major life activity, is episodic, or is in remission if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active. Whether an
impairment “substantially limits a major life activity” will be
determined without regard to how individuals function with
mitigating measures, such as medications or hearing aids. Furthermore, this Act prohibits employment discrimination against
individuals on the basis of their disability and only allows qualification standards, tests, or other selection criteria for employment that are related to the position and is consistent with the
needs of the company.
In introducing this legislation, Congress intended to restore
the original goal of the ADA, which has been hampered due to
U.S. Supreme Court cases Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.1 and
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,2 both
of which have narrowed the scope of protection for persons with
disabilities. By reestablishing the original intent of the ADA, the
amendments should fulfill its goal of promoting equal opportunity, economic independence, and full participation in American
society, particularly in employment.3
Senator Thomas Harkin from Iowa introduced this Act in
July 2008 with 77 co-sponsors. In September 2008, the Senate
and the House passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, and it
was signed into law by the President on September 25, 2008.

a daily average of 33,000 detainees in 2007.4 Instead of providing better health care, officials have been slow in reacting and
defensive about criticisms of their inadequate services. Yet, it is
hard to ignore the eighty-three immigrants who died in the last
five years and the many others who have suffered because a
loved one was denied basic care.5
Representative Zoe Lofgren from California introduced the
Immigrant Detainee Basic Medical Care Act of 2008 with
twenty-two co-sponsors.

S. 1315 Title IV “Veteran’s Benefits Enhancement
Act of 2007 Filipino WW2 Veteran’s Matters”
Introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI)
Title IV of this Act honors Filipino and Filipino-American
World War II veterans by qualifying them for veteran’s benefits
through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. This
Act also entitles children of Filipino and Filipino-American veterans to the same educational assistance as children of other
veterans. In 1941, when President Franklin Roosevelt conscripted Filipino men and boys into the U.S. Army, he promised
them full U.S. veteran benefits. After the war ended however,
U.S. Congress went back on the promise, thereby disqualifying
many Filipino veterans from benefits that were promised to
them.6 In an effort to rectify the situation, this Act will reward
more than 18,000 Filipinos for their service to the United States
during World War II, through benefits and other financial
awards.7
Senator Daniel Akaka from Hawaii introduced this Act in
May 2007 and it has passed both in the Senate and the House.

H.R. 5950 “Immigrant Detainee Basic Medical
Care Act of 2008”
Introduced by Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA)

H.R. 3686 “To Prohibit Employment Discrimination Based on Gender Identity”
Introduced by Representative Barney Frank (DMA)

This Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
establish procedures for providing mental and medical health
care to all immigrant detainees in the custody of the Department
of Homeland Security. These procedures must meet all of the
detainees’ various medical needs including primary care, emergency care, chronic care, prenatal care, dental care, eye care,
mental health care, medical dietary needs, and other specialized
care. The Act also sets forth an administrative appeals process
for denials of heath care to ensure that the Secretary explains the
reasons for the denial and to allow the onsite medical provider
and detainee to appeal a denial or failure to provide health care.
Supporters of the bill have described it as long overdue
given the many deaths of immigrants in detention facilities, and
the many other detainees who were not provided proper care
while in custody. In the past ten years, the use of detention facilities for holding undocumented immigrants has skyrocketed
from a daily immigration detention capacity of 8,279 in 1996 to

This Act purports to eliminate employment discrimination
on the basis of actual or perceived gender identity and allows
individuals to bring disparate treatment claims to remedy discrimination. Under this Act, employers cannot refuse to hire,
discharge, or discriminate against an individual with respect to
benefits and conditions of employment because of their actual or
perceived gender identity. The Act applies to employers’ enforcements of rules and policies, sexual harassment, access to
facilities that are consistent with the employee’s gender identity,
construction of new or additional facilities, and dress and
grooming standards. It authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Librarian of Congress, the Attorney
General, and United States courts the same enforcement powers
as they have under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Government Employees Act of 1991, and other specified laws.
Advocates state that employees risk being discriminatorily
dismissed regardless of their qualifications or prior history when
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disclosing their transgender status or when attempting to transition while working.8 Though many states and employers have
adopted laws and policies banning workplace discrimination
based on gender identity, these laws are inadequate to remedy
discrimination in jurisdictions without protections for workers
who are fired or harassed because of their gender identity.9 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act also does not provide a sufficient
remedy for transgender workers. Although many civil rights
advocates support the view that discrimination against someone
for changing their sex is sex discrimination qualifying for Title
VII protection, most courts have rejected that view.10 Therefore,
H.R. 3686 seeks to remedy these shortcomings in the law
through finally legislating against employment discrimination
based on gender identity.
Representative Barney Frank from Massachusetts introduced this Act in September 2007 and it has yet to be scheduled
for debate or a vote in the House and the Senate.

S. 3245 “Justice Integrity Act of 2008”
Introduced by Senator Joe Biden (D-DE)
The purpose of this Act is to address racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal process, including subconscious bias

that influences decisions to criminalize persons based on race.
The Act creates a pilot program in ten United States Districts to
promote fairness in the criminal justice system. Under this Act,
a United States attorney is designated to each District to implement a pilot program with an advisory group of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and other members of the criminal justice
system. Each group would collect data on the race and ethnicity
of defendants in each stage of the criminal justice process to
determine the cause of the racial disparity. Essentially, this Act
requires United States attorneys to oversee the criminal justice
system in an attempt to reduce the racial and ethnic disparities
that pervade the system.
Studies and reports show that extreme racial disparities
in all processes of the criminal justice system exist, including
arrests, charges, plea bargains, jury selection, convictions, and
sentencing.11 In prisons, racial minorities comprise two-thirds
of persons convicted by state and federal courts.12 Such inequality has decreased public trust in the criminal justice system. According to Senator Joe Biden, who introduced the Act, the Justice Integrity Act will ensure equal protection of the laws by
addressing the subtle forms of racism that continue to plague the
system.
Senator Joe Biden from Delaware introduced the Justice
Integrity Act of 2008 in July 2008 with five co-sponsors.
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ANNOUNCING
TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 2009
The Modern American Annual Symposium:
Revisiting the Separation of Church & State in the United States
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ."
- First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America
Although the United States is constitutionally bound by the separation of church and state, religion has undoubtedly had a major
influence on American law and policy. Religion has influenced discourse concerning a variety of issues in America including reproductive rights, foreign policy, marriage, social services, and education. This symposium will revisit the implications of the Establishment Clause, explore to what extent the separation of church and state in America has held true, and discuss which religions
have the most legal and political influence, why they do, and the effect such influence has in a religiously and culturally diverse
America. The symposium will also analyze recent legislation and state constitutional amendments as well as the interaction between
the American people, religion, and state in the regulation of morality.
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